

the gossip. But that is the way it works. So we all will continue to make it work that way.

Mr. President, as you can tell, I have used this opportunity to share some of the concerns and interests that I have having to do with national parks, having to do with allowing the private sector to participate in many of the things that are commercial in nature in the Government; talking about what I think is a more efficient manner of handling our budget on a 2-year budget cycle, and using the other year to have oversight to ensure those dollars are being spent in the best way they can.

They complain a little bit, I guess, which is OK, all of us do it, about the lack of ability to really portray and get out into the public the real issues and the real controversies. That is what we are really about here—is talking about different views and different directions. And to the extent that all of us can participate in making those decisions through the political process, which is how we govern ourselves, then it's important, I think—vital—to have that information available.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business Friday, April 24, 1998, the federal debt stood at \$5,505,293,755,428.21 (Five trillion, five hundred five billion, two hundred ninety-three million, seven hundred fifty-five thousand, four hundred twenty-eight dollars and twenty-one cents).

One year ago, April 24, 1997, the federal debt stood at \$5,343,217,000,000 (Five trillion, three hundred forty-three billion, two hundred seventeen million).

Twenty-five years ago, April 24, 1973, the federal debt stood at \$455,284,000,000 (Four hundred fifty-five billion, two hundred eighty-four million) which reflects a debt increase of more than \$5 trillion—\$5,050,009,755,428.21 (Five trillion, fifty billion, nine million, seven hundred fifty-five thousand, four hundred twenty-eight dollars and twenty-one cents) during the past 25 years.

THE MISSOURI RIVER ENERGY SERVICES

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, today I would like to share with my colleagues a development that is occurring in my region with an organization that has long been an agent of change. The Missouri Basin Municipal Power Agency is a joint action agency that provides affordable electricity, through its 58 municipal utility members, to over 200,000 consumers in my home state of South Dakota, and to citizens of North Dakota, Minnesota and Iowa.

The agency was formed in 1960 to coordinate municipalities' efforts to negotiate the purchase of power and energy from the Federal government. In 1970, the Federal government informed public power systems in the region that their growing power supply needs

could no longer be met through the Federal hydropower program. Missouri Basin stepped in and met the supplemental power supply of its member communities by participating in, among other arrangements, the Laramie River Station coal-fired plant, one of the cleanest coal plants in the country.

Over the years, the agency has played a vital role in meeting the energy needs of the region. The agency has promoted integrated resource planning, carried out an aggressive tree planting program, and continued to provide its customers with affordable, reliable electricity.

Faced with a changing electricity market, Missouri Basin this month changed its name to Missouri River Energy Services, signaling its readiness to embrace a new era in which utilities will provide many added services and benefits for their customers. Missouri River Energy Services is rising to meet this challenge admirably.

I appreciate the work Missouri River Energy Services has done for our communities and wish the agency the best of luck as it helps forge the future of the electricity industry.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THOMAS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is closed.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now go into executive session and proceed to the consideration of Executive Calendar No. 16, which the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Treaty Document No. 105-36, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

The Senate resumed consideration of the treaty.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, prior to the Easter recess, there was some rather spirited discussion on the question of NATO expansion, and the debate so

far has shown, I believe, that most Senators are reaching the correct conclusion that bringing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the NATO alliance is the right thing to do.

To be sure, there are some commentators who vow they know more than all the rest of us and who make a living on the talk shows and in newspaper op-ed pages, and they have been wringing their hands declaring how awful it is that the U.S. Senate is not taking this vital foreign policy issue seriously. How awful, they lament, it is that the Senate is not paying adequate attention to this important issue.

Sometimes when I hear comments completely off the wall like that, I am tempted to say to these know-it-alls, "Heal thyselfes." In fact, most of them have ignored the debate that the Senate has been having for months on this issue, and most of the commentators have been following something else, maybe an intern at the White House, or whatever. If they had been paying attention, they would have known why the Senate today appears to have reached a broad consensus as to the wisdom of NATO expansion and they would not be confusing that consensus with the lack of serious discussion and debate.

The fact is, Mr. President, we have been working with the administration leaders for 9 straight months now to fix their original approach to the NATO expansion. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate NATO observer group have made concerted efforts to address the contentious issue early on precisely to ensure that the major problems with NATO expansion were addressed by the time 12 noon today arrived and we reached the Senate floor with this proposal.

Last fall, when we began the Foreign Relations Committee's extensive hearings on NATO expansion, I gave the administration a clear warning emphasizing that there was a right way and a wrong way to expand NATO and that, in my view, and in the view of many Senators, the administration was doing it the wrong way.

Some may recall that when Secretary Albright first came to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee, I told that fine lady that while I wanted to be helpful to her in achieving Senate ratification of NATO expansion, it was essential that we work together to fix what was wrong with the administration's approach and make sure it was done the right way. During the ensuing months, that is precisely what we have done.

We have held eight—count them—eight separate hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss and debate every aspect of the administration's plan for NATO expansion. We heard from 38 different witnesses, who testified at some length each, and we produced a hearing transcript that is 552 printed pages long.

In the Foreign Relations Committee, we had worked with Secretary Albright

to make the necessary course corrections in the administration's original approach to expansion. I can report now that we have successfully made those course corrections. When we finally vote on the Senate's resolution of ratification, we will not just be voting to expand NATO, we will be voting to expand NATO the right way.

The administration has agreed to a tightly worded resolution of ratification which includes strict, legally binding language that, among other things, requires that the core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO members, not just peacekeeping or the achievement of so-called nonmilitary goals.

It requires that NATO defense planning command structures and force goals be centered on ensuring the territorial defense of a number of countries.

It builds impenetrable firewalls in the NATO-Russia relationship, ensuring that Russia will have neither a voice nor a veto in NATO decision-making and that the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council be a forum for explaining, not negotiating, NATO policy decisions.

It requires extensive consultation with the Senate in the case of any proposed changes in the strategic concept of NATO.

It reaffirms that NATO does not require the consent of the United Nations or any other international organization to take any actions it deems necessary to defend the security interests of its members.

It requires the administration to develop and to report to Congress on a plan for a NATO ballistic missile defense system to protect Europe.

And it places strict limits on the cost to the American taxpayers for expansion, ensuring that our current NATO allies pay their fair share of the cost and that the American taxpayers will no longer be required to subsidize the national expenses of any countries, including the new members—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—for them to meet their NATO commitments.

If the administration had refused to accept these and other conditions contained in the resolution, Mr. President, I guarantee we would not have the consensus that we have here this afternoon. I would, under that circumstance, be on the Senate floor all this week leading the fight to delay NATO expansion until the administration did accept those conditions, and the professional commentators would probably be criticizing the Senate for holding this important administration priority hostage.

The consensus is not unanimity. A number of my Senate colleagues, for whom I have enormous respect, still have concerns. For one, we have heard some Senators raise the issue of NATO dilution. I am concerned about the dilution of NATO as well, but let's not confuse the issue. No one—no one—

should be concerned that adding these new members will somehow dilute NATO. What we need to prevent is the dilution of NATO's mission and NATO's purpose, and we need to make sure that peacekeeping and nation building do not eclipse territorial defense as a primary alliance function.

I believe we have done that with our resolution of ratification by requiring that NATO defense planning remain focused on territorial defense and tied to the security of NATO members, not vague concepts like stability in Europe. There is none of that in this resolution of ratification.

The most important step we can take to stop NATO dilution is to bring Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the NATO alliance, and these countries know better than anybody else the need to keep NATO focused on territorial defense. Each of these countries spent the better part of this century, remember, either under foreign occupation or as satellites of a hostile superpower. They represent three more votes within the councils of NATO for the view of NATO with a clear-cut but limited mission.

Some have suggested that we take steps to curtail NATO's ability to act "out of area," as they put it; that is to say, outside of the North Atlantic area. That would be a serious mistake. The threats to the NATO alliance are changing and evolving. The day may not be far off when the principal threat to the territory of NATO members would not be a resurgent Russia but a missile strike or a terrorist attack launched by rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, or Libya.

The point is this, Mr. President: Would we really want to constrain NATO's ability to respond out of area with disproportionate force against a regime who dared to use chemical or biological weapons on the territory of a NATO member? Would we want to bar NATO's ability to strike out of area to prevent such attacks? Of course we wouldn't. With the end of the cold war, NATO's ability to act out of area will be more important as threats to the territory of NATO members change and evolve.

Some have said that NATO expansion is unnecessarily provocative to Russia. That is just plain wrong. NATO expansion in no way threatens Russian democracy or precludes building friendly relations with Russia. If anything, it will make it easier for us to maintain friendly relations with Russia, because an expanded NATO will shut off Russia's avenue to more destructive patterns of behavior.

Henry Kissinger pointed out that NATO expansion will "encourage Russian leaders to break with the fateful rhythm of Russian history . . . and discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders."

In other words, what he was saying is Russia will no longer have the option,

should the temptation ever arise, of seeking to restore its hegemony in Central Europe. With that avenue shut off, Russia is more likely to seek constructive options in its relations with the West.

Some others have suggested that the Senate require that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic first gain admission to the European Union before we admit them to NATO. With all due respect to our friends in Europe, the European Union could not find its way out of a wet paper bag, and we need to face up to that.

Giving the European Union a veto over who does and who does not get into NATO would be nothing less than the abdication of American leadership in Europe. The fact is this: Admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO is in America's best interest. If it were not, I would not be standing here this afternoon. These nations will be among the most reliable pro-American NATO allies that we could ever hope for. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that not only do these countries need NATO, America needs these countries in NATO.

That was certainly clear to me during the standoff with Iraq earlier this year. While many of our current NATO allies stuck their heads in the sand and wiggled their fannies, Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic did not do that. They immediately and without hesitation said, "We will send troops in alongside the American forces if a military response is necessary in Iraq."

Furthermore, while many of our friends in Europe pursue policies in Cuba and China—that is, self-serving policies—these countries stand with us in working to promote human rights and to promote democracy in those last few bastions of communism.

So, Mr. President, I am convinced that Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic will be among the first to stand with us in times of crisis and will support America as we work to ensure that NATO remains what it is today—the most effective military alliance in human history.

As I have tried to make clear, through the efforts of many Senators we have ensured with this pending resolution of ratification that NATO expansion is done the right way. I urge all Senators to vote for this resolution and right the historical wrongs of Yalta and support NATO expansion.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROBERTS). The distinguished majority leader is recognized.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am pleased the Senate is beginning to formally debate now the enlargement of NATO. I want to emphasize that this is the "formal" beginning of the debate. The real beginning goes back more than 4 years.

I want to again commend and congratulate the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee for his work on

this issue and his leadership, and, of course, the ranking member, the Senator from Delaware. I note the presence of two other distinguished Senators on the floor, Senator WARNER and Senator MOYNIHAN. They have some very important views which they will express, and they will have an amendment or amendments that I think will be very carefully considered by the Senate.

I do think it is important that we note that this issue has been debated for years. We did have some discussion a month ago. But because Senators felt that they needed more time to consider the issues—at least one Senator expressed the desire to actually go to Europe and meet with our allies, meet with NATO ambassadors, go to the affected countries. I thought that was a legitimate request, so some time was allowed to pass.

But now I think it is important that we stay focused on this. There will be no other issue that will be debated today or tomorrow or Wednesday other than NATO enlargement so that Senators will have a chance to focus, and so that the news media will feel this debate has been focused, and we can give it the consideration that a historic treaty of this nature deserves.

I had hoped that the U.S. Senate could have been the first country to vote on the enlargement of NATO. But Canada, Germany and Denmark have already ratified the enlargement by overwhelming margins.

I must express some surprise over media accounts which claim the Senate is giving NATO enlargement short shrift and we are rushing to judgment. We have not. We will not. The Senate should not rush to judgment on a treaty of this magnitude.

In 1994, in 1995, and in 1996 the Senate explicitly voted on urging NATO enlargement. The implications of this issue were all raised by opponents of that legislation, and in each case the legislation was overwhelmingly passed. But it has been debated and discussed and considered by the previous administration, by this administration, and by Congresses and the Senate since 1994.

Last April, I realized how serious this issue was. That is why I, along with the Democratic leader, created a special group, with the endorsement of the President, beyond the existing committee structure, to make sure that Senators were involved and were thinking about this enlargement question, to make sure that Senators on both sides of the aisle, not on the committees directly involved, would have a chance to attend hearings and go to Europe.

The Senate NATO enlargement group included 28 percent of the Senate—28 Senators. I made it a particular point to make sure that Senators who had reservations that had already been expressed would be included. That is why Senator WARNER was in the group, Senator KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON was in the group. Senator MOYNIHAN was included.

And it did include members from the Appropriations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, the Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees.

The observer group held 17 meetings with administration officials as well as political and military leaders from Europe. Senator ROTH led two observer group delegations to Europe.

I want to say at this point that I, too, took the time to go and meet with our allies. I went to London, and then I went to Brussels. I met with all of the NATO ambassadors. I went to Budapest, Hungary. I have taken advantage of opportunities to meet with leaders from the Czech Republic and Poland as well as Hungary to make sure I understood all the ramifications of this very important issue.

I think the criticism that we moved too quickly or have not seriously considered the issues of NATO enlargement does a real disservice to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Their hearing record, for instance, from just 6 weeks last year is 552 pages long, reflecting six hearings with 32 witnesses.

More than 20 Senators have already spoken on NATO enlargement here on the floor when it was considered last month. GAO and CRS have issued more than 30 reports on NATO enlargement. More than 1,000 op-eds, editorials and articles have been published in newspapers and academic journals on NATO enlargement. In fact, just recently I have seen endorsements, I believe, from the Washington Post and the Washington Times and criticism from the New York Times. So there has been a lot of thought, and a lot of articles and editorials have been written on this very important matter.

Let me provide an answer to one of the questions about the timing and nature of the Senate debate on this momentous issue. Why is there not more controversy? The answer is the supporters of NATO enlargement have been successfully making the case for 5 years. The arguments in support of NATO enlargement have convinced an impressive array of individuals and organizations. Much of the groundwork has been laid. That is why the 1996 platforms of both the Republican and Democratic Parties endorsed NATO enlargement. That is why every living former Secretary of State supports NATO enlargement.

I have made up my mind to support NATO enlargement. I believe it is in the strategic, moral, and political interests of the United States, as well as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Later this week all Senators will have a chance to vote on this issue. I think they will have all the time—I am going to make sure they have all the time they need to express themselves. I think the vote will be decided by an overwhelming margin. And it is a question not only of the security of the United States, but expanding the NATO alliance to these three countries. I think it will shape the future of Europe for many years to come.

I do subscribe to the view expressed by some—I believe Senator BIDEN has said this—that it is a natural extension of having won the cold war in that it is extending the ring of freedom to those countries that would like to join NATO.

That is one thing that impressed me so much. In Hungary, they have made progress toward democracy. They are making progress toward a stronger economy. They do want to have better communication and cooperation between our military capabilities. They are committed to doing the things that are necessary to help their country as a member of NATO and as they move toward full membership in the European Union. I think they would be greatly disturbed if at this point, after all these considerations and after the efforts they have taken after the votes that they had in their own countries, if we walked away from this opportunity.

There are those who say, "Well, what about Russia? Won't they be alarmed by this?" First, it is interesting to me that some of our colleagues who have felt the strongest against the Soviet Union and have raised the most concerns about Russia are the ones now saying, "Oh, well, what will Russia think?" Well, I think we should consider that.

But look at Senator LUGAR, who for years has been trying to make sure that the United States worked on its relations with Russia. He is for the NATO enlargement. He would certainly not want to do something that would harm the interests we share in a developing relationship with Russia. The bottom line is that NATO poses no threat to Russia or Russians unless Russia has ambitions against current or prospective NATO members.

As I noted, Senator WARNER will have an amendment to have a 3-year pause before NATO acts to invite additional members. There is no Member who is more thoughtful than Senator JOHN WARNER of Virginia when it comes to our national security, our military, NATO, and European security interests. I do not think that he is right in this instance that we need this pause. I think it would send the wrong signals.

I think we can make the right judgment as to how much time should be required or when additional countries would be invited to join. But I do think it is important we think about that and that we give all the time that is desired to the Senators who want to advance this amendment so that we can think clearly about what will the future hold as far as other countries that might be considered for admission to NATO and where it will eventually lead.

But we do have unanimous support from, as I said, the former Secretaries of State. We have the support of former President Bush, former President Carter, and a bipartisan group of five former Senators. I ask unanimous consent that their letters be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HOUSTON, TX,
February 24, 1998.

His Excellency VACLAV HAVEL,
President of the Czech Republic,
Prague.

DEAR VACLAV: I was delighted to receive your letter of February 10 favoring NATO expansion. Though I have no authority anymore, I certainly will take into consideration your arguments when discussing NATO expansion, which I strongly favor.

It is my view that Russia itself is better off with an expanded NATO, though Russia clearly does not see it that way yet.

On another subject, I was very pleased to see that picture of you greeting one of your Olympic heroes. You look well and that pleases me, for I have been concerned about your health.

Warm best wishes from your friend,
GEORGE BUSH.

THE CARTER CENTER,
Atlanta, GA, March 18, 1998.

Hon. Senate Majority Leader TRENT LOTT,
Senate Russell Office Building,
Washington, DC.

To Senate Majority Leader TRENT LOTT: I understand that the full Senate will soon consider the amendments to the Washington Treaty of 1949, which created NATO, to admit The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary as new members.

Given the strong bipartisan support for NATO expansion as reflected in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote, I hope that through your leadership the full Senate will give its overwhelming endorsement as well.

I was initially very concerned about the potential negative reactions within Russia. Like many, I was concerned that forces within Russia who perceived NATO expansion as a reflection of Russian weakness could marshal public opinion in opposition to close ties to the West and to further moves toward disarmament, particularly nuclear. My concerns have, however, been considerably alleviated through the open and forthright way Russia's fears have been addressed, although I realize there are still many opposed in Russia, which may be reflected in the Duma's debate over ratification of the Start II Treaty.

I believe it is vitally important to US foreign policy and security interests that NATO remain the cornerstone of cooperation on security matters in Europe, all the more as we witness the continued unrest in the Balkans. Strong, bipartisan support from the Senate would be seen in Europe as a clear indication of US commitment. I therefore encourage all Senators to view NATO expansion as very much in the US interest and give my full endorsement.

Sincerely,
JIMMY CARTER.
APRIL 23, 1998.

Hon. TRENT LOTT,
Senate Majority Leader,
U.S. Capitol, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. MAJORITY LEADER: In the next few days, the United States Senate will be confronted with a historic vote: the expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

We have watched the rapid progress of these three countries as they have rejoined the free societies of the world community. We are convinced that expanding NATO is good for the Alliance and for the United States.

It is unquestionably in the interest of the American people for Europe to remain free

and democratic, safe and secure. Having won the Cold War, we now have a fleeting chance to secure through peace what we once fought to achieve through war.

The Senate has held numerous hearings regarding NATO expansion, all of which have examined the issues surrounding the NATO debate. At least three different committees have examined every aspect of NATO enlargement. Even more importantly, the full Senate has acted on a number of occasions on legislation that would help speed the transition of Central European countries into NATO. The Senate has held several major debates and taken recorded votes as early as January 1994 that demonstrate overwhelming support for rapid transition for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO. The process, therefore, has been protracted, intensive and conclusive.

Now, the world watches for a sign of American leadership. To hesitate would send a signal that the U.S. role in the world has begun to drift. We urge our former colleagues to shine forth with a strong signal of leadership by voting in support of NATO expansion.

Sincerely,

HANK BROWN.
ALAN DIXON.
ALAN SIMPSON.
PAUL SIMON.
GEORGE MITCHELL.

Mr. LOTT. I am looking forward to listening to the debate. I know that it will rise to the standard that the Senate has always reached in consideration of historic matters of this type. I think when we get to the conclusion, hopefully by Wednesday, the American people will feel we have done our duty appropriately.

I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished leader and very dear friend for his kind remarks. But I would say that if the issue of sufficient time to debate was ever an issue, then it is long since to be put aside because, as the distinguished leader recited very carefully this morning, the Senate has given a lot of very conscientious deliberation to this issue, and now we have had a recess of some several weeks during which a number of colleagues, I say to the leader, and others, have had the opportunity to reflect adequately, in my judgment, on the seriousness of this question. It is time that we proceed today. I am confident at such time as the Senate reaches the vote this week, there will be no voice in opposition based on the absence of an adequate opportunity to consider it. So I thank the distinguished majority leader, and indeed the minority leader who collaborated in seeing that the Senate had adequate time.

We have our differences, Mr. President. And I should propound a question or two to my distinguished colleague momentarily, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. But first I think it is important—Senator MOYNIHAN and I have joined in our collaborative efforts to bring to the attention of the Senate our concerns in the form of two amendments.

I will say, although not present at the moment on the floor, there are

many others who have joined with us. Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, I spoke with him just moments ago. He will be joining in the debate this afternoon—Mr. HARKIN.

It is truly, Mr. President, a bipartisan effort of some Senators who spent many long hours working together and discussing this issue very thoroughly. There is not to be found in this debate, in my judgment, a single element of partisanship. It is truly a debate of conscience.

For the assistance of Senators, Mr. MOYNIHAN and I will put in the RECORD today, without objection, Mr. President, a letter from Paul Nitze, of the School of Advanced International Studies and a letter from Mr. George Kennan, former Ambassador to the then-Soviet Union—two men who have dedicated much of their careers to the very issue about which we will be discussing, NATO and, most specifically, its enlargement. I ask unanimous consent those letters be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, THE
PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
Washington, DC, April 24, 1998.

Hon. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN,
U.S. Senate, Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Your effort to introduce a more deliberate approach to the question of NATO expansion is most constructive. We are in a period of great change in the security challenges for which our country must be prepared, but it is also an era in which we would be foolish to squander the opportunities opened by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most important such opportunity is the chance to bring Russia into the community of nations. A sensible policy to support that objective would concentrate on lending political and economic support to the development of a democratic, market-oriented society in Russia. NATO expansion distracts both us and the Russians from that goal. Indeed, the open-ended expansion being proposed for the alliance points toward increasing friction with post-Communist Russia for years to come. Driving Russia into a corner plays into the arguments of those most hostile to forging a productive relationship with the United States and its allies. It is not a sound basis for future stability in Europe, particularly when no current or projected threats warrant extending the alliance.

As you and Senator Warner have proposed, the preferable path surely lies in the direction of enlarging the European Union to embrace the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Negotiations have now begun for the accession to the EU of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, along with others. Encouraging those negotiations is the most useful emphasis the Senate could give to current trends in Europe. It makes no sense at all to enlarge NATO merely "to fill the void," as one senior administration official described the current process. We should, on the contrary, use the period while the EU is negotiating its own enlargement to demonstrate that the Partnership for Peace—which now has more than 25 partners—is the suitable relationship for European countries which are not members of NATO.

In the present security environment, NATO expansion is not only unnecessary; it is gratuitous. If we want a Europe whole and free, we are not likely to get it by making NATO fat and feeble.

Sincerely,

PAUL H. NITZE.

[From the World Policy Journal, Spring, 1998]

MAROONED IN THE COLD WAR

(An Exchange between Mark Danner and George F. Kennan, Strobe Talbott, and Lee H. Hamilton)

(Mark Danner's article, "Marooned in the Cold War: America, the Alliance, and the Quest for a Vanished World," which was published in the fall 1997 issue of this journal, elicited a strong response from prominent writers in government and out. An exchange of letters between Richard Holbrooke, former assistant secretary of state for European affairs, and Mr. Danner appeared in our winter 1997/98 issue. In the following pages, we are pleased to publish letters in response to "Marooned in the Cold War" addressed to Mr. Danner by the eminent historian and diplomat George F. Kennan, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and Rep. Lee H. Hamilton, ranking Democratic member of the House Committee on International Relations, along with Mr. Danner's replies.)

From George F. Kennan: I have read the article twice, once upon receiving it and again just a short time ago, before writing this letter. It is hard for me to express, without pressing the border of the fulsome, my reactions to it. Let me just say that I have seen no finer treatment than this one, both as a summary of the salient features of the conduct of American policy in earlier decades of this century, and as a treatment of the bewildering into which we are now heading. What a pity, I find myself thinking, that this article could not be given the wide exposure it deserves and allowed to serve as cornerstone for a national debate on the problems and directions of American policy at this crucial post-Cold War moment. To put it briefly, the article is, to my way of thinking, in all respects excellent.

That neither this article, nor any other broad and thoughtful treatment of the questions you write about, could serve the purpose I have just mentioned, is obvious. It would be drowned in the cacophony created by the television, computer, and advertising industries which, each in its way, if they were to take any notice of it at all, would do so only in order to tear it to pieces and to exploit individual pieces as over-simplified sound-bites, here today and gone tomorrow. In itself, as I am sure you would agree, what is at stake in this sad state of affairs is a problem of tragic and momentous importance; for the situation now prevailing stands firmly in the way of the creation in influential American opinion of any quiet thoughtful concepts of American policy and hence of any really useful and constructive employment of the great and unique potential weight of this country in world affairs. But the national political establishment, as now existing, has shown itself totally incapable even of understanding the true dimensions of this problem, and much less in tackling it effectively; and one cannot now look to it for anything more than what it is capable of giving.

This was the reason why, in one of my books (*Around the Cragged Hill*) I urged the establishment of a wholly nonpolitical but prestigious advisory body, totally outside the boundaries of the political process, to address some of the deeper problems of the country and to let its advice, conclusions, and recommendations be pondered by presi-

dents, Congresses, state and local governments, and people at large. But never, I am sure, have any of my words ever met with less resonance than did the pages on which that suggestion was put forward; and with this total indifference facing me, I have seen no reason to press it further.

So much for the article in general. Now for one nit-pick and a couple of comments.

You refer to the Russians, on page 18, as having "accepted" the expansion of the NATO borders. Whether this is or is not a correct understanding depends on the meaning you give to the word "accepted." If it be taken to mean that one accepts something highly unwillingly and regretfully, persuaded that one has no other alternative, that is one thing. But if one accepts it in the sense that one has become persuaded of its merits, approves of it, welcomes it, and would not wish things to be otherwise, that, of course, is something else.

No one in authority in Russia today would, I am sure, accept the NATO expansion in the latter of these two senses. In the former? Yes, the vast majority would see it that way. What, after all, could they do about it? They could not oppose it by force of arms. The NATO leaders had said that they would not discuss it. They repeatedly emphasized that their decision was final, and that was that.

Yeltsin personally would probably accommodate himself to this state of affairs more easily than others would have done. He was plainly disinclined to make a serious issue of it in his relations with NATO, and with the United States in particular. But he too, has repeatedly stated publicly (and most recently only in the last few days) that he could not accept the expansion. On the contrary he regretted and deplored it. And in other sections of the regime, in the Parliament and among the military leadership, feelings were plainly angry and resentful. Neither of these circles, after all—neither the Parliamentarians nor the military leaders—had been, so far as the outsider can see, consulted or allowed to participate in the recent meetings between Yeltsin and Western leaders where these questions of the NATO expansion were discussed. The military, in particular, have felt themselves humiliated and demeaned in their professional dignity by this unilateral decision on the part of the Western powers, and have seen it as a shameful exploitation of a temporary and quite abnormal weakness in their own military posture.

The American authors of the expansion, disquieted, I suspect, by some of the adverse reactions their initiative has unleashed, have been at pains to persuade us that the Russians have actually accepted it voluntarily, that they are now quite happy about it, and that it will cause no serious difficulty. The nationalist elements in the Russian public, they point out, consist primarily of older people, now a passing generation, who have never had great electoral support. The youth, they would say, have for the most part supported Yeltsin. And the common people don't care.

Perhaps, perhaps. But the military have not yet been heard from. And aside from that, a process has now been put in motion that can hardly be stopped until NATO has come to take in practically all of Europe except the Balkans, at the risk of making of itself a dangerous absurdity rather than a meaningful alliance.

But enough of that. There is one more comment that I should like to make. Madame Albright is quoted as saying that NATO's foundation, 50 years ago, "gave Europe confidence in economic recovery." I would have to challenge that statement quite flatly. It was not all the foundation of NATO but rather the Marshall Plan, put for-

ward one to two years earlier, that had this effect. The foundation of NATO was actually a detraction from the beneficial effect that the Marshall Plan was at that time having on European opinion and particularly on the confidence of the Europeans in their own economic recovery. The foundation of NATO demanded that very large sums, which otherwise could have gone into the economic recovery process, were now to be diverted into the building up of armed forces in the center of Europe. And this, a number of us felt, was not only unnecessary, given the circumstances of that moment, but directly detrimental to certain of the positive developments which the Marshall Plan had put in motion.

The wider and more lasting basis for my own opposition to the NATO expansion will be visible to you, I think, from the enclosed copies of two of the final pages of my own last book (*At a Century's Ending*), pages that were written, I seem to recall, at the end of the year 1994.

My congratulations, once more, on the qualities of your article, not the least, if not the most important, of which was the excellence of the writing *October 15, 1997.*

Mr. Danner replies: As I sit down to write I must frankly admit that I run the clear risk—as you so well put it—of "pressing the border of the fulsome." The fact is, the beauty and extraordinary generosity of what you wrote left me rather stunned.

In the last quarter century, I have read, I believe, nearly everything you have written. To me you became—and here I am afraid I tread very close to that perilous border—something of a hero. In large part, this was because of the tenacity of your principles (a phrase that should properly be redundant but in our world today sadly is not). Perhaps in equal part, though, it was because of the supreme artistry of your work.

Of course, I agree fully, and sadly, with you that "the national political establishment . . . has shown itself totally incapable even of understanding the true dimensions of this problem." And yet nonetheless I find myself increasingly amazed by the steady and silent progress of the enlargement policy. I suppose I go on hoping that the debate must come; and yet as the days pass the phrases of our senior public officials simply grow murkier and murkier and the public discussion, what little of it there is, is directed more toward obscuring the underlying issues than uncovering and illuminating them. I wish, for example, I had had the wit to point out, as you do, that in declaring that NATO had originally given Europe "confidence in economic recovery," Mrs. Albright not only speaks inaccurately but manages to falsify a history of competing military alliances and civilian institutions that might well have taught today's policymakers a critical lesson, if they had bothered to look.

Now, of course, arguments of frank absurdity hold the stage, notably Mrs. Albright's repeated declarations, as she promotes the expansion of the alliance, that in Europe there is now "no more us and them." There is only one side." Many erstwhile critics, meantime, let themselves sink into bleak resignation.

I certainly agree, and hope I made clear in my message, that the Russians can be said to have "accepted" the expansion only in the most limited sense, so limited in fact that the word "accept" used in this way, might as well be meaningless. The least that can be said of this is that a dynamic process has begun, and no one can doubt that it takes relations between our two countries in a very different direction from the one in which we were traveling only four or five years ago. It seems impossible to say what might have

happened; but I am profoundly disappointed that some of the positive elements of those relations are now very unlikely to be pursued.

By the way, I know At the Century's Ending, and its beautifully crafted last pages, very well. Rereading the photocopies you sent has encouraged me to go back to the book's beginning, and I am now happily in the midst of making my way through its pages once more.

Mr. WARNER. Also, Mr. President, I would like to place in the RECORD excerpts from a speech delivered by the distinguished senior Senator from New York, Mr. MOYNIHAN, before the Associated Press on April 20, in which he outlined with some specificity, and indeed absolute clarity, his deep concerns. And he put it in a historical context. This is a document worthy of each Senator's consideration as they proceed to prepare themselves fully for this debate.

I will read one excerpt, as follows:

And there were reservations. George Kennan, for one, felt economic recovery as embodied in the Marshall Plan provided the best hope for peace. The eventual incorporation of a prospering Federal Republic of Germany surely attests to this thought. History is repeating itself, so much that it could be said we are on the verge of fighting the last war.

Half a century ago, the Soviets kept their eastern neighbors out of the Marshall Plan, so an Iron Curtain descended across Europe. Five decades later, it is the west Europeans who are not prepared to admit the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovenians, Estonians, who have made clear their hopes to join a continental common market, the European Union, which would make for a united and secure Europe. Last fall Ambassador Richard Holbrooke noted the irony, "Almost a decade has gone by since the Berlin Wall fell and, instead of reaching out to Central Europe, the European Union turned toward a bizarre search for a common currency. So NATO enlargement had to fill the void."

Allow me to suggest that wandering in this void we may stumble into the catastrophe of nuclear war with Russia.

This would come about not from Russian strength, but Russian weakness. This is an idea we find difficult to absorb and understandably so. But we had better do [that].

Russians have been trying to tell us this.

I will have the remainder of the excerpts printed in the RECORD, but I think as we proceed in this debate there are a number of documents that should be carefully considered. I ask unanimous consent that the excerpts I referred to be printed in the RECORD, along with the most recent cost estimate by the Congressional Budget Office, dated March 17, 1998.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPTS FROM SENATOR MOYNIHAN'S
SPEECH

The founding of NATO in 1949, then a pact of 12 nations, was an act of rare foresight and political will. Yet, it had its ambiguities. At the signing ceremony, President Truman observed that the alliance was made necessary because "one of the major powers"—the USSR—had blocked the formation of an international force provided for in Article 43 of the Charter that was to have enabled the United Nations to preserve world peace. By

contrast, the AP account of the signing ceremony recorded that the French Foreign Minister, "speaking in his native tongue," noted that the new treaty in no way compromised his country's nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. Rather, said the French Minister in the words of the dispatch, "This is directed against a possible future German menace." Indeed, in 1966, President Charles de Gaulle, having developed an independent atomic potential, withdrew France from NATO and unceremoniously threw our headquarters cadre out of his country.

And there were reservations. George Kennan, for one, felt economic recovery as embodied in the Marshall Plan provided the best hope of peace. The eventual incorporation of a prospering Federal Republic of Germany surely attests to this thought.

Much of this history is repeating itself, so much that it could be said we are on the verge of fighting the last war. Half a century ago the Soviets kept their Eastern neighbors out of the Marshall Plan, and so an iron curtain descended across Europe. Five decades later it is the west Europeans who are not prepared to admit the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovenes, Estonians, who have made clear their hopes to join a continental common market, the European Union, which would make for a united and secure Europe. Last fall Ambassador Richard Holbrooke noted the irony, "Almost a decade has gone by since the Berlin Wall fell and, instead of reaching out to Central Europe, the European Union turned toward a bizarre search for a common currency. So NATO enlargement had to fill a void."

Allow me to suggest that wandering in this void we may stumble into the catastrophe of nuclear war with Russia.

This would come about not from Russian strength, but Russian weakness. This is an idea we find difficult to absorb and understandably so. But we had better do.

Russians have been trying to tell us this. On December 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev gave an extraordinary speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations declaring, "We in no way aspire to be the bearer of ultimate truth." The Marxist promise had failed in astonishing ways. (Thus, in 1996, a 16-year-old Russian male had only a 54 percent chance of surviving to age 60; two percentage points less than had he been born a century earlier!) In the meantime, ethnic hostilities, which were in theory meant to disappear, seemed to rise on every hand. In 1992, Gorbachev spoke to us in Statuary Hall in the Capitol of the problems of Russians now outside Russia:

"One problem which is assuming an acute and at times dramatic character in Russia is that of ethnic enclaves which, thanks to the breakup of the formerly unified state organism are being violently separated from their accustomed motherland, and now find themselves on the other side of a national boundary. . . .

"The situation is aggravated by the paroxysms of extreme nationalism which have here and there generated direct discrimination against minorities. Sometimes this is carried to a point which resembles apartheid. In this situation, any incautious step by anyone, however well intended it might be, can be misinterpreted and used in a way contrary to what was anticipated."

"Any incautious step." As, for example, expanding NATO to the Soviet border of Kaliningrad. Or officials in Moscow comparing the leader of Latvia to Pol Pot, as happened just last week.

Also last week Charles Krauthammer, blunt as ever asked in The Washington Post column: "Is NATO expansion directed against Russia?" "Of course it is," he answered.

If we don't see that, surely the Russians do. This is painfully clear in their National Security Blueprint issued by President Yeltsin on December 17, 1997. It is a 14,500 word assessment of their bleak situation and their only seeming option. "The former defense system has been disrupted, and the creation of a new one is proceeding slowly. Long unprotected sections of the Russian Federation state border have appeared." What does remain and does work are the strategic nuclear forces. And so:

"Russia reserves the right to use all the forces and systems at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, if the unleashing of armed aggression results in a threat to the actual existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state."

Conspicuously, the Duma has yet to ratify the START II Treaty signed in 1991. In a careful argument against NATO expansion first published in The Los Angeles Times, Howard Baker, Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye termed this a doctrine of "inflexible response." A generation of arms negotiations, beginning under President Eisenhower, all directed against "first use" nuclear policies seems now to have been rejected.

A Newsday editorial of March 15 began with George Kennan's stark assessment: "Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era."

More recently Kennan has written in World Policy Journal:

"... what is at stake in this sad state of affairs is a problem of tragic and momentous importance; for the situation now prevailing stands firmly in the way of the creation in influential American opinion of any quiet thoughtful concepts of American policy and hence of any really useful and constructive employment of the great and unique potential weight of this country in world affairs. But the national political establishment, as now existing, has shown itself totally incapable even of understanding the true dimensions of this problem, and much less in tackling it effectively; and one cannot now look to it for anything more than what it is capable of giving."

Now is the time to look to the Senate. There will be a debate. Thanks to the insistence of Senators such as John Warner, Bob Smith, and Tom Harkin, there will be a debate. As of now there is not much doubt as to the outcome. This could change. Public opinion would seem to be changing. As recent Pew opinion survey found that approval for NATO expansion has dropped to 49 percent, with a large undecided element.

But should the vote go as expected, may we at least hope that the people and that the "national political establishment," as Ambassador Kennan has it, be alert to the risk we will have taken? We might even change our mind one day. We might even recall that Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. . . ." Which includes every nation in Eastern Europe. This is grounds on which we went to war with Iraq. It is the law of nations. Concerning which at the General Assembly in 1988, Gorbachev declared "Pacta Sunt Servanda." Agreements must be kept. That is all President Truman intended at that ceremony in 1949. The law of the Charter must be enforced. Such "idealism" no longer resonates with Americans. But surely it is the great standard we have given the world. Russia included. It deserves our attention.

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, March 17, 1998.

Hon. JESSE HELMS,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for the Resolution of Ratification of Treaty Document 105-36.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jeannette Deshong, who can be reached at 226-2840.

Sincerely,

JUNE E. O'NEILL.

Enclosure.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST
ESTIMATE

RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION OF TREATY
DOCUMENT 105-36

(Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic)

Summary

The resolution would ratify protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 that would admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Expanding the alliance would require the United States to contribute additional funding for equipment or capabilities shared by members of NATO. CBO estimates that those costs would initially be in the tens of millions of dollars and would reach about \$100 million a year after four or five years. Ultimately, the United States and its NATO allies have considerable discretion in how to implement the protocols and, therefore, in the costs that would be incurred.

Estimated Cost to the Federal Government

On December 16, 1997, the United States and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed protocols to expand NATO to include three new members. Article V of the treaty commits each nation to provide assistance—including the use of armed force—to restore and maintain the security of any threatened member. The protocols, if ratified, would extend full NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic including a security guarantee under Article V.

In addition to spending for special national needs, NATO members contribute funds for equipment and facilities needed to accomplish common goals. NATO members share the costs of the alliance's spending for civilian and military headquarters, the Airborne Early Warning Force, various science and public information programs, and the NATO Security Investment Program (SIP) that covers common infrastructure projects, communications and air defense systems. Overall totals for the commonly funded budgets are determined collectively, and individual contributions are based on formulas for burden sharing.

Expanding the alliance would entail greater costs for improving command, control, communications, logistics and infrastructure—primarily the activities covered under SIP. The United States and its NATO allies, however, would have considerable discretion in how to implement the protocols and, therefore, in the costs that would be incurred. For example, standards for facilities, equipment, and training cover a wide range. Depending on what standards NATO sets, the budgetary consequences could vary substantially. Nevertheless, NATO has provided some initial studies that lay out basic military requirements.

At the December 1997 ministerial meetings, NATO's Senior Resource Board (SRB) pre-

sented cost estimates for expansion-related projects that would be eligible for common funding. In that report, the SRB identified costs of \$1.5 billion for the next ten years. Assuming that current rules for burden sharing would continue under the protocols, the United States would cover 25 percent of those costs, or approximately \$40 million per year. Similarly, the Department of Defense (DoD) assumes that NATO funding will increase gradually over the next four to five years with U.S. assessments for additional military costs reaching \$36 million in 2002.

CBO's estimate includes an allowance of \$25 million a year for the likelihood that U.S. costs would rise as NATO finalizes implementation plans, engineering surveys, and eligibility criteria for common funding. U.S. costs might also be higher if new member countries face difficulties paying for infrastructure or if military plans become more ambitious. In addition, the United States is likely to incur bilateral costs for expanded exercises, training, and programs to incorporate NATO compatible equipment into the Central European militaries. CBO estimates these costs would be low in the near-term but could amount to \$30 million to \$45 million a year after 2001 based on additional exercise costs for one brigade and two air squadrons every year plus the cost of subsidies for weapons purchases by the new members.

Thus, CBO estimates that the costs to the United States of expanding NATO would total about \$100 million a year after a transition period of four or five years. Roughly 90 percent of these costs would be charged to Defense Department accounts for operation and maintenance, and military construction. The remaining 10 percent would accrue to budget function 150, International Affairs.

Previous CBO estimate

The CBO paper *The Cost of Expanding the NATO Alliance* (March 1996) explored five different scenarios for extending the NATO security guarantee to four central European countries. The scenarios ranged from a low-threat security environment that called for minimal NATO reinforcement of Central Europe to a scenario assuming a resurgent Russian threat that required the forward positioning of NATO troops in Central Europe.

The cost estimates in that report focused on the total costs to all NATO members, including the new members who would bear the largest shares of the total. Average annual costs to the United States over a 15-year period ranged from about \$300 million to \$1.3 billion. However, since CBO prepared that study, the SRB has provided clearer indications of how NATO would use its discretion to implement the protocols.

Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.

Intergovernmental and Private-Sector Impact

Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 excludes from the application of that act any legislative provisions that are necessary for the ratification or implementation of international treaty obligations. CBO has determined that these protocols fit within that exclusion, because they make the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.

Estimate Prepared by: Federal Costs: Jeannette Deshong (226-2840); Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Pepper Santalucia (225-3220); Impact on the Private Sector: Eric Labs (226-2900).

Estimate approved by: Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

Mr. WARNER. I shall read briefly from it the cost estimate.

The resolution would ratify protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 that would

admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Expanding the alliance would require the United States to contribute additional funding for equipment or capabilities shared by members of NATO. CBO estimates that those costs would initially be in the tens of millions of dollars and would reach about \$100 million a year after four or five years. Ultimately, the United States and its NATO allies have considerable discretion in how to implement the protocols and, therefore, in the costs that would be incurred.

Mr. President, I think it is essential that the Senate spend a great deal of time during the course of this debate on costs. Right now, the United States spends about one-fourth of the costs of the entire NATO—let me repeat that—the taxpayers of the United States spend one-fourth of the entire cost of NATO, a membership of 16 nations, and now we are asked to add three more.

On each Senator's desk were the hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee. I will ask a question of the distinguished chairman. I have looked through this, and I suggest at some point today he have printed in the RECORD those references in this well-done document which relate to costs.

I have to say in all fairness to my distinguished friend and chairman, I find very little addressing the issue of cost in this. It would be my hope that the committee could provide such supplemental material that can be of assistance to Senators on this issue of cost. The costs range from a low of \$1.5 billion over 10 years—that is the NATO-U.S. estimate—to \$125 billion over the same time; that was the original CBO estimate. The administration claims the U.S. share of expansion will cost \$40 million per year for 10 years. But the March 17 CBO estimate cost resolution of ratification had costs much higher—\$100 million per year.

Mr. President, we are embarking here in a few days on a decision which will have far-ranging implications, not only to the men and women of the United States who proudly wear the uniform today and tomorrow and for a decade hence in terms of their own personal security, in terms of the admissions of NATO—and I will address that momentarily—but to the American taxpayer, who for years, literally 50 years, have borne the majority of the costs associated with this treaty.

The time has come, I think, that we have to examine those costs and the burdensharing very carefully, and we should do that in the context of the deliberation on this treaty.

Another document that is on each Senator's desk is legislative notice—at least on our side of the aisle, and I presume a similar document is on the other side—and it points out NATO's new missions. It is my understanding that the new mission of NATO is a subject which is under study at this time, yet to be determined by NATO itself, much less ratified by the 16 nations through the forum of the North Atlantic Council.

So, again, we are asked to vote on enlargement of the treaty without knowing the future missions to which men and women of our Armed Forces and the other nations could be committed in the future.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. WARNER. Yes, indeed.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Sir, would you be aware—and obviously this is a rhetorical question because the Senator is very much aware—that the resolution of ratification has a section, “The Strategic Concept of NATO,” in which I read, “The Senate declares that NATO may also, pursuant to article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on a case-by-case basis engage in other missions when there is consensus among its members that there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO members.”

Would my distinguished friend not regard that as a huge expansion of the mission and territorially defined role from a specific North Atlantic Treaty Organization to a global treaty?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is so correct in his observation.

In the course of addressing the press the other day, I said we are literally trying to create, through this expansion and the indefinite new missions, a 911 organization—“Call if there is a problem”—dial-a-cop, dial-a-soldier.

Mr. President, the American public has no idea what is taking place with regard to the expenditure of their tax dollars, with regard to the commitment of their sons and daughters for future NATO service. That is why it is so important we focus on the very point the distinguished Senator from New York raises.

There is an amendment to be considered by the Senate, I presume shortly, by the distinguished Senator from Missouri, Mr. ASHCROFT. I am joined as a cosponsor. It raises the precise question with regard to the future missions—I think we should pass that amendment—the basis of which would be to reestablish the original purpose of NATO as a collective defense of the member nations and not to go beyond the border unless it is clearly a dispute that puts in jeopardy the security of one or more members of NATO.

I hope the Senate will adopt that amendment, together with others, because we cannot allow this organization to become a response unit to any crisis in that part of the world. We will have lost its purpose, a purpose which has been magnificently served for over 50 years.

I challenge any Senator to point out another military alliance, another military treaty, that has served the American people, that has served Europe, that has served the cause of peace in half the world better than this. If it works, it works well; why try to fix it? We would not turn our back on a clear act of naked aggression against these three nations that are being considered

for membership. I am certain that there would be an alliance probably consisting of the principal members of NATO that would come to their defense.

We see a similar alliance today in war-torn Bosnia. I, for one, feel that that is a conflict which represents the type of conflicts the world is most likely to experience in the years to come. I just made a trip to the Caspian Sea recently. That region has potentially one of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world, a world which is becoming desperate for more energy resources. But the nations that surround it are still embroiled internally, and with their bordering nations, in old ethnic and religious hatreds that go back, some, for centuries.

If I may depart for a moment, when I look at the magnificence of the United States of America, just over 100 or so years ago this Nation was torn apart by a cruel, devastating civil war, but we put it behind us, we have gone on. We took a north and a south and brought them together and reestablished ourselves militarily and economically to where we are the strongest nation in the world today. And to the extent that we refer to that tragic period, it is done only now with serious, contemplative reflection on history, which remains perhaps the single most studied chapter in history in contemporary America. I know my State, in which the majority of the battles of this region were fought, is host to hundreds of thousands of visitors every year. But the point I wish to make is that we put it behind us, we reconciled our differences, and we went on to become the strongest nation in the world.

Somehow, that is not an achievement that so many other nations of the world can seem to reach, and they still are embroiled in conflict. That is why I certainly am going to join in the debate and focus on this strategic concept of what the future missions of NATO are, and do it very carefully, and hopefully, even if these three nations are permitted to join, restrict it to what was a collective defense of the individual nations.

Mr. President, I just want to ask my distinguished chairman here, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, What is his view as to the costs and what are the basic facts on which he relies in bringing forth this treaty at this time to the Senate?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, my response to my friend from Virginia has to be in many parts. I just told my helpmate here that we did a drivel here and a drivel there, all formal and official estimates. Before we go any further, I want to get the Senator's question on paper, and then we will give the citations for the various figures. The problem is that the cost of operating NATO, oddly enough, reduces in the early years, and then it will go up, and then it will come down again. I want to explain that so that the Senator will understand it and, to be honest, so that

I will understand it a little better myself. It is things like that. Why don't we get together and get the specific question about the specific figures, and we will give the Senator the responses on which we based our judgment.

Mr. WARNER. I think that is a most reasonable reply. I will carefully draft it up, submit it in a letter, and in due course I hope to have the opportunity to debate a response to my letter with my distinguished chairman. We will try as best we can to at least refine the extremes of the estimates and the likelihood that we can have any consensus—which I feel is unlikely—as to the costs, which I think is a very important part of this debate, I say to the Senator.

Mr. HELMS. Of course it is.

Mr. WARNER. Because we are about to commit the American taxpayers, in my judgment, to almost a blank check for almost an indefinite period of time. So we will go to work on that together.

Mr. HELMS. We will respond to that in particular. I am not inclined ever to give anybody a blank check for the American taxpayers' money. We will cover every detail the Senator wants to cover, as well as the distinguished Senator from New York.

Mr. WARNER. My second question to the chairman is—and he can put it in writing or otherwise—I would like to have a clarified understanding of what the committee's view is as to the future missions of NATO and whether or not my position is correct that it is undecided, undefined, and it is now being considered by the NATO staff and yet to be published. That publication will come, regrettably, long after the Senate action on this question of the three nations.

Mr. HELMS. The Senator is on sound ground in wanting to get that point cleared up. I will help him.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair and my distinguished chairman. I see my colleague from New York on his feet.

Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I first join in thanking the revered chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee for the openness with which he has addressed this issue of cost, which has come to be a bit of an embarrassment. We start out by hearing it is only \$150 billion, and in no time at all we learn that it is only \$3.5 million. But those are not his fooling with the estimates; that comes from downtown.

I would like, sir, to address, just for balance, the question of who has entered objections, expressed fears, or concerns regarding NATO expansion. The majority leader was quite correct that the Secretary of State and others have joined in supporting this measure. It was their policy for many years, but it is also the case that the persons most responsible for the formation of NATO and the formation of the containment policies which NATO implemented, in a far off time that not everyone remembers—I believe it is the

case, sir, that half of the Members of the Senate were born after 1940, such that many would have been aged 9 when NATO was established. It is in a distant time.

Following World War II, American foreign policy faced the maniacal determination of Stalin to extend his effective borders and power—somewhat conceded by the United States at Yalta, in all truth. The Soviet expectation was that there would come a day, not far distant, when Socialism would manifest, with the U.S.S.R. and China leading the way to international unity. But the person who put in mind the notion that the Soviet Union will fail if you just contain them, that the internal contradictions are so awful, they can't pull this off, that man is George F. Kennan. He was a treasure then, and is doubly so now, as he is still alive to bear witness to the aftermath and the extraordinary success of his policy. His famous "Long Cables From Moscow" and the subsequent anonymous article published in *Foreign Affairs* under the pseudonym "X" are part of the history of the United States, not just this particular period.

Sir, George Kennan has said that expanding NATO would be "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-world war era"—"the most fateful error." More recently, in the *World Policy Journal*, he writes:

What is at stake in this sad state of affairs is a problem of tragic and momentous importance; for the situation now prevailing stands firmly in the way of the creation in influential American opinion of any quiet thoughtful concept of American policy and hence of any really useful and constructive employment of the great and unique potential weight of this country in world affairs. But the national political establishment, as now existing, has shown itself totally incapable even of understanding the true dimensions of this problem, and much less in tackling it effectively; and one cannot now look to it for anything more than what it is capable of giving.

I have the honor to have known Ambassador Kennan for 30 years. He has been a historian for 45 years now at the Center for Graduate Studies at Princeton. He does not normally speak with such disdain of those in, as Shakespeare called "our brief authority," here in Washington. He is a statesman. But he says that the persons involved in a moment of "tragic and momentous importance" are quite incapable of doing anything but what they have done.

That is George Kennan.

If there was one other iconic—and I will use that word—person of the age still with us, still active, and in Washington, it would be, of course, Ambassador Paul Nitze. Paul Nitze, active advisor to President Truman at a time when we formed this policy we call containment and when NATO's article 5 military guarantee, that an attack upon any one of us is an attack on all of us, was extended. And don't make any mistake about that. That was the beginning.

Paul Nitze has just this moment written in almost the same terms as George Kennan to say, don't do this. I am going to read, if I may, the letter which I received on Friday from Paul Nitze addressed, in effect, to me and to my distinguished colleague, Senator WARNER. It is from the Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. It says:

DEAR SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Your effort to introduce a more deliberate approach to the question of NATO expansion is most constructive. We are in a period of great change in the security challenges for which our country must be prepared, but it is also an era in which we would be foolish to squander the opportunities opened by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most important such opportunity is the chance to bring Russia into the community of nations. A sensible policy to support that objective would concentrate on lending political and economic support to the development of a democratic, market-oriented society in Russia. NATO expansion distracts both us and the Russians from that goal. Indeed, the open-ended expansion being proposed for the alliance points toward increasing friction with post-Communist Russia for years to come. Driving Russia into a corner plays into the arguments of those most hostile to forging a productive relationship with the United States and its allies. It is not a sound basis for future stability in Europe, particularly when no current or projected threats warrant extending the alliance.

As you and Senator Warner have proposed, the preferable path surely lies in the direction of enlarging the European Union to embrace the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Negotiations have now begun for the accession of the EU of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, along with others. Encouraging those negotiations is the most useful emphasis the Senate could give to current trends in Europe. It makes no sense at all to enlarge NATO merely "to fill the void," as one senior administration official described the current process.

Might I interject here, Mr. President, to say that was Ambassador Holbrooke, and I commented on this in my address to the Associated Press.

To quote further:

We should, on the contrary, use the period while the EU is negotiating its own enlargement to demonstrate that the Partnership for Peace—which now has more than 25 partners—is the suitable relationship for European countries which are not members of NATO.

In the present security environment, NATO expansion is not only unnecessary; it is gratuitous. If we want a Europe whole and free, we are not likely to get it by making NATO fat and feeble.

Mr. President, one other question. I see my friend.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, could I interrupt my colleague for a moment,

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Certainly.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I will ask him when it fits in with his presentation. Later on this week, I would like to speak on this. But I have some questions that I would like to put to my colleague. I have had tremendous respect for Senator MOYNIHAN over the

years, long before I came to the Senate. I think this is such an important debate. I wanted to ask my colleague, when it does not break up the flow of his presentation, some questions.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. If I could say to my distinguished friend, I have about 5 more minutes at the most to comment on the nuclear matters. Then I will open to questions.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank my colleague.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, on the nuclear issue, I raised this in an address to the Associated Press, their 150th anniversary, which was held in Dallas on April 20. I simply put the question: Could NATO expansion lead to nuclear war? The thrust of these remarks was that Russia is now a much weakened country—terribly weakened. They have recently issued the equivalent of our NSC-68, which Paul Nitze wrote in 1950, a national security memorandum. In the Russian National Security Blueprint, issued in December, describes how Russian armed forces have seriously declined, the army has melted away, the navy is rusted, and things like that. But it says, don't forget this. We have nuclear weapons, and don't think that we will not use them if our country is in danger. The whole of 40 years of national security doctrine, from President Eisenhower on, of thinking of conventional forces, of a graduated approach to conflict, of no first use of nuclear weapons—all that is off the table. Not because the Soviet Union is so powerful but because it is so weak. We can almost feel them pleading in this document to say, "Don't you understand our situation?" Back to the hair trigger of the 1950s.

I ask unanimous consent that address to the Associated Press be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COULD NATO EXPANSION LEAD TO NUCLEAR WAR?

(Address by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan at the 150th anniversary annual meeting of the Associated Press, April 20, 1998)

As some of you may have learned, things are a bit confusing in Washington just now. I have had some personal experience of this.

Some while ago, I was most generously invited by the President to a formal White House dinner. Our daughter had never been to one of these affairs, and so off we went, making our way past one Secret Service checkpoint after another, until at last we arrived at the East entrance where a bright young Agent, clipboard in hand, leaned through the car window and proclaimed, "Good evening, Senator Thurmond."

Next came my birthday, March 16, and a letter from the Vice President which began: "Dear Daniel:

"I was very pleased to learn about the recent birth of your twins. Tipper joins me in sending our warmest congratulations and best wishes to you. We know that everyone close to you shares the excitement of the new additions to your family."

The more, then, do I welcome this opportunity to talk to people who make it their business to get their facts straight.

The Associated Press at 150! Conceived by David Hale of the *Journal of Commerce*, still flourishing on West Street in Manhattan, meeting with editors from five other New York dailies. It happens that at that time there was another such organization, operating out of Brussels. This was the network of correspondence bureaus which Karl Marx and Frederick Engels had established connecting various European capitals. Soon they had a Communist League across Europe, and in 1848, issued the celebrated Communist Manifesto.

There is a sense in which the age that followed was a competition between the ideas embodied in these respective organizations. As an early AP correspondent, Lawrence A. Gobrecht, put it, "My business is to communicate facts."¹ To the Marxists and the other ideologues that would follow, facts were merely an epiphenomenon of vast historical forces, which could and should be shaped to great historical ends. That much grief came of the latter is well known. Lesser known, perhaps, is the achievement of the Associated Press and the ideals it represented in large polities in which democratic politics become possible because people basically have the same information, and accordingly, can reach common understandings.

This was the beginning of modernization. We go straight from Hale and Raymond and Greeley to the Internet. The whole world now has the same facts.

The transition has not been smooth and, indeed, at times seemed doubtful. There were many reasons, but in essence they were those that Marx and Engels set forth, namely that the transition to a modern world meant we would enter a period of ever mounting economic crises which would eventually destroy the system that created them. For a half century, until just recently, the world has been frozen in a Cold War between the Soviet Union, committed to this proposition, and the West, led by the United States which, well, hoped it wasn't so.

There was one person, however, who you could say knew it wasn't so, the English economist John Maynard Keynes. In 1932 he published here in the United States a small volume entitled, "Essays in Persuasion." The whole of the Western world was then seized by a devastating economic crisis. How right Marx and Engels appeared to have been; how hopeless our own situation. Nonsense, wrote Keynes. His thesis was simple.

... the profound conviction that the Economic Problem, as one may call it for short, the problem of want and poverty and the economic struggle between classes and nations, is nothing but a frightful muddle, a transitory and an unnecessary muddle. For the Western World already has the resources and the technique, if we could create the organization to use them, capable of reducing the Economic Problem, which now absorbs our moral and material energies, to a position of secondary importance.²

He estimate it might take until about a hundred years.

Well, here we are, two thirds of the way and it begins to look as if Keynes might have been right. The past half century has been one of near continuous economic growth for the United States, and most of the industrial democracies. A story by David Skidmore on the AP wire last Tuesday began, "Inflation disappeared from the U.S. economy for the second time in three months in March. . . ."³ We have full employment and steady growth. Other nations that pay attention are having the same experience.

Just last week our distinguished Secretary of the Treasury Robert E. Rubin outlined an

American initiative to avoid future economic convulsions of the kind that have unsettled Asia. It is time, he said, to update the international financial institutions which Keynes, for the British, along with various Americans, established at the end of the World War II. Time for international financial systems "to be as modern as the markets."⁴ Which means as the AP would say, to get the facts out fast and straight. Work on the optimistic hypothesis, Keynes would say, and the hypothesis will tend to be realized.

A final reference to Keynes. In the preface to his essays, he has this seeming simple, but profound forecast:

"... [t]he day is not far off when the Economic Problems will take the back seat where it belongs, and that the arena of the heart and head will be occupied, or re-occupied, by our real problems—the problems of life and of human relations, of creation and behavior and religion."⁵

Human relations, behavior, religion Hmm. We may yet long for the age of the General Strike! For, as we look about the world, we see dreadful civil strife, ethnic warfare, religious hatred of the most appalling kind. This is seen as somehow pre-modern, in that much of the most conspicuous conflict seems to occur in pre-modern settings. But I would offer you the thought that a number of us have been writing about for years that it is essentially post-modern, and is not about to go away. To be sure, we are developing international institutions to deal with such matters, from election observers to international criminal courts. An international common law is emerging, along with an ever more elaborate network of legal agreements. And yet, the Cold War no more ended, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, than the first European war in fifty years broke out in what had been Yugoslavia. I got into Sarajevo in 1992; one could feel the future.

This comes to us of a sudden, and our grasp of it all is only just beginning to develop. For it was sudden, the end of the Cold War. I spoke to your annual luncheon in 1976, almost a quarter century ago. It was a somewhat sullen talk. I felt we had been conceding too much to the Soviets, and for my pains had just been fired as U.S. Representative to the United Nations. I had previously been Ambassador to India and had left the subcontinent asking how long could anyone seriously suggest that the Russians would hang on to, let us say, Tajikistan. I remarked at lunch:

"Russia, after all, is merely the last 19th Century European Empire left, and it is just as likely to come apart one of these days as did its onetime peers."⁶

This, I argued, would come about principally from centrifugal forces of ethnicity, religion, nationalism, which drive international politics in our age. But there was something more; the near death of the universalist Marxist belief in world communism in the Soviet Union itself. Moscow might then have been dispatching Cuban forces to Angola, invading Africa, if you like, but with small conviction. What I was not able to tell you in that talk was that Arkady N. Shevchenko, Under Secretary General of the United Nations, a man on most anyone's short list to succeed Andrei Gromyko as Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., had that winter defected to the United States. No such event had ever occurred. An official near the center of Kremlin policy had looked about him and decided that the whole Soviet idea had failed. No one in the Kremlin any longer believed in it, or, for that matter, understood it. Dissolution was inevitable. Shevchenko was kept "in place,"⁷ in the tradecraft term, for another two years. But his insights and forecasts were available

from the first, even if few in Washington paid much heed.

This is central. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 took the West almost completely by surprise. We now have volumes like that of former Red Army political commissar, Dmitri Volkogonov, whose *Autopsy for an Empire* was published posthumously. It describes the stagnant decades in which decline became irreversible. In a review in The Wall Street Journal, Gabriel Schoenfeld writes that we should ask ourselves:

"... [W]hat failure of will led the West to behave so timidly, pursuing unobtainable friendship and detente with doddering mediocrities who engaged in the ceaseless accumulation of arms and who recklessly lit bonfires around the globe?"

We have never asked this question in Washington. At least we have never answered it. Instead, we continue to act as through the Cold War is still a central reality of foreign policy, withal there has been a turnover and we now have the ball and it is time to move downfield. How else can we explain the astonishing decision to expand NATO to include three former members of the Warsaw Pact. And only the beginning. As Amos Perlmutter recently wrote in The Washington Times: "the second phase, sometime at the end of 1999, will usher the entry of Croatia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and assorted new and old entities."⁸ Thereafter, the three Baltic nations and after that, who can say?

Moreover, the Resolution of Ratification now before the Senate providing for the Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic has this singular provision.

"(I) THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.—

"(A) THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.—The Senate declares that—

"(i) in order for the NATO to serve the security interests of the United States, the core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO members; and

"(ii) NATO may also, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on a case-by-case basis, engage in other missions when there is a consensus among its members that there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO members."⁹

Does this not read suspiciously like a license to get into a fight just about anywhere?

The founding of NATO in 1949, then a pact of 12 nations, was an act of rare foresight and political will. Yet, it had its ambiguities. At the signing ceremony, President Truman observed that the alliance was made necessary because "one of the major powers"—the USSR—had blocked the formation of an international force provided for in Article 43 of the Charter that was to have enabled the United Nations to preserve world peace. By contrast, the AP account of the signing ceremony recorded that the French Foreign Minister, "speaking in his native tongue,"¹⁰ noted that the new treaty in no way compromised his country's nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. Rather, said the French Minister in the words of the dispatch, "This is directed against a possible future German menace."¹¹ Indeed, in 1966, President Charles de Gaulle, having developed an independent atomic potential, withdrew France from NATO and unceremoniously threw our headquarters cadre out of his country.

And there were reservations. George Kennan, for one, felt economic recovery as embodied in the Marshall Plan provided the best hope of peace. The eventual incorporation of a prospering Federal Republic of Germany surely attests to this thought.

Footnotes at end of article.

Much of this history is repeating itself, so much that it could be said we are on the verge of fighting the last war. Half a century ago the Soviets kept their Eastern neighbors out of the Marshall Plan, and so an iron curtain descended across Europe. Five decades later it is the west Europeans who are not prepared to admit the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovenes, Estonians, who have made clear their hopes to join a continental common market, the European Union, which would make for a united and secure Europe. Last fall Ambassador Richard Holbrooke noted the irony,

"Almost a decade has gone by since the Berlin Wall fell and, instead of reaching out to Central Europe, the European Union turned toward a bizarre search for a common currency. So NATO enlargement had to fill the void."¹²

Allow me to suggest that wandering in this void we may stumble into the catastrophe of nuclear war with Russia.

This would come about not from Russian strength, but Russian weakness. This is an idea we find difficult to absorb and understand so. But we had better do.

Russians have been trying to tell us this. On December 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev gave an extraordinary speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations declaring, "We in no way aspire to be the bearer of ultimate truth."¹³ The Marxist promise had failed in astonishing ways. (Thus, in 1996, a 16-year-old Russian male had only a 54 percent chance of surviving to age 60; two percentage points less than had he been born a century earlier!¹⁴) In the meantime, ethnic hostilities, which were in theory meant to disappear, seemed to rise on every hand. In 1992, Gorbachev spoke to us in Statuary Hall in the Capitol of the problems of Russians now outside Russia:

"One problem which is assuming an acute and at times dramatic character in Russia is that of ethnic enclaves which, thanks to the breakup of the formerly unified state organism are being violently separated from their accustomed motherland, and now find themselves on the other side of a national boundary. . . .

"The situation is aggravated by the paroxysms of extreme nationalism which have here and there generated direct discrimination against minorities. Sometimes this is carried to a point which resembles apartheid. In this situation, any incautious step by anyone, however well intended it might be, can be misinterpreted and used in a way contrary to what was anticipated."¹⁵

"Any incautious step." As, for example, expanding NATO to the Soviet border of Kaliningrad.¹⁶ Or the mayor of Moscow comparing the leader of Latvia to Pol Pot, as happened just last week.¹⁷

Also last week Charles Krauthammer, blunt as ever, asked in *The Washington Post* column: "Is NATO expansion directed against Russia?" "Of course it is," he answered.¹⁸

If we don't see that, surely the Russians do. This is painfully clear in their National Security Blueprint issued by President Yeltsin on December 17, 1997. It is a 14,500 word assessment of their bleak situation and their only seeming option. "The former defense system has been disrupted, and the creation of a new one is proceeding slowly. Long unprotected sections of the Russian Federation state border have appeared." What does remain and does work are the strategic nuclear forces. And so:

"Russia reserves the right to use all the forces and systems at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, if the unleashing of armed aggression results in a threat to the actual existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state."¹⁹

Conspicuously, the Duma has yet to ratify the START II Treaty signed in 1991. In a careful argument against NATO expansion first published in *The Los Angeles Times*, Howard Baker, Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye termed this a doctrine of "inflexible response."²⁰ A generation of arms negotiations, beginning under President Eisenhower, all directed against "first use" nuclear policies seems now to have been rejected.

A *Newsday* editorial of March 15 began with George Kennan's stark assessment: "Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era."²¹

More recently Kennan has written in *World Policy Journal*:

"... what is at stake in this sad state of affairs is a problem of tragic and momentous importance; for the situation now prevailing stands firmly in the way of the creation in influential American opinion of any quiet thoughtful concepts of American policy and hence of any really useful and constructive employment of the great and unique potential weight of this country in world affairs. But the national political establishment, as now existing, has shown itself totally incapable even of understanding the true dimensions of this problem, and much less in tackling it effectively; and one cannot now look to it for anything more than what it is capable of giving."²²

Now is the time to look to the Senate. There will be a debate. Thanks to the insistence of Senators such as John Warner, Bob Smith, and Tom Harkin, there will be a debate. As of now there is not much doubt as to the outcome. This could change. Public opinion would seem to be changing. A recent Pew opinion survey found that approval for NATO expansion has dropped to 49 percent, with a large undecided element.²³

But should the vote go as expected, may we at very least hope that the people and that the "national political establishment," as Ambassador Kennan has it, be alert to the risk we will have taken? We might even change our mind one day. We might even recall that Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. . . ." Which includes every nation in Eastern Europe. This is grounds on which we went to war with Iraq. It is the law of nations. Concerning which at the General Assembly in 1988, Gorbachev declared "*Pacta Sunt Servanda*."²⁴ Agreement must be kept. That is all President Truman intended at that ceremony in 1949. The law of the Charter must be enforced. Such "idealism" no longer resonates with Americans. But surely it is the great standard we have given the world. Russia included. It deserves our attention.

FOOTNOTES

¹Charles J. Hanley, *Flash! The Associated Press Covers the World* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1998).

²John Maynard Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1932), vii.

³David Skidmore, "Inflation Disappears for Second Time in Three Months," *The Associated Press*, 14 April 1998, 12:09 EST.

⁴David E. Sanger, "U.S. Treasury Chief Offers Plan to Avoid Crises Like Asia's," *The New York Times*, 15 April 1998, A15.

⁵Keynes, op. cit., vi.

⁶Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *The Associated Press Annual Luncheon Address*, 3 May 1976, 17.

⁷Gabriel Schoenfeld, "Room at the Top," *The Wall Street Journal*, 15 April 1998, A20.

⁸Amos Perlmutter, "Illusion of an Unending NATO Expansion," *The Washington Times*, 9 April 1998, A17.

⁹Resolution of Ratification, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Report of the

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Exec. Rpt. 104-14, 6 March 1998, 40.

¹⁰"Ministers Assert Peace is Sole Aim of Atlantic Pact," *The Associated Press*, 4 April 1949.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Roger Cohen, "While Kohl Touts New Currency, Many Germans Cry: 'Not Again!'" *International Herald Tribune*, 19 September 1997, A1.

¹³Mikhail Gorbachev, "U.S.S.R. Arms Reduction: Rivalry into Sensible Competition," Speech delivered before the United Nations on December 7, 1988; reprinted in translation in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 55 (1 February 1989), 234.

¹⁴Murray Feshbach, "Population and Health Issues in Russia and the Pundits," (Speech at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on 8 December 1997), Washington, D.C.

¹⁵Mikhail Gorbachev, Transcript of an Address to the Congress of the United States, 14 May 1992, 8-9.

¹⁶Note: There are a total of 89 administrative subdivisions of the Russian Federation.

They are as follows:

49 Oblasts: administrative subdivisions made up predominantly of Russians

21 Republics: national homelands of the major non-Russian minorities, including Tatarstan and Chechnya

6 Autonomous okrugs (districts): national homelands of smaller non-Russian minorities

10 Krais: mixed population of Russian and various non-Russian nationalities, between okrug and oblast

Moscow and St. Petersburg: federal cities

Jewish autonomous region: created by Stalin in the early 1930s, it was intended to be national homeland for the Soviet Jews.

¹⁷Charles Krauthammer, "Good Geopolitics," *The Washington Post*, 17 April 1998, A23.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹Russian National Security Blueprint, December

17, 1997, p. 19. (Trans. by FBIS Dec. 26, 1997, Doc. ID: FTS19971230000280[0]).

²⁰Howard Baker, Jr., Alton Frye, Sam Nunn, and Brent Scowcroft, "Will Expansion Undercut the Military?" *The Los Angeles Times*, 26 March 1998, A11.

²¹"Expanding NATO Would Be the Most Fateful Error of American Policy in the Entire Post-Cold-War Era," Editorial, *Newsday*, 15 March 1998, B1.

²²George F. Kennan, "Marooned in the Cold War," *World Policy Journal* XIV (Spring 1998): 107.

²³Pew Charitable Trust Poll, 25-29 March 1998.

²⁴Gorbachev, op. cit., 234.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Finally, just a few comments. Some attention was paid to that address. On just last Friday there was an article in *USA Today* in which it says:

At a speech in Dallas this week Senator MOYNIHAN raised eyebrows when he said that NATO expansion at a time of Russian weakness in conventional weapons and increased dependence on nuclear weapons could cause the United States and Russia "to stumble into the catastrophe of nuclear war."

Then this paragraph:

"That's not hyperbole," says Michael Mandelbaum of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Affairs. "If NATO continues to expand, as many envision to include the Baltic States on Russia's border—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—we would be moving toward a hair-trigger nuclear balance of the kind we had in the 1950s and 1960s."

David Broder had a column last Wednesday in the *Washington Post* in which he quotes Jack Matlock, who is the former Ambassador to Moscow, a wonderful diplomat, who says:

There is no question that our decision to take on new members now, when no country in Eastern Europe faces a security threat from the outside, will greatly complicate our efforts to see to it that the vast stocks of nuclear weapons now in Russia are never used against us or our allies.

And finally, just from this morning's *Newsweek* magazine, there is an article by Fareed Zakaria, who is the managing editor for Foreign Affairs who simply comments—this is my last remark

so Senator WELLSTONE can ask some questions—he asks, “Can’t Russia Join the Club, Too?” But he makes one simple blunt assessment:

NATO could defend the Baltics by only one means, nuclear attacks.

Nuclear attack and nuclear response. We are right back to where we were in the 1950’s, or we will be as we continue this. We have already signaled we are going to move into the Baltic States. I cannot imagine the thinking process that has led us to this point. I can only note that the persons who conceived this extraordinarily successful strategy in the 1940s look up today and say: Have you all gone mad? Do you realize what you are doing? Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent these documents be printed in the RECORD, and I yield the floor or yield to my colleague from Minnesota for any questions that he may have.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From USA Today, April 24, 1998]

UNLIKELY CAST GATHERS TO OPPOSE NATO GROWTH

(By Barbara Slavin)

WASHINGTON.—An unusual bipartisan coalition is launching an 11th-hour effort to block expansion of the NATO military alliance.

At a news conference Thursday, nine senators, anti-abortion activist Phyllis Schlafly and a business group led by the liberal Ben Cohen of Ben and Jerry’s ice cream urged the Senate to stop NATO’s growth.

Formal debate on whether to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic resumes Monday. A vote could come as early as Wednesday.

The measure, a treaty modification, requires 67 votes, or two-thirds of the Senate. It does not go to the House. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was set up in 1949 to confront the Soviet Union in Europe. It now has 16 members.

Some opponents argue that including countries once part of the Soviet empire will cost U.S. taxpayers billion of dollars that could be better spent on social problems at home. Others say expansion would alienate Moscow, force the United States into dangerous military alliances and blur NATO’s mandate.

President Clinton and congressional supporters say NATO should be open to all new free-market democracies in Europe.

At least 20 senators have moved from being in favor of the NATO expansion when Congress recessed three weeks ago to undecided when it returned this week, said Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa. Bob Smith, R-N.H., says public support is waning as Americans learn more about what NATO expansion might entail.

Supporters say they will have the votes they need. They may have more trouble blocking amendments that would limit expenditures or require a three-year pause before any further growth.

“What’s the urgency?” Smith asked at the news conference. “The greatest threat is a situation where Russia and the United States are not allies.”

Sen. Kent Conrad, D-N.D., said Russia’s more than 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons—“loose nukes”—should be the focus of U.S. concern. Sen. John Ashcroft, R-Mo., worried that a new NATO would become a “911 for disorders around the globe.”

At a speech in Dallas this week, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., raised eye-

brows when he said that NATO expansion, at a time of Russian weakness in conventional weapons and increased dependence on nuclear weapons, could cause the United States and Russia to “stumble into the catastrophe of nuclear war.”

“That’s not hyperbole,” said Michael Mandelbaum of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. If NATO continues to expand as many envision to include the Baltic states on Russia’s border—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—“we would be moving toward a hair-trigger nuclear balance of the kind we had in the 1950s and ‘60s,” he said.

The Clinton administration, which has made NATO expansion its top foreign policy priority, says expansion would solidify democratic gains in Central and Eastern Europe and decrease the likelihood of small-scale ethnic conflicts and of a wider war.

[From the Washington Post, April 22, 1998]

BRAVE NEW NATO

(By David S. Broder)

With their heads presumably cleared by two weeks at home, the members of the Senate have returned to the issue of NATO expansion. They tried but failed to focus on it in March. This time they vow to see it through to a vote. Let’s hope they have their thinking caps on.

Before they went out for Easter, Sen. John Warner of Virginia, the Republicans’ leading voice on national security issues, told me he could count no more than 15 other senators who shared his doubts about adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the alliance. Only if it appears the potential opposition may approach the 34 votes needed to block this questionable action will President Clinton feel compelled to give the American people a clear explanation of the course to which he is committing this nation, something he has conspicuously failed to do so far.

Charles Krauthammer, whose column typically contains much good sense, attempted last week to fill in for Clinton by providing a rationale for expanding NATO more compelling than what he called the “pabulum” and “rubbish” offered by administration spokesmen.

Cutting through all the State Department boilerplate about “extending the borders of peace,” friend Charles says NATO “is expanding in the service of its historic and continuing mission: containing Russia.”

“It says to the world, and particularly to the Russians, that the future of Central Europe is settled,” Krauthammer writes. “The no man’s land is no more. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are now securely part of the American-allied West. Finis. And if any Russians entertain other ideas, they can forget about it.”

You’ve got to admire that like-it-or-lump-it logic. But even though Krauthammer calls NATO expansion “the easiest U.S. foreign policy call of the decade,” he leaves one big question unanswered: If it’s smart to move NATO’s front line eastward with these countries, why not do a real job of containment and sign up all the countries in Russia’s neighborhood?

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright might like the idea. Soon after the first three recruits were invited last year, she said, “We must pledge that the first new members will not be the last and that no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map.”

Five other countries have been promised early consideration: Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Slovakia won’t be far behind. And why not Ukraine and other

former Soviet republics struggling for democracy? That would be containment with a capital C.

Only two problems. Pull out a map and ask yourself how the United States and its allies would guarantee these new NATO members that an attack on their territory from any source would be dealt with exactly as if it were an attack on Paris, London or Chicago. That pledge has made NATO the most successful military alliance of this century. It should not be given lightly, especially if you agree with Krauthammer that Russia may no longer be communist but is still a major power that inevitably will seek to dominate its own region.

None of the current NATO countries envisages sending its ground troops to fight on this vastly enlarged frontier. The security guarantee will have to be underwritten by America’s nuclear force—a prospect that assuredly will motivate Russia to maintain its own nuclear weapons, rather than join us in scaling them down.

More broadly, a policy of aggressive containment will inevitably be seen by Russians as threatening. Boris Yeltsin has gone along so far, grudgingly accepting a Clinton policy that effectively bars Russia from NATO membership but creates a fig leaf NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which Albright promises “gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay or block NATO decisions.” In his current weakness, Yeltsin has no alternative.

But Susan Eisenhower, granddaughter of the former president and a student of Russian foreign policy, has documented scores of statements by leading Russian figures, both democrats and hard-liners, expressing anger at NATO expansion. Even a moderate such as Grigory Yavlinsky has declared, “It is absurd to believe in NATO’s peaceful intentions.”

Jack Matlock, the former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, says, “There is no question that our decision to take on new members now, when no country in Eastern Europe faces a security threat from the outside, will greatly complicate our efforts to see to it that the vast stocks of nuclear weapons now in Russia are never used against us or our allies.”

Think, senators; think. And force Clinton to address these issues.

[From Newsweek, May 4, 1998]

CAN’T RUSSIA JOIN THE CLUB, TOO?—IF THE NATO ALLIANCE IS ABOUT STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY, THE TROUBLED NATION SHOULD GET ITS OWN INVITATION

(By Fareed Zakaria)

The expansion of NATO is a foregone conclusion. The Senate will soon vote overwhelmingly to extend membership in the alliance to Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. But while they’re at it, the senators might think about adding one more name to that list—Russia.

This is not nearly as preposterous as it sounds. Having succeeded in its original mission—to deter the Soviet Union—NATO is somewhat lost in this new era. Expansion, the Clinton administration has stressed, is an ongoing policy that could result in many new members. That will further change the essential nature of the alliance, moving it from a tight military camp to a larger crisis-solving and democracy-strengthening organization. In this new context, Russian participation becomes indispensable.

Few alliances survive victory. After having come together to defeat Napoleon, the Quadruple Alliance soon fell apart in the 1820s and 1830s. NATO has done better. It still exists, has a large bureaucracy, conducts military maneuvers and is used by the United States as its preferred military outfit when force is

required. But its core function—defending its members from Soviet attack—is dead; as dead as the Soviet Union.

The United States still has many problems dealing with Russia, but they stem from Russian weakness rather than strength. Russia's economy today is slightly more than half the size it was 15 years ago, and has declined for five straight years. Its military is in ruins, with salaries, food and medicine in scarce supply, let alone modern tanks and aircraft.

Additionally, Russia's new borders are farther away from those of NATO members—including the new countries of Central Europe—than they have been for 300 years. Yet NATO has responded to this precipitous decline in Russian power and its diminished imperial intentions by bulking up and getting closer. The administration has given a wink and a nod to the Baltic states, which want to be next in the club. Their membership would almost certainly end any pretense of credible security guarantees: NATO could defend the Baltics by only one means—nuclear attack.

All this is old thinking, we are told by the Clinton administration. The new NATO is meant to deal with the new world. Precisely because there are no longer actual threats to the security of Western Europe and other members, the alliance must deal with those threats that exist—whether in Bosnia or the Middle East—which require a new, expanded alliance. "NATO must go out of area or out of business," says Sen. Richard Lugar. This turns NATO into a kind of off-the-shelf army that might be used when its members can agree. But as the war in Bosnia bloodily proved, NATO members can't really agree on much. Out of area—in Libya, Iran, Iraq, the peace process, China—the United States and Europe are out of sync.

Hence, when the United States wants to use military force, it will try to get NATO support. If not, it will go alone. And if it gets a few NATO countries and a few non-NATO ones to come along, it will construct a "coalition of the willing." So how exactly is the new, improved NATO helping here? If global problem-solving is NATO's new mission, it can work only with the cooperation of other great powers—principally Russia, which straddles two continents and has the world's second largest nuclear arsenal and a veto in the Security Council. To try to construct an international security system and leave Russia out because it lost the cold war contradicts the most simple rule of strategy for the victorious. Written across the first page of Churchill's magnificent history of World War II is the four-line "moral of the work," which reads: "In War—Resolution; In Defeat—Defiance; In Victory—Magnanimity; In Peace—Goodwill." The last time a losing power was excluded from the new order was Germany in 1918, and things didn't turn out so well.

There is, finally, the moral argument. We are told that the countries of Central Europe deserve to be recognized as full-fledged members of the West, and their fledgling democracies supported and strengthened. But if one of NATO's new goals is to strengthen democracy, then surely its place lies with the most important democratic experiment taking place on the European continent—in Russia. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary are in no real danger of backsliding on democracy. What they need is access to West European markets. Membership in the European Union, not NATO, can alone solve that problem. But the fate of Russian democracy is in the balance, and the outcome will have enormous consequences for the democratic idea everywhere and for peace in Europe. Why not help where help is needed?

As for belonging to "the West," Central Europe has many cultural affinities with

Western Europe, but surely they are matched by those of Russia. Which has made a larger contribution to European culture: Hungary or the land of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Pushkin, Prokofiev, Kandinsky and Shostakovich? Bringing Russia firmly into the West is a goal worthy of the United States—and its Senate.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I thank my colleague.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KYL). Senator WELLSTONE is recognized.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I came to the floor because I had just come back and was in my office and I heard my colleague talk about the wisdom of George Kennan. I associate myself with his remarks. I have said on the floor before that my father was a Jewish immigrant who fled Russia. He had a chance to meet with George Kennan on a number of different occasions. He always marveled at Kennan's command of the language. My father also was always so respectful of his wisdom.

George Kennan has argued that this could, indeed, be a fateful decision. I want to, first of all, ask Senator MOYNIHAN whether or not he believes that we run the risk—I know he has talked about this—whether or not he believes that we run the risk of really poisoning relations with Russia and playing into the hands of the militaristic forces in Russia? Susan Eisenhower talks about a visit that she had with Gorbachev and that Gorbachev was deeply disturbed by NATO expansion. I quote what Gorbachev had to say to Susan Eisenhower. "Russia has been swindled," he asserted, "and it is feeding into the wild ideas of those who hold 'conspiracy' theories, that the West is intent not only on the Soviet Union's demise but also Russia's. NATO expansion has poisoned the atmosphere of trust."

I have two questions for my colleague. Do you believe that that is, indeed, the mistake that Kennan is talking about?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes. Yes.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Needlessly risking poisoning relations with Russia? And second, can my colleague discern what are the reasons for doing that as opposed to the expansion of the European Union? I am trying to find—I am puzzled by this. Why are we doing this at this time in the history of our country and the world?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I would like to respond first to the absolutely essential question Senator WELLSTONE has put, or so I judge, in the context of Mr. Gorbachev's response to Susan Eisenhower. That all takes place in the context of the reunification of Germany when the wall came down and western Germany moved into eastern Germany. There was a clear understanding that that is as far as NATO would go. That is why I believe the word "swindled" was used.

Now I would like to make a point which I know my friend would sympathize with, and I think his father might sympathize with, which is to say

this: That the Russians have the right to claim that they freed their own country from the horrors of a decayed Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. It was not always such in Russia.

I have, Mr. President, a certain advantage which comes with age. There are not many others. But when I grew up in New York City, Alexander Kerensky would come around to speak to our high school classes from time to time.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Kerensky, the "Social Democrat."

Mr. MOYNIHAN. The Social Democrat. So I had the opportunity to learn early in life—which most people never seem to recall—there wasn't one Russian revolution, there were two. There was a democratic revolution, a provisional government came in, recognizable Social Democrats, as we say, and they were overthrown by the Bolsheviks. All right, now, in turn, the Bolsheviks have been overthrown. The Russians have a right to say, "we are back on course."

There was a rather striking meeting of Woodrow Wilson's Cabinet in Washington in the spring of 1917 after this first Russian revolution. I know my friend would be interested in this. On March 20, 1917, before the United States had entered the war, the cabinet was called together for a discussion on "the question of war with Germany and the abandonment of the policy of neutrality" as Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote in a memorandum of the Cabinet meeting. They were very clear that war was coming with Germany and the President asked the cabinet if he showed call for a meeting of Congress to so declare. And then Lansing had this comment. He said:

I said that the revolution in Russia, which appeared to be successful, had removed the one objection to affirming that the European war was a war between democracy and absolutism.

We welcomed the Mensheviks, the Social Democrats, and we said—I will say that once again. Here it is 1917, the United States is about to get into the First World War—and the Second World War is just an extension of the first—and the Secretary of State believed "that the revolution in Russia, which appeared to be successful, had removed the one objection to affirming that the European war was a war between democracy and absolutism."

Do we want to put that in jeopardy? Don't we want the Russians to be able to say, "We are back where we were at the beginning of the century; we have a democratic tradition, not a perfect one, but we have one, we were moving there, and the Bolsheviks just stole it; we liberated Poland and we liberated the Baltic States that Stalin had seized; we have done things for which the world ought to sort of say thank you."

I spent most of my adult life thinking would we go to war with the Soviet Union this week or next week. It is a bit late in life that that prospect declined and has gone away, until now.

Wouldn't the Senator agree that the Russian people and their leaders have something of which to be proud?

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from New York that—and I appreciate his historical perspective, because this is going to be a very important debate; this is a very important debate. We are going to be making a decision on the floor of the U.S. Senate that is going to crucially define the quality or lack of quality of lives of people throughout the world, because what happens in Russia is key to what happens in Europe and key to what happens with our children and our grandchildren.

My colleague is absolutely right. Kerezhsky was a democrat, overturned and then the Bolsheviks came in, Lenin and the Bolsheviks.

I say to my colleague, my father, who was almost 50 when I was born, came to this country. He fled czarist Russia. He was born in the Ukraine, Odessa, trying to stay one step ahead of the pogroms, where basically soldiers would come in and destroy my dad's dad's business because he was Jewish. My dad fled the country at the age of 17 in 1914, 3 years before the revolution. Then he was going to go back. He was excited because it looked like the czar had been overthrown and there would be democracy. Then his parents wrote him and said, "Don't come back, the Communists have taken over." My father never saw his family again.

When Sheila and I finally visited—I wish my dad could have gone back to Russia after the democracy forces were able to succeed—it was clear to me that all his family was murdered during the Stalin years.

What has happened is that finally what we have is no longer a Soviet Union. We have the democracy forces and, I say to my colleague, Senator MOYNIHAN, let's just talk about Dr. Arbatov, who was involved in the START I negotiations in Geneva and served as consultant through all the Russian-American arms control issues. You talked about your concern over the direction this takes us with the risk of nuclear war, including START II and the CFE treaties. Dr. Arbatov has said, and I will read the end of his quote:

At best, NATO expansion to the east—

Right up to the border—is regarded in Russia as a mistaken policy. At worst, it is regarded as the consummation of the "grand design" to encircle and isolate Russia, establishing strategic superiority and finally destroying Russia, ending once and for all Russia's role as a European power.

Let me finish with this quote. Dr. Arbatov, by the way, is a leader of the democracy forces. That is what he is about. The people whom I talked with in Russia, the people whom I believe the American citizens are most committed to are the democracy forces. They are deathly afraid of what is about to happen if we adopt this agreement.

Let me quote Dr. Arbatov again:

NATO expansion will plant a permanent seed of mistrust between the United States and Russia. It will worsen everything from nuclear arms control to policies in Iraq and Iran. It will push Moscow into alliance with China and rogue regimes.

I say to my colleague, yes, I think this undercuts the democracy forces, and it also undercuts a people who are proud of overthrowing communism and are now trying to build a market economy and build a democracy and who had no inkling whatsoever that what we would now do is expand what is a military alliance eastern right up to their border and redivide Europe.

This is exactly the opposite of what they thought would happen. The European Union, that is where we should be using our leverage as a nation—expand the European Union. That is about markets, that is about democracy. But I fear that people in Russia feel betrayed by this, and I am even more frightened that the very forces that we do not want to see in power in a post-Yeltsin Russia—and there will be a post-Yeltsin Russia—will come into ascendancy as a result of this. This is a very, I think, serious mistake we are about to make.

I ask my colleague this question. One American scholar has defined NATO expansion as "a bad idea whose time has come."

Can my colleague explain to me why this is—I think it is a bad idea. Why has its time come? Why are we doing this? In other words, we know what the risk is. We know that this is a real risk for democracy in Russia. We know that this is a real risk for arms agreements. We know this is a real risk in perhaps setting off just the opposite of what all of us hope for, which is the use of nuclear weapons, the unthinkable. We know what the risks are—poisoning relations with Russia, instability in Europe. So the question is, why are we doing this? Why are we expanding a military alliance? Is there a military threat?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I would like to say here that we have an element of candor that is not always forthcoming in these matters. Ambassador Holbrooke said, what? Because Brussels won't expand the European Union, NATO expansion must fill a void. Is it filling a void because they cannot agree on a common agricultural policy in Europe? So filling a void to bring back the prospect of nuclear war, is that worth it? I know there are a lot of farmers in Poland. Well, there are a lot of farmers in Spain, too, and Ireland, too, and they got into the European Union and they have lived through it.

The Europeans owe us something. Half-half—the defense outlays of the United States for the last half century, Mr. President, have gone to protect Europe. I was there. I was called back in the Navy when the Korean War broke out for service in Europe in case that conflict became global. Oh, the ruin. But we, by God, were there, and the

submarine pens the British had managed to get a few bombs through, just testing. We saved those people. And now because the common agricultural policy would be a little bit inconvenient for them, we are proposing to expand NATO as a surrogate. And may I make a point to my friend, I am sure he knows it, but not everybody does. We say we are expanding the borders of NATO toward Russia. My learned friend knows there is a Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea which is called Kaliningrad, named after one of the original members of the politburo—Stalingrad is gone, Leningrad is gone, Kaliningrad continues—sitting right next to Poland.

We are not getting close, Mr. President, to the borders of Russia. We are on the borders of Russia. There it is, that little yellow spot—yellow for Russia. It says "Russia."

Mr. WELLSTONE. Might I ask my colleague, what would be the reaction of people in our country if there was a Russian military alliance that came to the border of the United States?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Nova Scotia?

Mr. WELLSTONE. Nova Scotia.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Well, there would be a lot more people on the Senate floor this afternoon. But, I mean, I could not agree more. You heard George Kennan say, in fact, "Is this the only thing our policymakers in Washington can think to do?"

Now, the creating of NATO was a big event. It was a proposal by Ernest Bevin, who understood these things in a way that not every American did. There is a nice story that I think Senator WELLSTONE will enjoy, and you, Mr. President.

As some people recall—I recall, but I was in the Navy. After V-E Day, the British held an election. They had not had one for 10 years. Suddenly, Churchill and all his Cabinet—out they go. And in comes the Labor Government. Big change. Clement Attlee is Prime Minister. And Ernest Bevin, the sometime head of the Transport and General Workers Union, becomes Foreign Secretary. So he goes off to Potsdam, which is just a suburb of Berlin. And there is Stalin and all his people. And Truman—I doubt whether Harry S. Truman ever met someone he knew to be a Communist until he got to Potsdam and was introduced to Stalin. They do not have many of them in Kansas City. We had lots of them on the west side of Manhattan, but that is another matter.

This story is apocryphal but true. Bevin comes back from Potsdam, and he is in on the floor of the House of Commons. And a friend comes up to him, a parliamentarian, and says, "Ernie, what are those Soviets like?" And he says, "Well, you know, they're just like the bloody Communists."

I mean, there are no shortage of Communists in the Transport and General Workers Union. He could spot their behavior and so forth. It was he who said we had to form a military alliance. The thing nobody in this world

wanted was more armies and navies, and so forth, but he knew. And our people responded.

Harry Truman, who did not know there was an atom bomb being built as Vice President, who had very little contact with any of this—he had been in Europe in World War I—supported it. God, there was a golden age.

Now, all we can do is expand NATO because the common agriculture policy is making it difficult in Brussels to include the Czech Republic and Poland. That is not the standards we set for ourselves when the cold war began.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I say to Senator MOYNIHAN, could I ask you one final question?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Sure.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I say to my colleagues who are on the floor, I know other colleagues want to speak, and I am sensitive to your schedules. But I do think this is an important discussion and I never had the chance to do this in the 7 years I have been in the Senate.

I said I really believe that George Kennan has made enormous contributions to the world. I think he is as profound a thinker and as knowledgeable a person about Russia as there is, and I put my colleague, Senator MOYNIHAN, in the same tradition.

There are other points that I will make later on in the debate I have other than what I have made today. I find it interesting. There was a piece in the New York Times, front page story, about all the ways in which some of the bigger companies, military contractor companies have now poured money into lobbying on behalf of this.

That makes me nervous because I really do not want to see this become kind of a proliferation of weapons in some of the new member countries. And then what will be the Russians' response? I have concerns about that. Other Senators will talk about the cost, what will be the cost.

But we are talking, I say to Senator MOYNIHAN, about what I am most worried about, which I think it is a profound mistake, because I believe that, again, this needlessly risked poisoning relations with Russia in creating the very kind of instability we do not want to see. I think that we do not want to see the people who are prodemocracy forces undercut.

But my question is this. You can help me out. I come from a State—I will tell you this is probably maybe the most difficult for me. Actually, the welfare vote was the most difficult for me on political grounds, but this may be the second most difficult vote, because I have met with some wonderful people—Czech community, Bulgarian community, Polish community, we have big populations in Minnesota.

They have been wonderful supporters of me, I say to the Senator. They are really disappointed in me. And I wonder, what would you say to some pretty wonderful people in our country who feel so strongly that as a matter of

kind of almost historical justice that these countries should have membership in NATO? How do you speak to their strongly held views, to how emotional—and I do not mean that in a negative way; I am not putting people down at all—they feel about this? How do you respond to them? What do you say based upon your knowledge, your experience in public service, your sense of history? Do you understand my question?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I understand your question perfectly, sir, because it is my question.

And I say this—and I would recommend to anyone who wishes to think about it—if you love Poland, if you think that solidarity was the first real assault on the Soviet system, if you think that Pope John Paul has meant more in advancing freedoms in this age than anybody you can think of, do not do this to Poland. See that Poland is in the European Union, give them a common market, give them the same currency that the Danes will have and the Spanish will have. Give them access to a global market they have never been allowed into. Give them a common agricultural policy that will give their farmers a living.

That is what they deserve. And that is what is being denied them by the bureaucracies, as bureaucracies will do. And what we do not want is—Poland has had enough in this 20th century. We do not want another period of hostilities that could lead not just to war but to annihilation.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank my colleague.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I see my distinguished friend from Indiana is on the floor. I have to apologize. In the colloquy with Senator WELLSTONE, I did not realize he had characteristically quietly come aboard.

I yield the floor, and I look forward to his remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LUGAR. I thank the distinguished Senator from New York and the distinguished Senator from Minnesota for a very constructive and helpful colloquy. I enjoyed it.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. LUGAR. I ask unanimous consent that Kevin Johnson, a fellow in my office, be permitted floor privileges for the duration of debate on the Protocols of Accession to the NATO Treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Senate has begun a historical debate over NATO's future, one that surely will reverberate for many years to come. I believe we have a historical window of opportunity to take steps which will secure European peace and stability and which will lock in the freedom and independence won in the revolutions of 1989 and the collapse of communism.

If the Senate ratifies enlargement, we will have set the foundation for dec-

ades of European peace and prosperity; but if we fail, historians may look back at the early post-cold-war period as a tragic loss of opportunities. The more distant we are from the days of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, the clearer it becomes that we have entered a new era. But dangers still abound in post-cold-war Europe. The revolutions of 1989 not only led to the collapse of communism but also to the end of the peace orders established after two world wars.

What is at stake here and now is order and stability in Europe as a whole. And that is why American interests are involved. Mr. President, NATO cannot by itself solve all of Europe's problems, but without a stable security framework, we run the risk that reform and democracy in Eastern Europe will not persist but will instead be undercut by destructive forces of nationalism and insecurity.

The failure of democracy in the east could not help but have a profound consequence for democracy in the continent's western half as well. If history teaches us anything, it is that the United States is always drawn into such European conflicts because our vital interests are ultimately engaged. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are democratic, free-market nations with professional militaries under civilian control. In addition to contributing to NATO's core mission of collective defense, they are ready and able to support American and allied interests beyond their borders as they have demonstrated in Desert Storm, in Haiti, and in Bosnia.

Accession of these three democracies to NATO will eliminate immoral and destabilizing dividing lines in Europe. I point out, Mr. President, those lines are there—not put there by us—and extend stability into a region long troubled by conflict.

A stable and peaceful Europe will benefit all of Europe, including Russia and non-NATO countries. Expanding peace and stability in Europe lessens the chance of the United States again being pulled into conflicts in the region. NATO enlargement provides an opportunity for the alliance to be proactive in shaping a stable and strategic landscape in Europe.

Mr. President, it has been argued that we are rushing into 1992 enlargement. I have advocated, among others, expanding the NATO alliance since 1992. I have had countless discussions on the subject with colleagues here in the Senate and in the administration since that time. I have traveled to Europe and to the former Soviet Union many times in recent years, and the issue of NATO enlargement has been one of the most debated and talked about issues throughout that period of time.

As an early advocate of enlargement, I do not agree that the Senate is rushing to expand NATO. Rather, I suggest that supporters and critics of enlargement have been engaged in a debate

and discussion of this topic for at least 6 years—hardly a hurried process. NATO enlargement has been endorsed by Congress each year since 1994. NATO enlargement was endorsed in the Contract With America as part of the 1996 Republican Presidential platform.

Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee held 12 hearings over the past 4 years to hear from nearly 50 supporters and opponents of the policy of enlargement. In fact, I held the first hearing on the subject as chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee. Not only has the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings and studied the subject, but so has the Armed Services Committee, Intelligence Committee, and Budget and Appropriations Committees.

These committee hearings have thoroughly examined concerns about NATO expansion, including projected cost, how we deal with Russia, and the future mission of NATO. The committee's resolution addresses all of these points and was reported by a vote of 16-2. Our chairman, Senator HELMS, and distinguished ranking member, Senator BIDEN, have done an excellent job in constructing a very thoughtful and balanced resolution of ratification.

If Senate committee hearings and deliberations are not enough, Senators LOTT and DASCHLE organized a Senate NATO observer group, which had 28 members and met 17 times to study and discuss this important foreign policy initiative. NATO enlargement has received endorsements from every living U.S. Secretary of State, numerous former Secretaries of Defense and National Security Advisers, and more than 60 flag and general officers, including 5 distinguished former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This has been a long, serious debate among Members of Congress, the administration, and our allies regarding the benefits and possible pitfalls of enlargement. There has been no rush to judgment. We are now entering the final stage of the process; namely, Senate debate and a vote on the merits of NATO enlargement. I have listened carefully to critics who suggest that there is no threat at the present time and thus we should not expand NATO now. They suggest there will be plenty of time to expand the alliance should a new enemy or threat appear on the horizon. I strongly disagree with that point of view. We have learned that the weapons used in Desert Storm were envisioned, planned, and produced in the 1970s. Thus, the systems which allowed us to triumph in the Persian Gulf are 20 to 25 years old.

The organization and infrastructure to meet future threats must have a similar root structure. We must begin to construct an alliance which can meet the future and undetermined threats. Our military experts and top strategic thinkers believe an alliance which includes Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be better able to meet those challenges.

What might those challenges be? Perhaps the emergence of a hostile regional power, a threat from the Middle East or from North Africa, a resurgent imperialist Russia, nationalist or religious instability, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The systems needed to deter or defeat such future threats must begin to be constructed long before they can be expected to operate effectively. One cannot expect an alliance to be shelved during times of peace and simply dusted off when the threats emerge. The alliance must begin to lay the foundation which will prepare us to meet an uncertain future. In my mind, expanding the zone of peace and security in Europe and adding three new willing, enthusiastic members will contribute to that preparedness.

Four of our NATO allies—Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Germany—have already ratified the protocols of enlargement. It is time for the Senate to act and to show leadership on this issue.

NATO's open-door entrance policy established by article 10 of the Washington treaty—which should not be misunderstood as an open-ended policy—has given countries of Central and Eastern Europe the incentive to accelerate reforms, to settle disputes with neighbors, and to increase regional cooperation. They have done so magnificently.

To retract the open-door policy, as some have suggested, would risk undermining tremendous gains that have been made for peace throughout the region. The result of a "closed-door" policy would be the creation of new dividing lines across Europe. Those nations outside might become disillusioned and insecure and, thus, inclined to adopt the competitive and destabilizing security policies of Europe's past.

NATO's decision to enlarge in stages recognizes that all new democracies and applicants in Europe are not equally ready or willing to be security allies. Some states may never be ready. At the same time, NATO must not prejudge the future or draw new lines in Europe by pre-emptively excluding or setting time lines for future cooperation or membership.

The selection of future NATO members should depend on: (1) a determination by NATO members of their strategic interests; (2) NATO's perception of threats to security and stability; and (3) actions taken by prospective members to complete their democratic transitions and to harmonize their policies with NATO's political aims and security policies.

This would clarify the security expectations of non-NATO members. It would make clear that it is the intention of the United States that NATO remain a serious defensive military alliance and not slip into a loose collective security society. It suggests that enlargement will be a careful, deliberate process, with consideration of all security interests. Finally, it draws

again on the principle of reciprocity, both to encourage prospective members to align themselves with NATO's values and policies and to signal that threats will be counterproductive.

Intellectually, I can understand the concern that we must not allow the NATO Alliance to collapse under the strains, produced by multitudes of new members. But, neither can we seek a quick, painless remedy for serious debate and oversight of American foreign policy through "strategic pauses" or "NATO linkages". The best way to ensure the continued vitality of NATO is for the United States to consider and debate the qualifications and potential ramifications of new members on a country-by-country or a stage-by-stage basis.

NATO's open-door policy has served the Alliance well for fifty years. The Senate has always and will retain its prerogatives and powers in the area of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Alliance. A two-thirds Senate majority is the best form of balance and oversight we can produce without treading on executive privilege.

In the weeks leading up to the Alliance's Madrid summit in July 1997, many of our current European allies pushed for a larger initial number of states to join NATO. The President decided to keep the initial round to three members. This was not a popular decision with some of our allies, who had championed the cause of Slovenia and Romania. And while neither the Administration nor the Senate can prevent other current members of the Alliance from promoting the membership of additional states, both have the ability to prevent the accession of other candidates—the

Administration through its predominant voice in the North Atlantic Council and the Senate through its role in approving modifications to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Consequently, I do not believe a legislatively mandated pause is in the interest of this country, this institution, or the NATO Alliance.

Some propose that NATO enlargement be bound to the expansion of the European Union (EU). EU enlargement is highly desirable in its own right, but must not be a condition to NATO membership. It would restrict a trans-Atlantic Alliance led by the U.S. to the political exigencies of a strictly European organization.

I point out again, Mr. President, that NATO is the organization in which the United States is involved and in which we offer leadership, not the European union.

The transfer of security decision-making power to an institution which has been unable to develop a common security policy and failed to stop the fighting in the former Yugoslavia would not bode well for the future of European security. The EU's decision-making procedures are notorious for being cumbersome and slow. Moreover, the consensus-building process they

serve to tend to produce outcomes expressing the lowest common denominator. All of these traits are antithetical to the demands of a military alliance which places a premium on timely, decisive action rather than first meeting the test of political acceptability to a diverse relationship.

Finally, subordinating NATO to the EU in this manner would make the Alliance, not a cornerstone of European security, but an appendage. The role of the U.S., Canada, and Turkey, none of whom are members of the EU, would be significantly diminished in the enlargement process. This potential "back-door" approach to enlargement is fraught with dangers; I prefer the "front-door", the "open-door".

Critics assert that NATO enlargement repeats the mistake of the Versailles Treaty by mistreating Russia. One should be careful with historical analogies. NATO enlargement is not a punishment or isolation of Russia. During the period that NATO enlargement has proceeded, President Yeltsin was re-elected; reformers were elevated in government; President Yeltsin pledged to press for ratification of START II and then to pursue deeper nuclear arms reductions in START III; the Russian Duma approved the Chemical Weapons Convention; Russian troops continue their participation in Bosnia; the West has extended some \$100 billion since 1991 to assist Russian democratic and economic reforms, and over \$2 billion in weapons dismantlement and security.

NATOP members will continue to have both common and divergent interests with Russia, whether NATO enlarges or not. It is a mistake to view Russia solely as a reactive power and to blame its actions on Western behavior alone. There will be areas of collaboration and areas of discord in the relationship, and those distinctions will be determined by differences in geography, history, and economic standing, not by ideology as during the Cold War and not by NATO enlargement in the post-Cold War world. The only way to manage both areas of coincident and conflicting interests is by building bridges where possible and drawing lines where necessary.

Many reject NATO enlargement out of a desire to preserve a Russian sphere of influence. If Russia cannot accept the legitimate right of its neighbors to choose their security arrangements, a policy they embraced in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, then NATO's role in the region will prove even more important.

Some critics believe that NATO enlargement is somehow condemning the START II Treaty and cooperative U.S.-Russian nuclear dismantlement activities to the dustbin of history. I do not believe this is the case. Russia's recent ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention would indicate that the linkage between NATO enlargement and arms control is more political than strategic.

Many Russians, including liberal Duma members, simply do not like the START II Treaty. They believe the Russian side was out-negotiated by the Americans, and oppose it whether NATO expands or not.

What is at issue among Russian arms control specialists is whether the United States can be convinced to pay some additional price for mutual strategic nuclear arms control reductions that the Russians themselves will have to undertake with or without a treaty. Continued statements about the dire consequences that will accompany NATO enlargement become the means by which they hope to induce the U.S. to go to a START III agreement sooner rather than later.

Perceived START II inequities constitute by far the primary reason for the reluctance of many Duma members and defense specialists to ratify the START II Treaty, not continuing, deep-seated resentment of NATO enlargement. It is not simply the nationalists but the so-called liberals in the Russian foreign policy elite who believe that START II, as currently written, is not in Russia's national interest. The latter would also propose to substantially modify the START III elements of the Helsinki joint statement agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, arguing that the March 1997 START III principles do not go far enough to guarantee that Russia's smaller strategic forces of the future will be able to reliably deter the United States.

At the very time that prominent Russian "arms controllers" are publicly laying the blame for lack of Duma ratification of START II at the feet of an expanding NATO, they are privately probing to determine how far the United States would be willing to go in further lowering warhead ceilings through START III, realizing that Russia cannot realistically afford to maintain the proposed START II strategic force levels. They want to drive the warhead ceiling down to a figure that Russia can afford! They are urging the beginning of START III negotiations as soon as possible, in part, they say, to improve the prospects for Russian ratification of START II. They are arguing, in short, that the entire strategic arms control dialogue is foundering, not because of NATO enlargement, but because the U.S. insists on waiting for START II ratification before beginning formal negotiations on START III.

It is not so much NATO expansion that is eating away at the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship. Rather, it is Russian weakness and the desire of some Russians either to stop the strategic nuclear arms reduction process at START I levels, or to convince American statesmen and political leaders, in part through a "guilt trip" over NATO enlargement, that a better deal needs to be offered to the Russian side—either in order to secure ratification of the START II Treaty or to supersede it with a START III agreement.

There is nothing inherently inconsistent between a strong, healthy U.S.-Russian relationship and an expanding NATO. Too many Americans critics of NATO enlargement who posit this as an either/or choice fail to understand the nature of the debate within the Russian Federation.

NUNN-LUGAR

In recent trips to Russia and the former Soviet Union it has been clear to me that NATO enlargement is unlikely to have a negative impact on our broad and deep cooperation with the Russian government to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction. My colleagues have expressed their concern that our successful cooperative dismantlement and destruction programs may falter as NATO enlarges.

For the past year or two, while NATO issues were being addressed by senior diplomats, Nunn-Lugar activities continued along their steady path, uninterrupted. The programs are proceeding well, with no signs of NATO enlargement hindering or damaging our ongoing destruction and dismantlement efforts.

To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated 4,700 nuclear warheads, destroyed 255 ICBMs, eliminated 252 ICBM launchers, destroyed 37 bombers, eliminated 95 SLBMs, destroyed 80 SLBM launchers, and sealed 114 nuclear test tunnels. These numbers will continue to climb as we expand our cooperative efforts with Russia.

Our cooperative programs with Russia on these issues have not slowed down; rather they have made remarkable gains in recent months. Recently, the Russians have indicated their willingness to move forward on a range of new projects. Nunn-Lugar will support the elimination of over 20 Russian SS-18 ICBMs each year. At 10 warheads apiece, this removes one of the most feared threats to U.S. strategic forces.

Nunn-Lugar will support the elimination of over 10 missile submarines per year at three Russian shipyards. Dismantlement projects will include DELTAs and ultimately TYPHOONs, the workhorses and mainstays of the Russian submarine forces. Moscow has also proposed Nunn-Lugar support for transforming the fissile material from dismantled Russian warheads into non-weapons-usable hockey puck shapes for storage at the Mayak fissile material storage facility. This project would provide unprecedented conformation that the Russians are dismantling nuclear warheads, and will speed the safe and secure storage of weapons-usable material.

Ukraine has been similarly expansive in identifying new areas of cooperation. The Ukrainian government has requested Nunn-Lugar assistance in eliminating SS-24s and associated silos to meet its requirements by 2000. Kiev has also asked for Nunn-Lugar assistance in destroying 44 bombers, as well as over 1,000 advanced air-launch cruise missiles.

With these major advances in our cooperative destruction and dismantlement programs under Nunn-Lugar, it is difficult to find evidence to support the claim that NATO enlargement is interfering with the larger problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Just the opposite, as NATO enlargement has progressed, so have our joint efforts with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union to deal with the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

Therefore I conclude that NATO enlargement and deeper NATO-Russian relations both have immense value for the United States and Europe if they are pursued properly. They are complementary and reinforcing objectives. The best outcome for the United States and Europe is for both tracks to succeed. A zero-sum debate about them, therefore, misses the point.

The coming votes of European parliaments and the U.S. Senate on NATO enlargement will not simply be decisions over whether to add a few members to a military alliance. These votes will become a statement on the roles of the United States and the countries of Western Europe in the world. The U.S. vote on enlargement will be seen as a sign of whether America intends to maintain its international leadership role, or whether, after the end of the Cold War, the United States intends to retreat and relinquish its status as the world leader.

It is my hope that America will maintain its position and engagement in the world's arena. We should ratify NATO enlargement and expand the zone of peace and security which has served Western Europe so well for the last fifty years to the central and eastern portions of this important continent.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. GRAMS addressed the Chair.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ASHCROFT). The Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, Ronald Reagan once remarked that:

They say the world has become too complex for simple answers. They are wrong. There are no easy answers, but there are simple answers.

Mr. President, with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire, we must face the challenge of maintaining a zone of stability in Central Europe while preserving the freedom and independence of these democratic states. Enlarging NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is not an easy answer, but it is a simple answer. Most importantly, it is a simple answer that is in the best interest of the United States.

This is not the first time that the Senate has considered the merits of NATO enlargement. NATO added new members on three other occasions, bringing Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Spain into the fold. With each addition, the military capability of NATO increased, and the stability of Europe

was enhanced. I am confident that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO will have the same effect.

This round of NATO expansion, however, is significant in that these are the first candidates for NATO membership to be considered that were part of the Soviet bloc. Nearly a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we have a chance to right the historical wrong of Yalta, and firmly anchor Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the West. While the accession of these three nations to full NATO membership should not be supported for moral reasons alone, our moral obligation to these countries should not be ignored. We must look at NATO expansion not just as a way to make up for past mistakes, but as a chance to secure the gains of freedom and democracy and ensure that they will never again be encroached.

NATO expansion offers the United States a remarkable opportunity to be proactive in shaping the strategic landscape of Europe. That this opportunity is a result of peace, and not the spoils of war, is a tribute to the effectiveness of NATO over nearly 50 years. It is not a responsibility that we should take lightly; it is not a responsibility that we can shirk.

NATO'S MISSION

The Senate does not have merely the obligation to determine whether Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic should be admitted to NATO, but to safeguard the integrity of the organization they would be joining. NATO has been a successful military alliance with a clearly defined mission: protecting the territorial integrity of its members, defending them from external aggression and preventing the domination of Europe by any single power. NATO's mission remains just as valid today as it was at its inception. I am convinced that a NATO which includes Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be a stronger, more viable institution as long as NATO retains its essential character throughout this transition.

I share the concerns of some of my colleagues that unless we are vigilant, NATO may evolve into a UN-style peacekeeping force. However, it is important to underscore that the expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will inhibit—not promote—this objectionable outcome. The prospective members are eager to join NATO to receive the same strong security guarantee that NATO members have traditionally enjoyed. They understand what it means to be invaded and occupied, and do not want NATO's ability to carry out its mission to be diluted or compromised. They will be on our side in the internal debate in the North Atlantic Council over NATO's strategic concept in the 21st century.

RUSSIA

Mr. President, others have argued that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary,

and the Czech Republic in NATO will destabilize Russia and endanger our efforts to build a constructive relationship with that important nation. I do not believe this is the case. The Russian legislature is refusing to ratify START II. Russia is forging closer ties to Iraq and Iran and undermining US policy in the Middle East whenever possible. Moscow is trying to disrupt US-backed plans to move Caspian Sea oil through an Azerbaijani-Georgian pipeline to the Black Sea. But there is no evidence that any of these actions is linked to NATO expansion. Indeed, Russia was pursuing these policies long before the expansion of NATO was seriously contemplated. NATO expansion may be a convenient excuse for Russia's stance on foreign policy issues that run counter to US interests, but it is not the cause.

I have no doubt that Russia, if given the choice, would like to maintain a "sphere of influence" in Central Europe, or barring that, a buffer zone. But this is 1998, not 1948, and Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have the right and the ability to reject the former, and the United States has a vital interest in denying the latter. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted.

Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience. A greater security dilemma would be created by ceding to our own fears about antagonizing Russia than proceeding with enlargement.

Furthermore, appeasing the Russian extremists who object to NATO expansion would only serve to undermine the very democratic forces that we're trying to protect. I see no evidence of a brewing nationalist backlash that critics keep warning us about. The Russian people are concerned about securing jobs, protecting their pensions, and preserving their personal security. Opinion polls show that Russian voters don't care one way or another about NATO expansion. As one expert witness, Mr. Dimitri Simes, before the Foreign Relations Committee remarked, the Russian leadership: engaged in terrible atrocities in Chechnya against [. . .] many Russian civilians. They are not paying wages and pensions at a time when people can easily observe the huge mansions of the new elite [. . .]. None of this moves Russian politics in a nationalist or reactionary direction. But somehow an obstruction like NATO enlargement is supposed to have a mystical, destructive impact on Russian politics. It is very difficult for me to believe.

EUROPEAN UNION

Mr. President, we should not let our fears of Russia's response stall NATO expansion; nor should we let protectionist elements of the European Union have the same effect. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are established democracies with free market economies. They have resolved all territorial conflicts with their neighbors. Their

militaries are firmly under civilian control and they have pledged to meet all the responsibilities of NATO membership. These countries want to be engaged in Europe; they are willing to fully participate in the defense of Europe and have pledged to do their fair share. There is no need to wait until the European Union accepts Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic before we permit them to achieve full membership in NATO.

Right now, three of our current European allies are not members of the European Union: Norway, Iceland, and Turkey. There is no reason to raise the bar for the admission of new members.

MANDATED PAUSE

The accession of Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic to full NATO membership must be regarded as the first—not the only—round of expansion. A mandated pause would create a new dividing line in Europe and send a signal to the Central European countries who were not included in the first round that enlargement has not just stalled, but has stopped. Many of these countries are making positive changes toward democracy and free markets with the view of joining NATO. It would be destructive to remove that goal.

RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION

As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I raised a number of concerns about the Administration's proposal to expand NATO and I am pleased that these have been addressed in the Resolution of Ratification. This Resolution of Ratification underscores that NATO's central mission remains the territorial defense of its members and that NATO command, structures, force goals, and defense planning must reflect that fact. It confirms that Russia will not have a voice or a veto on NATO decision-making and that the Permanent Joint Council will be a mechanism for explaining NATO policy, not creating it. It also ensures that there will be a clear, equitable distribution of the financial costs of expansion. American taxpayers should not pay the costs of modernizing the forces of our current allies, because they have failed to live up to their previous commitments. Nor should our taxpayers pay more if any of our European allies refuse to pay their fair share for the costs of bringing in new members.

MINNESOTA

Some of my colleagues have stated that the American people have not been informed about the issues surrounding NATO expansion. Well, I can categorically state that is not the case in Minnesota. Minnesotans have participated in an ongoing dialogue on the merits of expanding NATO at every level—from the Minnesota legislature, to academic symposia, to town hall meetings. Mr. President, at this time I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the remarks of three Minnesotans who have worked diligently for the inclusion of Poland,

Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO: Mr. John Radzilowski, Mr. Lazlo Fulop, and Ms. Paulette Will. They made an extraordinary effort to make sure that their fellow Minnesotans had the opportunity to become well-informed about the issues surrounding NATO expansion.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY JOHN RADZILOWSKI IN FAVOR OF A RESOLUTION MEMORIALIZING CONGRESS TO SUPPORT THE ADMISSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (HF 2417)

BEFORE THE MINNESOTA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, JANUARY 21, 1998, REP. MICHAEL JAROS, CHAIR

(John Radzilowski is president of Polish American Cultural Institute of Minnesota. He is a historian, and a freelance writer and editor, currently in the final stages of his Ph.D. candidacy. He is the author of three books, the co-author of four others, as well as many articles, reviews, and stories. He has written on topics such as Minnesota history, east European history, immigration, and American ethnic groups)

Mr. RADZILOWSKI: I would like to thank the committee for providing me the opportunity to speak today and I am very pleased to be able to speak in favor of the resolution supporting NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. As a Polish American who grew up in Minnesota, I am especially proud to see the legislature considering this vital issue. Since the beginning of American history, the interests and values of the Polish and American peoples have coincided. During our war for independence, Americans were aided by many Polish patriots. Kazimierz Pulaski founded the U.S. Cavalry and died fighting the British at Saratoga. Tadeusz Kosciuszko, a close friend of Thomas Jefferson, played a key role in the American victory at Saratoga, and designed the fortress of West Point (which later became our military academy). Kosciuszko was also a fierce foe of slavery and on hearing that Congress had awarded him a plantation for his services, he ordered Jefferson to free its slaves, sell the plantation, and use the money to educate freed blacks. Poland's 1791 Constitution was based on the U.S. Constitution, and was only the second democratic constitution in the world.

Although Poland lost her fight for independence, Poles kept their dream alive. When they could not win their own freedom, Poles battled for the independence of oppressed peoples around the world, becoming known as the scourge of tyrants. Fleeing political oppression and economic hardship, Poles found a haven here in America. Today, there are about 10 million Polish Americans, while Minnesota boasts about a quarter million Polish Americans, making us the state's sixth largest ethnic or racial group. [According to the 1990 U.S. Census.] Polish Americans have distinguished themselves in America's service. According to the 1990 U.S. Census, Polish Americans have the highest per capita percentage of veterans in their population than any of the other ethnic and racial groups the government keeps track of.

After World War I, Poland regained her independence, thanks in part to the efforts of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who is still considered a hero in Poland today. Following the shameful Munich Pact of 1938, in which an independent Czechoslovakia was turned over to Hitler, Poland refused to give in to

German threats and was attacked in September 1939 and defeated by Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union after a month of desperate fighting. Many Poles escaped to the West, where they helped make up the fourth largest Allied force in the fight against Nazism. On many occasions Polish and American troops fought side by side. Polish fighters escorted American bombers on raids deep into Germany. Polish destroyers watched over merchant convoys in U-Boat infested waters. In Italy, the Polish victory at Monte Cassino allowed the Americans to break out of the Anzio beachhead and capture Rome. On August 19, 1944, soldiers of the Polish 1st Armored Division linked up with Gen. George Patton's 90th Infantry Division near the French town of Falaise to close the trap on 60,000 Nazi troops, destroying the bulk of the German army in the West.

World War II cost the lives of some 6 million Polish citizens (a number divided about evenly between Christians and Jews), as well as incalculable losses of property and cultural and artistic treasures. Despite the terrible cost, and despite fighting for the winning side, Poland did not regain her freedom. Her struggle against tyranny was forgotten. Instead, Poland, like her neighbors Hungary and Czechoslovakia, became a satellite of the Soviet Union, a nation that was responsible for the deaths of almost 1 million Poles. Yet, Soviet communism proved a failure in Poland, and the people did everything they could to undermine a system that became increasingly corrupt, unworkable, and morally bankrupt. Given this history, it is no surprise that the unraveling of the Communist system in Europe began in Poland. Although we did not know it at the time, the election of Pope John Paul II and the formation of the Solidarity independent trade union in Poland spelled the beginning of the end for the Cold War. The momentum that began in Poland was furthered by the people in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The rest of story is, as they say, history.

After breaking with the communist past, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic began an effort to re-enter the family of democratic nations from which they had been unnaturally separated in 1945. They transformed their economies from state-run command systems, to free, open markets. They reformed their political systems, reintroducing real democracy, a free press, and civilian control of the military. These changes have taken root and borne fruit—there have been a series of free and fair elections, and the economies of all three nations are doing well. Poland, for example, has the fastest-growing economy in Europe. Each of these three nations has taken the initiative and solved its outstanding border disputes and tensions. In short, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic have met the objectives we in the West set for them as conditions for NATO membership.

NATO enlargement will expand the borders of peace and security. It will spread more evenly the burdens of defense within the alliance. It will add to the ranks of our allies. It will encourage those who want to reject politics based on hatred, division, and spheres of influence. As Czech president Vaclav Havel put it, NATO "is first and foremost an instrument of democracy intended to defend mutually held and created political and spiritual values." It is not an alliance aimed at an enemy, but "a guarantor of Euro-American civilization and thus a pillar of global security." [New York Times, May 13, 1997.]

The consequences of the U.S. Senate not ratifying NATO expansion would be serious indeed. Hardline nationalists in Bosnia, Belarus, Serbia, and elsewhere would be encouraged, while friends of democracy and

free markets would be disheartened. Furthermore, U.S. interests would be severely harmed. We depend on stability in the heart of Europe. An expanded NATO is the best guarantor of that security. With NATO membership for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, no dictator will ever again dream of a central European empire based on force and violence. We only need to remember the price the U.S. paid in two major European wars and the protracted commitments of the Cold War to understand how important this is.

For Minnesotans, east-central Europe is of increasing importance. The three NATO candidates have some of Europe's fastest growing economies and many Minnesota companies are doing good business in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The list of major companies with interests in these three countries reads like a who's who of corporate Minnesota: Cargill, 3M, Honeywell, Pillsbury, Land O'Lakes, NRG. We can add to this many medium and smaller companies, especially in the high technology area (many of which were started by recent immigrants). Ask the officials of these companies what NATO enlargement means for them.

In just two weekends this summer we collected some 1,400 signatures of Minnesotans from all over the state on a petition in support of NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This was a grassroots effort conducted by volunteers with little or no political experience. Since then, there has been a flood of letter writing, faxing, and calling to our U.S. Senators. One senator supports NATO expansion, while the other is officially undecided. The debate continues. Thus, it is important that the state legislature make its voice heard on this important issue, to tell the U.S. Senate that NATO expansion is good for global security, good for America, and good for Minnesota. I thank Rep. Jaros, and other state legislators who have helped on this issue, for their good work, and I urge members of this body to support the resolution.

NATO membership is the final step in the return of Poland and its neighbors to their place as our allies. As President Clinton recently noted, Poland is not a new ally for America, but an old friend returning home.

STATEMENT BY LASZLO G. FULOP, IN SUPPORT OF WHY HUNGARY SHOULD BECOME A NATO MEMBER.

BEFORE THE MINNESOTA SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND VETERANS

Mr. FULOP. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear in front of your committee and speak in support of Hungary's—along with Poland's and the Czech Republic's—admission to NATO.

Let me introduce myself: Laszlo G. Fulop, architect and planner of Minneapolis, MN., representing the Minnesota Hungarians.

The question many of you have in mind is, Why should Hungary become a NATO member? Before responding to this question let me make a few brief remarks, that are pertinent to this issue.

Hungary has existed in Europe for over 1100 years, and of those over 1000 was oriented to Western Europe. In the course of this orientation she found herself in situations where she fought for and defended the Christian culture of Western Europe, often just by blocking great expansionist endeavors from the East.

Hungary also had a 200+ year interest in the United States. Many Hungarians fought in the American War of Independence. Indeed a Hungarian, Colonel Michael Kovats serving under the famous Polish General Pulaski, organized the first US Cavalry, while fighting for American independence. Later, when the

Hungarians fought for their freedom with the Hapsburg empire in 1848-49 and declared their independence, the new Hungarian Constitution was modeled after the American Constitution of 1787. By the way, the Hapsburg forces were able to put down that valiant revolution, only because they asked for Russian help. A Russian army of 175,000 together with the Hapsburg armies eventually subdued the Hungarians fight for freedom. Unfortunately this intrusion was not an isolated occasion.

Until just 9 years ago East and part of Central Europe was relegated to the Soviet Sphere of interest and even the US conducted her relationship with the region through Moscow. Since the defeat of Communism in 1989-90 the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, regaining their independence, had to overcome great difficulties in their efforts to reestablish democracy.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, initiated by Hungarian Prime Minister Antall in 1990, along with the absence of existing security guarantees has left a strategic vacuum in the region. This effectively dissolved a bipolar world order, and also changed the situation of European security. The threat of nuclear war was replaced by much more limited in scope, yet expanded in types of threats. Aggression in Yugoslavia that went on unchecked for too long has shown just one major cause why this vacuum has to be filled.

The practical view of this membership: what's good in it for me and what's in it for you? Let's look at a few areas:

Security

The Enlargement means expanded security for Europe, and for the individual countries. It means ensuring common interests, common values. NATO was never an aggressive organization, but was an effective deterrent of active war. NATO always professed to protect the "status quo". In this case NATO's Enlargement simply means the "eastward expansion of the region of security and stability."

Hungary values its security, exactly because it had been threatened so often during her history.

Also a new security system seems to be evolving in Europe that is based on cooperation and partnership and these are driven by democracies in Western Europe. In orienting herself to the West, it will be imperative for Hungary (and to Poland and the Czech Republic) to participate in the economic, political and security aspects of this newly evolving mechanism. This will require modernization in more fronts, including security.

European stability is in the interest of the United States, as well, as NATO has been one of the major guardians of that. Today, it is still viewed in that role, and its enlargement will simply expand the security enjoyed by the current NATO countries, to establish conditions for peaceful, and democratic development in the new member countries. This enlargement is not viewed as pushing the military line established during the Cold War further east, but to expand the state of stability. A war in the area would cost the US a great deal more both in political efforts and in military spending than the costs associated with the NATO Enlargement. These countries will mean a net gain for NATO and the United States.

Developing democracies

Hungary also intends to become member of the EU, but, as NATO has become more than just a military organization, HU views NATO as complementing her integration into the ranks of western democracies.

These three countries mean market, strong sources of educated manpower, and devoted allies to the West in political as well as on economical turf.

The association with NATO provides a vision that can galvanize people in these three countries (and hopefully later with others) to achieve higher levels of co-operation in areas of common concern and shared destiny. Collectively these people will have a greater power to integrate their future within this alliance. This is perhaps truer today than it ever was before, and the recognition is becoming more pervasive than before. Partially, the margin of vote (85.5%) in Hungary attested to this recognition.

The threat of a large scale military conflict is currently not real, however, smaller scale conflicts can occur. Their potential can never be ignored. For Hungary the upgrading of military will be a costly affair, but it is estimated to cost less over the same period than as if she had to provide for her total defense alone.

Since the reestablishment of democratic governmental forms in Hungary, the military is under civilian control.

Nature of concerns

We are aware that some people are concerned about this step of NATO and has urged a wide ranging discussion on this topic. The main concern seems to be that this expansion will "... bring the Russians to question the entire post-Cold War settlement, and galvanize resistance in the Duma ...". It, however, appears that Russia's benefits from the enhanced security adjacent to her borders are being recognized. Serious attempts are being made to re-focus Russia's main goals for the 21st century to the economic development front, [see recommendations prepared by the prestigious Foreign and Defense Policy Council which in its 1997 report came out and said: "Russia should not busy itself with the blocking of enlargement but adjust itself within a short time to the new situation as effectively as possible." Further, "(if) Russia does not want to completely withdraw from it (i.e. the Central European region) economically, it must adjust itself to the present economic and political conditions for the sake of its own interests.]

Additionally, NATO and Russia has worked out a unique cooperative deal that did more for enhancing Russia's diplomatic position in Europe than she could have hoped for without the enlargement-issue being pursued. We also heard from an authentic and very reliable source that the NATO Enlargement issue is on the low end of concerns of Russian citizen on a Moscow street. On the other hand, even the customarily reserved Encyclopedia Britannica in "The role of NATO" brands those trying to do away with NATO as "neo-isolationists".

Finally, we also see this world as becoming more and more globalized. Minnesota firms are doing business in Europe, and increasingly in the Central European countries, as well. The University of Minnesota has several student exchange agreements with other countries including the Central European countries. We believe the enlargement of NATO and the attendant security will be but one step to insure increased cooperation, and better understanding of people in an atmosphere of enhanced security and stability.

These are only a sampling of reasons why this action should be supported. Indeed, President Clinton should be commended for seeking solutions in an atmosphere conducive to stability in Central Europe, and anchor security in this area while there are problems in the Middle East. This creates a safer environment for all of us.

Therefore, we urge you to pass a supporting resolution to this most important foreign policy consideration and express your support to the United States Senate. Thank you for allowing me to talk on this issue.

STATEMENT OF PAULETTE WILL IN FAVOR OF A RESOLUTION MEMORIALIZING CONGRESS TO SUPPORT THE ADMISSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (H 2417)

MINNESOTA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, JANUARY 21, 1998, REP. MICHAEL JAROS, CHAIR

Ms. WILL: Chairman Jaros and Members of the Committee, My name is Paulette Will, I am President of the Minnesota Czechoslovak Center and a partner in Bohemian Traders, a Minnesota-based company importing leather bags from the Czech Republic.

Thank you for the opportunity to express my support for the Czech Republic's entry into NATO along with Hungary and Poland. The Czech Republic is, as you probably know, a very young country. On January 1, 1993 Czechoslovakia, founded in 1918, ceased to exist and the Czech Republic and Slovakia became independent nations as a result of an agreement by their respective governments the previous year. Before World War II Czechoslovakia had a flourishing economy surpassed only by France and Switzerland. Since 1938 the history of the region includes occupation by the Nazis, loss of religious and personal freedoms in the 1968 Prague Spring Soviet crackdown, countless personal losses in terms of families being torn apart from Czechs seeking freedom from an oppressive regime and just this year both the Czech Republic and Poland were struck by catastrophic rains and floods. Today the Czech Republic has a population of 10.3 million people. The country is strategically located in the center of Europe and as such is in an ideal position for trade and investment. Geographically, Prague is located to the west of Vienna, Austria.

According to the last Federal census in 1990 almost 100,000 people in Minnesota are of 50% or more Czech descent (87,748 Czech and 11,466 Czechoslovak) 238,039 are of Polish descent and 12,349 are of Hungarian descent. Minnesotans of Czech heritage are dispersed throughout the state with significant concentrations in LeSuer (New Prague & Montgomery), Rice, Steele, McCleod, Jackson, Pine, Polk, Pope, Renville and St. Louis counties. Many German-Bohemians settled in Minnesota as well, mostly in the New Ulm area.

Recently, the Czech Ambassador to the United States, Alexandr Vondra journeyed here in Minnesota. He said that NATO membership would be the fulfillment of the "century's goal of the Czech state". Here in the center of the United States, Minnesota's business community is significantly invested in the Czech Republic. NRG, a subsidiary of NSP is the 5th largest investor in the Czech Republic where they are building an electric power generating plant in Kladno. Other Minnesota corporations with substantial business interests in the Czech Republic include: 3-M, the Carlson Companies, Ecolab, Honeywell, H.B. Fuller, Land O'Lakes, Midwest Imports, Pillsbury, Radisson Hotels, Toro, Thermo-King and many smaller companies such as mine. In the past eight years all of Minnesota's major educational institutions have had Czech students studying here and returning to work in law firms, private industry and the media as many Americans have lived and settled in the Czech Republic.

But something curious is happening in the United States. It's called isolationism. David Gergen said in a U.S. News and World Report article, October 27, 1997 "Americans from boardrooms to college classrooms are embracing the rest of the world as never before. Business people and students are heading overseas . . . while our political leadership

is staying at home. U.S. companies have increased their exports by 40%, many now earning more than half of the revenue overseas . . . Not long ago, our public leaders personally knew the chancellor of Germany and the prime minister of Japan at least as well as the President did. In 1995, some 200 members of the German Parliament came to Washington, not one member of Congress visited Bonn. The National Security Caucus Foundation in Washington reports that one third of today's Senate and House members do not even have passports. Some American political leaders are signaling that it is time to disengage from world affairs." This attitude has serious long term implications, not least for Americans peace, security and economic stability. For, like it or not, we are a major player on the world stage and we are inevitably called upon to defend freedom. No one wants to see Central Europe remain isolated between the East and West. Central Europe's security and economic interests are Europe, Canada, America and Minnesota's security and economic interests. NATO ratification is a simple vote to help guarantee civil and safe societies.

A few days ago, on January 18, NATO peacekeeper troops surrounded key buildings in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina just hours after a deeply divided Parliament elected a moderate Prime Minister for the Bosnian Serb Republic. NATO peacekeepers also circled a ministry building in the eastern town of Bijeljina. The Bosnia Serb conflict has cost billions compared to the estimates for NATO expansion. The lesson to be learned is simple; pay now or pay later.

So, here in Central United States, I trust that the Minnesota House and Senate will each enact resolutions joining other State Legislatures around our country urging the United States Senate to ratify the expansion of NATO to include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.

Mr. GRAMS. In conclusion, Mr. President, this Resolution of Ratification provides the Senate with a historic opportunity to shape the strategic landscape of Europe.

At the end of the Cold War, there was a lot of discussion about the "peace dividend"—the financial savings which would accrue from the end of the superpower rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Well, the expansion of NATO reflects the true "peace dividend"—the extension of a zone of security to codify the gains of freedom and democracy for three more nations and ensure that they will never again be encroached.

Mr. President, the United States has a national security interest in assuring the stability of Central Europe. I am convinced that the best way to do that is to enlarge NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

As Czech President Vaclav Havel, a man who I respect and admire, has warned, "If the West does not stabilize the East the East will destabilize the West." Mr. President, we have an obligation to our troops stationed in Europe and to future generations of Americans to do everything in our power to make sure it is the West which stabilizes the East and war will never again be precipitated by a power vacuum in Central Europe.

Mr. President, I will cast my vote in favor of expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Repub-

lic, recognizing that this is one of the most important votes that I will take in the Senate. I urge my colleagues to do the same. I yield the floor.

Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.

Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator from Connecticut for allowing me about 20 seconds. May I also say to the Senator from Minnesota, who has just spoken, and the Senator from Indiana that I subscribe to their remarks and appreciate the strength of their statements.

Mr. President, the United States Senate today has the rare opportunity to right a historical wrong. In the years immediately following World War II, Europe was forcibly divided. As the United States helped to rebuild the nations of Western Europe, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe were subjugated under the heavy hand of Soviet domination. To counter this Soviet expansion into Europe, the United States and its Western European allies forged the most effective defense alliance in modern history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The military and political strength of this alliance made it the guarantor of an unprecedented period of peace in Western Europe and contributed significantly to the eventual demise of the Soviet Union.

Today, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are free, and three of them—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—are seeking to take advantage of an opportunity denied them following World War II, the opportunity to join NATO, an alliance described by Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington as "the security organization of Western civilization [whose] primary purpose [in the post-Cold War world] is to defend and preserve that civilization." It is my hope that the United States Senate will grant them this opportunity—an opportunity that these nations deserve and have earned.

In the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these three nations have demonstrated a commitment to the Western ideals embodied by the NATO alliance. Their dogged pursuit of democratic institutions, free market economies, and human freedom will serve to remind the existing members of NATO what it means to be a part of the Western world. Indeed, their dedication to these ideals is all the more zealous because they know first hand what it is like to suffer under a regime that denies its citizens basic human freedom.

The enlargement of the NATO alliance to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic serves America's national interests. The essence of the U.S. national interest in the world is promoting the security, well-being, and expansion of the community of nations that respect their citizens' democratic rights. Although this is a moral policy, it is not an entirely altruistic one. The freedom, prosperity, and security of Americans—our standard of living and

our domestic civil liberties—all are enhanced and bolstered when this community of free nations grows bigger and stronger, especially when it does so in Europe, where our closest allies and our most profound interests are concentrated.

The enlargement of NATO will also send a clear message to any power who may wish to interfere with the ongoing process of democratization in Europe: you will not succeed, so do not even try.

I know that the enlargement of NATO will not be free. Clearly, additional financial resources will be required on the part of all NATO members—old and new alike. These new costs must be shared equitably by all allies. Although enlargement will ultimately require an increased financial commitment by the United States, I believe that the substantial dividends that will accrue to the U.S. from enlargement justify our strong support for this endeavor.

I urge my colleagues to support the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO, so that, as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently noted, “three nations who have long been our allies in spirit will become our allies in fact.” It is the right thing to do, and it serves our national interest.

AMENDMENT NO. 2310

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I call up an amendment which is at the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Arizona (Mr. KYL) proposes an amendment numbered 2310.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

In paragraph (I) of section 3, after “(I) THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.—” insert the following:

(A) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.—The Senate understands that the initial adaptation of NATO’s strategy for the post-Cold War environment is contained in the Strategic Concept of NATO (as defined in (I)(E)), and that its core concepts remain relevant today as the North Atlantic Alliance approaches the 21st century. The Senate understands that the policy of the United States toward the revised Strategic Concept shall reflect that fact and shall be based upon the following principles:

(i) FIRST AND FOREMOST A MILITARY ALLIANCE.—NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. NATO’s success in securing peace is predicated on its military strength and strategic unity.

(ii) PRINCIPAL FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF SECURITY INTERESTS OF NATO MEMBERS.—NATO serves as the principal foundation for collectively defending the security interests of its members against external threats.

(iii) PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.—Strong United States leadership of NATO promotes and protects United States vital national security interests.

(iv) UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP ROLE.—The United States maintains its leadership role of NATO through the stationing of United States combat forces in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATO commands, and through the presence of United States nuclear forces on the territory of Europe.

(v) COMMON THREATS.—NATO members will face common threats to their security in the post-Cold War environment, including—

(I) the potential for the re-emergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe;

(II) rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver these weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles, or other unconventional delivery means;

(III) threats of a wider nature, including the disruption of the flow of vital resources, and other possible transnational threats; and

(IV) conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes or the actions of undemocratic leaders.

(vi) CORE MISSION OF NATO.—Defense planning will reaffirm a commitment by NATO members to a credible capability for collective self-defense, which remains the core mission of NATO. All NATO members will contribute to this core mission.

(vii) CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO COMMON THREATS.—NATO’s continued success requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to common threats. Building on its core capabilities for collective self-defense of its members, NATO will ensure that its military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals promote NATO’s capacity to project power when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members. This will require that NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts.

(viii) INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE.—The Integrated Military Structure of NATO underpins NATO’s effectiveness as a military alliance by embedding NATO members in a process of cooperative defense planning and ensuring unity of command.

(ix) NUCLEAR POSTURE.—Nuclear weapons will continue to make an essential contribution to deterring aggression, especially aggression by potential adversaries armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. A credible NATO nuclear deterrent posture requires the stationing of United States nuclear forces in Europe, which provides an essential political and military link between Europe and North America, and the widespread participation of NATO members in nuclear roles. In addition, the NATO deterrent posture will continue to ensure uncertainty in the mind of any potential aggressor about the nature of the response by NATO members to military aggression.

(x) BURDENSARING.—The responsibility and financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe will be more equitably shared in a manner in which specific obligations and force goals are met by NATO members.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I, again, thank the Senator from Connecticut.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I rise to support the resolution calling upon the Senate to advise and consent to the ratification of the Protocols of the North Atlantic

Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

This is an important debate, an important week for this Chamber, for this country, for our alliance with our friends in Europe and, indeed, for global security. I appreciate very much the quality of the debate and the thoughtfulness of it as it has proceeded this afternoon. I must say that I am honored to be part of this debate and grateful to my constituents in Connecticut for giving me the chance to do so.

It is a debate that looks backward and forward, and its significance goes in both directions.

Looking backward in our history and in the history of Europe, it could well be said that the enlargement of NATO to now encompass these first three countries that lived under Soviet domination is a ratification of the end of the cold war. It is a validation that we have learned the lessons of that war.

Looking forward, it is, in my opinion, and respectfully, directly at odds with those who oppose expansion and spoke earlier this afternoon, it is the best step that we can take to protect and sustain the peace and freedom that now has broken out across the European Continent. So I appreciate very much the opportunity to participate in this debate.

Mr. President, there are three principles, three values, three ideas, three purposes that I want to speak about this afternoon in supporting NATO enlargement. They are freedom, collective defense and the promotion of peace. Each of those three, I think, speaks powerfully on behalf of the need to enlarge NATO, on the wisdom of that move.

I want to speak particularly about freedom, because that principle may be lost in the strategic discussions and in the practical and tactical concerns that people in the circle may have about the effect of NATO enlargement.

Freedom is at the heart of what it means to be an American. Freedom is at the heart of the American experience, and it is at the center of NATO and the NATO experience. The quest for freedom is what drove the founders of our country here, and they, in turn, were motivated by their faith, by their own quest for personal freedom and by the understanding their faith gave them that they expressed at the very outset of the Declaration of Independence, that all of us are created equal and we are blessed with certain rights—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—not by any assemblage of our fellow human beings, legislators, lawyers, philosophers, but we are endowed with those rights to freedom by our Creator. Freedom, the pulsating, motivating principle of the American experience, expressed in the declaration, fought for throughout our history, fought for particularly in this century in two great and terrible wars in Europe.

After the second of those, when another threat arose to freedom in Europe from Soviet communism, the leaders of the Western European countries and the leader of the United States at that time, President Harry Truman, saw the need to come together in a military alliance, NATO, to protect what had been won, the freedom that had been won during the Second World War and to try to roll back the advance of tyranny and communism that had begun to occur in Europe under Soviet domination.

That is what NATO is all about. Yes, I understand it is a military alliance, but it is a military alliance in defense of a principle, and that principle is freedom, individual human dignity and worth, as expressed in our Declaration, as I described a moment ago.

Political freedom, religious freedom, the right to express oneself, the right to pursue one's own economic well-being without being dictated to by a central government—that is what NATO is about, a military alliance in defense of a principle. And that is what the cold war was about, not just a clash of blocs or power groupings; it was a great clash of ideas.

Freedom against tyranny, the right of the individual against the right of the state to dictate to the individual; state-controlled economy against market economies. And freedom won, individual dignity won, market economies won. It is a remarkable story whose heroes are numberless, the soldiers in NATO who stood guard over those decades of the cold war, the proud and effective leaders of the Western democracies, the people who understood what was at risk and stood side by side in defense of these principles.

In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. The Soviet Union began to collapse, and the countries that lived under its domination, not just the people of Russia, among whom there are so many heroes who brought this about, but the people in the constituent countries of the former Soviet Union who had lived under tyranny, whose national identities had been temporarily erased, at least from public expression, certainly not from within their own conscience, whose right to worship as they wished had been suppressed and stifled, whose drive to better themselves by working to build a better life for their family, to profit, to achieve success was undermined, was crushed by the power of the bloated bureaucratic Communist state.

Those people who were suddenly freed, freed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, understood what the cold war was about, understood it was about freedom and understood what NATO is about. That is why they have come to us to ask for inclusion.

After all those years of living in effective slavery, they have turned to us and said, "By the grace of God and good leadership and faith, now we have the opportunity to express our national will, our individual selves to be free, to prosper," and they have turned to

NATO and not to the European Union, as some of my colleagues would urge them to do, because they understand what the past was about and what the future is going to be about.

Yes, NATO is a military alliance, but it is a military alliance in defense of a principle, which is freedom, and freedom and security precede commerce.

Of course, inclusion in the European Union is important. But these countries now knocking at the door of the family of freedom, asking to become members of our community of freedom, they understand the significance of NATO.

(Mr. GRAMS assumed the Chair.)

And for us, who for years during the cold war would speak out across the Iron Curtain that dropped in the middle of Europe and say to the people in the suppressed countries—we used to call them the people of the captive nations; they were captives—"Rise up. Be strong. Have faith. A day will come when the Soviet Union will collapse or be defeated. You will have your opportunity to be free and we will welcome you into the community of free nations."

That is what they are asking. Will we now turn our backs on them and the principle, the idea, the value of freedom that motivated us throughout the cold war and motivates them today? I hope not. I do not think so. I do not believe we will.

Mr. President, collective defense is the second reason why we ought to expand the NATO alliance to embrace these three nations and keep the door open for others as they meet the tests, the standards.

NATO, from the outset, was a military alliance to provide for the collective defense, to protect member nations from attack from an outside enemy. It was started quite clearly as a defensive alliance against Soviet aggression. We had hundreds of thousands of troops in Europe ourselves to protect our allies and ultimately ourselves from that danger.

Now, times have changed. Fortunately, the threat of aggression from the East is not there. Some say that an alliance, a military alliance can only last as long as the threat that engendered it. Now that that threat is gone, some say NATO really ultimately will dissipate.

Well, would that it were so that there were not threats in the world that should tie the member nations and those who choose to be added to NATO together in common defense. My colleagues have mentioned them. I will only repeat them very briefly. Today, the threats may be more from the south of NATO than from the east, from weapons of mass destruction, from terrorism, from threats via ballistic missiles.

We may well—hopefully soon—work with our allies in NATO to form a regional missile defense to protect member nations from the threats posed by the high-tech war that we and our allies face.

So I would say, unfortunately, though security is greater than it was on the European Continent during the cold war, there is still much to worry about. A strong NATO, working together, surely can provide a better defense against those common enemies than nations alone.

In fact, Mr. President, though the NATO treaty, as originally stated—article V—talked about each member being obliged to defend and protect member states who might be attacked, it talked about focus on conflict within the area that is NATO. Clearly in our times some of those threats may come from outside—threats to security of the member nations.

It was not so many years ago—it was 1990 and 1991—when Saddam Hussein drove his Iraqi Army into Kuwait, threatening not just the independence of that small country, but the energy supply on which not only we but our European allies and others depend. The gulf war, Operation Desert Storm, was not explicitly a NATO action, but it was surely NATO in the experience that we had together within NATO. That was not only the place on which the defense and counteroffensive against Saddam could be fashioned and formed, but it was where over those many decades we had learned to work so well together.

So, in fact, I view the enlargement of NATO in our time, the post-cold war time, as the best step that the United States can take to bring others to share our burden of world leadership. We say repeatedly we are not going to be the policemen of the world, but the fact is that we are the world's only remaining global superpower, and responsibility and interests come with that.

Our alliance in NATO is a place in which we can find allies to share the burden when a threat affects the security of the United States and other member nations of the NATO alliance and organization. The three nations that seek accession to NATO, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, have already helped us in Bosnia and elsewhere. Some helped during the gulf war. They add 200,000 troops to the NATO forces on the European Continent, providing hope that less will be asked of the United States, or at least we will only be asked in a more proportionate way when these three nations and perhaps others in the future are added.

The third reason why I support this resolution so strongly, Mr. President, is the promotion of peace. That is to remember that NATO from the outset was never just a defensive alliance. It was always an organization which was aimed at promoting peace among its members, not just to bring its members together in alliance to protect them against outside threats. But acknowledging the war-torn history of Europe, feeling still the pain, the sting, the horror of the two World Wars that preceded it, NATO was formed to create an organization in which common interests could be stressed, yes, through

military alliance, but through the sharing of opportunities and challenges. It has worked magnificently in that regard, and it will work even better in this post-cold war period to bring nations formerly under Soviet domination in Central and Eastern Europe within that zone of peace, within that community of which peace will be promoted and conflict will be avoided. That is the record of the now almost five decades of NATO in terms of the amity, the civility, the cordiality of the relations among previous enemies, now members, of NATO, and it will continue to play that role as we expand NATO to other countries on the European Continent. The fact is that it has already begun to happen in anticipation of this effort to accede to NATO membership of the three we are focused on today. And other nations hoping for NATO membership have begun to resolve long-standing conflicts.

The conflict between the Hungarians and the Romanians comes to mind. That is the drive—the momentum will be on the side of conflict resolution among the member states of NATO and those who choose to become members in promoting peace on the European continent and again learning the lessons of the war-torn history of Europe.

Mr. President, a final word about Russia. It is from within Russia that the Soviet Union and communism that I have spoken of and the denial of freedom began. It is from within Russia under the historic progressive leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and from within the hearty and heroic band who resisted tyranny even as it began to rear its head again after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. It is from within Russia that this historic change began.

It began, as I said earlier, and occurred because of the steadfastness, the sense of purpose, the heroism of people in the NATO alliance and Western Europe and the United States, and it began after a long period of suffering by those who lived within Russia and within the member states of the former Soviet Union under Soviet domination.

It has to be a central tenet of priority of our foreign and defense policy to develop good relations with Russia. We have worked mightily at that. But I must say, as I hear some of those who oppose expansion, enlargement of NATO, who are prepared to blame enlargement of NATO on anything that goes wrong in Russia, I simply cannot accept that prediction. Those who foresee the most dire consequences of NATO enlargement, including, as some have suggested here, the heightened possibility of nuclear war—I simply do not see it. These arguments in some ways seem more psychoanalytical than geopolitical, more psychological than strategic.

Yes, I know that Russia has struggled and has much work to do. I simply echo and embrace by association the comments of the Senator from Indiana, Mr. LUGAR, on this course. The fact is that Russia has come some distance in

spite of the challenges it has faced. It has sustained a democratically elected government. It has fought off attempts to create denials of freedom within the country. If there is a threat to the continued movement forward of freedom within Russia, if there is a threat that will somehow raise the possibility of nuclear conflict with Russia, it is not the enlargement of NATO.

I must say, as I speak to members of the Russian Government and private citizens, including businesspeople and think-tank people, I know there are some in the political community who are opposed to the enlargement of NATO, but honestly I do not find it to be the priority of concern that some on this floor have suggested.

The fact is, as the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. GRAMS, said, every poll I have seen taken in Russia shows that the people list NATO enlargement far down in their itemization of concerns they have about Western behavior. Think about how we and our people would feel if we were in Russia. What would be more important to us—that NATO is about to accept Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into this alliance or that I am not getting my paycheck for working at the shipyard, or I am not getting my pensioners' check as a retired person, or my children's education is not as good as it used to be? Those are the things that the Russians are focused on. Those are the threats to stability if it exists within the Soviet Union. Those constitute the ground in which a more aggressive and warlike leadership might—I hope never will—but might arise again in Russia, not NATO enlargement.

It simply, respectfully, does not make sense to me that that is the case. I have said before we have worked hard at building good relations with Russia. The Founding Act creates an institutionalized relationship between Russia and NATO that some feel actually goes too far. I think it is appropriately balanced.

The relationship between President Clinton, President Yeltsin, Vice President GORE, former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and presumably the new Prime Minister Kiriyenko, is very strong. If we have had a shortcoming in our policy, in our post-cold war reaction to Russia that may have squandered an opportunity, which is a phrase that one of those who opposed NATO enlargement spoke about earlier, it is not to enlarge NATO, it is that we did not rush in early enough and broadly enough to help the Russians build their economy in the period after the Berlin Wall fell.

There were some great voices at that time—late President Nixon, most prominently at that point, speaking to the historic opportunity we had. The truth is what we delivered was timid, was weak, was insufficient. If we squandered an opportunity, it was at that moment when, as some said, we might well in our own self-interest

have adopted the equivalent of a Marshall Plan for Russia, encouraging and creating incentives for American businesses to go over and invest there and create opportunity. Not enough of that has happened. Very little of that has happened. It is in that neglect that we planted the seeds that might—again we hope and pray never will—grow into a less democratic, more aggressive Russian, but not NATO, enlargement.

Let us come back to this. So much of the opposition to this enlargement is based on the effect it will have on Russia. That is what I said earlier, and I say respectfully, this becomes an argument more in psychoanalysis than in geopolitics or reality. NATO is a defensive alliance. NATO has no hostile intent on Russia. Does Russia fear military aggression from Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland? Of course not. So why do we yield to what we see or fear may be the opposition within Russia to the enlargement of NATO? When we do that, when we yield, we do something far more damaging. That is, we forget the principle I spoke about at the beginning, which is freedom. We forget what Winston Churchill said about that Iron Curtain falling in the middle of Europe. We forget what Harry Truman spoke to us when he joined in the creation of NATO, as he watched the Soviet threat in Europe against freedom. We forget what President Kennedy did at the Berlin Wall in the confrontation of Berlin in the 1960s. We forget what President Reagan said about the evil empire. Why was it evil? Because it denied its people freedom. And we forget we fought that cold war over an arbitrary, dictatorial, unnatural division in Europe which denied the principle of freedom, the line Stalin forced in Europe.

So will we now, because of our fear—strange for a victor, the world's global superpower, to have such fear—will we now redraw that line by shutting people in Central and Eastern Europe out of the community of free nations? I don't believe we will. I am confident that more than the necessary number of our colleagues here in the Senate will see the historic opportunity we have to validate the end of the cold war, to uphold the principle on which it was at fault, and to create the conditions for peace and security in Europe among the member nations of NATO as those members expand and together between them, in a free, secure, and strong Russia.

Mr. President, I close with words of one of the heroes of the century and certainly the heroes of the post-cold-war period, Vaclav Havel, who wrote almost a year ago in the New York Times, May 13, 1997:

The [NATO] alliance should urgently remind itself that it is first and foremost an instrument of democracy, intended to defend mutually held and created political and spiritual values. It must see itself not as a pact of nations against a more or less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of Euro-American civilization and, thus, as a pillar of global security.

That is what this debate is about. I look forward to the dialog as it continues this week. It is a critically important debate, and I hope that we will join it directly and not hesitate to speak forcefully but, of course, respectfully to one another. That much is at stake here.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROBERTS). The distinguished Senator from Missouri is recognized.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I am happy to have this opportunity to rise and discuss some of the ramifications of the proposed expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A number of issues have received attention, and it is appropriate that we focus on those issues and give them very, very close scrutiny. The cost of enlargement, for instance, deserves our attention; the political and strategic benefits or deficits that of new NATO members deserves our attention; and finally, the effect of NATO expansion on the relationship of the United States with the Soviet Union deserve the Senate's full attention.

But while all these issues are important, I think in some respects they divert inquiry into a fundamental issue regarding NATO's future, and that is, "What is the purpose of the organization?" Is the purpose of the organization being altered inappropriately? Is it being transitioned away from that for which it was initially called into existence?

The expansion of NATO and the question about whether it should or should not be expanded is significant. But defining the purpose of the organization is even more significant.

I just might, in an aside here, mention that I am not sure we can redefine NATO. One of the most serious questions I raise is, Is it possible for NATO to be redefined without the redefinition being subject to the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate? If a treaty, once it is enacted and ratified by the United States, could then be changed without the U.S. Senate again offering its advice and consent, we would never need but to enter into one or two treaties, and then, subsequently, administrations could transfer, transition, enlarge, subtract, or shrink the treaty in accordance with the particular foreign policy strategy of the moment. A treaty's purpose might be distorted from defense to trade, or otherwise changed, if it is possible to change a treaty without being subject again to the Senate's advice and consent.

Now, we obviously find ourselves, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, looking at a treaty designed to protect the member states from a hostile foreign invasion. The Soviet Union no longer exists. There are nations that were a part of the Soviet Union that now exist, but we find ourselves with a significantly different configuration of forces and challenges to the United States. Challenges to the mem-

ber states of NATO are different than they were when the treaty was called into existence in 1949.

So I think it is important now for the U.S. Senate—which is, if you will, the quality control organization as it relates to U.S. treaties—to ensure that U.S. treaty commitments are not expanded inappropriately and the American people are not subjected to obligations that have not been approved through the proper constitutional processes. The U.S. Senate has a role of assessing the quality of treaties as they proceed through the Senate before the Senate's imprimatur of approval is given.

Here we stand at this moment in time debating perhaps the most successful collective defense organization in the history of the world, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO still stands, although the specific threat for which it was created has disappeared for the time being. We have to ask ourselves at this juncture, "What is the purpose of the treaty?" Would some try to change the purpose of the treaty? Is it appropriate or possible to change the treaty, without amending the treaty, just by beginning to lean everyone in one direction, to turn the treaty to one side or another, or begin to assert that there are new things to be considered because the treaty is evolving?

I have to say to you, Mr. President, I don't believe in treaty evolution any more than I believe in the evolution of the Constitution. If you could just evolve treaties, as I said, U.S. treaty commitments would seldom have to be brought before the Senate. In this case, NATO would be evolving and going on its way, entangling this country with potentially serious obligations which place in jeopardy the lives and fortunes of those who serve in our armed forces and those who support the military. I think we have to be very careful that we don't allow treaties to simply evolve.

It is interesting to me that as we work to address where NATO is and the purpose of the organization, that we be clear about what it is supposed to do. What is interesting to me is that there is a group of individuals who now say that NATO is totally different than the organization created in 1949.

I want to call attention to this idea that NATO, which was once designed to protect individuals in the North Atlantic area, is now, according to a number of people, becoming an organization with a global scope. Expanding the scope of NATO has serious ramifications: if the responsibility of NATO is no longer confined to specific territory, but now is global in nature, the kinds of required military devices, the kinds of technology, the kinds of cooperation, and the expenses are going to be massively different.

Here is what the immediate past U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 19th day of March of this year:

The original mission of NATO—detering an attack from the Soviet Union—is obviously no longer relevant.

Well, I would say the Soviet Union might be reconstituted, or there certainly might be a threat, but we will give him that much.

The original geographical area of NATO responsibility is no longer sufficient", Mr. Perry continues.

Sufficient for what? It is sufficient for the people who live in that area. NATO helps secure the homes and livelihoods of people in the North Atlantic area.

Mr. Perry states, The original military structure of NATO is no longer appropriate.

We are going from a military alliance to something else.

He says:

The new missions—

I am taken aback. "New missions"? How can a treaty organization ratified by the U.S. Senate, in place for 50 years, all of a sudden have new missions, new purposes?

Mr. Perry continues, "The new missions of NATO should be preventive defense—creating the conditions for peace in Europe."

Mr. Perry refers to Europe—not NATO member nations. There are a number of nonmember nations in the European area. All of a sudden, we are expanding beyond the concept of a group of individual countries who have agreed to defend themselves to the projection of a peace guarantee on an entire continent.

Mr. Perry continues, "The geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere in the world * * *"

Mr. President, that is a substantial change. That is a significant departure. This is not the traditional understanding of NATO. This is not in the language of the original treaty. This is an effort to make NATO a worldwide organization. " * * * anywhere in the world where aggression can threaten the security of NATO members."

I wish to emphasize that we need to be very careful about anybody who threatens the security of NATO members. But what does this administration mean when it makes statements endorsing a global NATO? We don't have to rely on the former U.S. Secretary of Defense for guidance on that question. We can go to the current Secretary of State. According to the Washington Post, Secretary Albright "also has urged that an expanding national North Atlantic Treaty Organization must extend its geographic reach beyond the European continent and evolve into a 'force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa.'"

I think it is only fair that we go beyond focusing on three new members in Eastern Europe. If a new mission is really what we are talking about, if this is what the intention is, the change here is far more than adding three new countries. The transformation is a shift from the defense of territory—specified and outlined with

clear boundaries—to an organization whose impact will be worldwide. According to the Secretary of State NATO should be a “* * * force for peace from the Middle East to central Africa.”

If what the Senate is really considering here is the transformation of NATO's mission, then I think it requires us to ask, “Is this what was intended when this NATO agreement came into existence? Was it designed to have this kind of elasticity? Was it designed to evolve, as an amoeba does, changing shape with different circumstances to fill any void? Not according to the folks who presided in the U.S. Senate in 1949 when this great treaty organization was ratified.

Listen to the words of Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time: “Let us not forget that this treaty is limited in scope. Its main purpose is to maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. We do not propose to stretch its terms to cover the entire globe.”

It is interesting to consider these comments by Senators from the past. “We do not propose to stretch its terms to cover the entire globe”, stated Senator Connally. His statement offers a striking contrast to the language of a globalist NATO offered by officials from this administration. This administration is now supporting the expansion of NATO to three new members, but is also presiding over an incredibly significant transition in the scope and shape of the organization itself.

In NATO, the United States was making a calibrated commitment. We joined NATO and considered the possible deployment of U.S. forces with the utmost caution. In 1949, our Congress was not about to deploy U.S. forces willy-nilly around the world. The collective defense mission of NATO was defined explicitly in article V, and I quote: “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them”—of the parties, of the member nations—“in Europe or North America, shall be considered an attack against them all * * *”

Collective defense was meant to respond to an attack on the United States or another NATO ally. This was an attack on the member nations in Europe within their borders. The allies would then take such action, according to article V, as each “deems necessary” to restore the peace for those member nations.

The geographic scope of the article V commitment was defined explicitly in article VI to make sure there was not any confusion. In article VI, we made it clear. It said the United States would defend the territory—territory of NATO members—not the interests, not the commercial transactions, but the territory of the NATO members.

The geographical scope of Article 6 included the Mediterranean Sea and the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article V says if you are attacked, you are to respond to the attack. Article VI has the sort of precision of a real estate transaction, specifically stating where the territory was and how it was to be defended.

Article IV of the treaty is seen by some now as an escape hatch for expansion of NATO's mission. Article IV of the treaty states: “The parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is threatened.” Terms like “territorial integrity” and “political independence” and “security” flow from and reinforce NATO's collective defense mission.

As I will argue in more detail, undergirding NATO's collective defense mission was the purpose of article IV. Article IV was not a loophole for any military operation the North Atlantic Council could dream up.

One of the things I think the Senate should consider carefully is the expansion of NATO, not just by membership but by mission—from the defense of territory to the defense of interests, which is the direction in which things are pointed. If we go from defending territory to defending interests and following those interests, as Secretary Perry indicated and Secretary Albright has indicated, to remote locations on the globe, that threatens some of the very essential purposes of NATO. If you squander defense resources or if your forces are so thinly deployed, it can be very damaging and undermining to the capacity to respond to a real security threat.

It would be terrible to think that we would have our forces so far-flung that we could not respond to a real security threat. I have to say this: Right now the administration is so willing to deploy U.S. troops and so unwilling to provide resources for the military that we are stretching our resources very thin. If we want to put ourselves in real jeopardy by stretching them thinner, we should change the mission of NATO so that we become an international policing organization effectively answering 911 calls anywhere around the world. Secretary Perry says anywhere around the globe. Secretary Albright says in the Middle East and throughout central Africa.

The United States is extending defense commitments to these three new potential NATO countries while slashing its defense resources—a 27-percent cut in defense spending over the last 8 years. We need to be very careful. If your defense spending is falling and your defense deployments are rising, you have very low resources to meet high commitments, placing yourself in serious jeopardy.

Most Americans have agreed we have to have an ability to fight at least in two regions. If we cannot fight in two regions, and if we get into any kind of a struggle somewhere, it is an invitation for an aggressor somewhere else to start something. I mean, after all, if we

were involved in the Middle East and we only had a capacity to defend one area, that would be the only area we could defend. It would invite rogue regimes, dictators, to be involved somewhere else pretty quickly. North Korea might decide to send its people over the border en masse. So the United States has to sustain the capacity to fight in two regions.

John Hillen writes in the *National Review* that we are losing that kind of capacity.

In 1998, almost all the active Army's heavy-tank and armored-cavalry units outside of Korea and Bosnia would have to go to the Persian Gulf in order to equal the fighting power of America's VII Corps in 1991. And the VII Corps was only one of three American corps engaged in Desert Storm. In other words, it would take all the fighting materiel we have to make up one of the three corps that were fighting in Desert Storm. Given the fact that we have the commitments we have in both Korea and Bosnia, we have to be careful we don't hollow out the force. And expanding the mission, broadening the range of deployments, expanding NATO from the defense of territory to the defense of interests could further hollow out our armed forces.

Here's how NATO expansion will increase U.S. security commitments.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic comprise 301,000 square miles of new NATO territory and 2,612 miles of new NATO frontier to which the collective defense commitment is extended.

Total national defense spending fell by 27 percent over the last 8 years.

If we are going to be a part of defending this new territory, I wonder about whether we can do it with a plummeting rate of investment in national defense.

Outside normal training and alliance commitments, the Army conducted 10 “operational events” between 1960-91, and 26 since 1991.

There you have it. We are sending our troops all over the world, and you wonder if we can do that without hollowing out the force when we have a 27 percent drop in our funding.

The Marine Corps conducted 15 “contingency operations” between '82 and '89, and 62 since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

We are sending our people all over the place and we are not funding them the way we really should.

According to the Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer, the Army reduced manpower by 36 percent while increasing the number of deployed operations by 300 percent.

Can you forever shrink your resource base and increase your deployment?

President Reagan's Deputy Undersecretary of Defense states:

Like Gulliver's enfeeblement by the Lilliputians, [the U.S.] will be tied down in so many parts of the world for so long that it will be hard-pressed to respond to the major threats against which only overwhelming force would prove effective.

I think the point I want to make here is we have to be very careful in expanding the mission, changing the mission of NATO from a defense-of-territory to a defense-of-interest mission, projecting deployments in central Africa and

a wide variety of other places, as Secretary Perry indicated, around the globe. Are we making sure we have the necessary defense resources in the event there is a real security challenge? If we are stamping out brushfires on the other side of the world, can we defend ourselves against a firefight in our own backyard?

These are the kinds of things that I think are important. I don't think this administration has made very serious strategic assessments about NATO expansion. "We must pledge that the first new members will not be the last," according to Secretary Albright, "and that no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map." In other words, come one, come all. We are not going to make strategic judgments. In the real world, real soldiers die defending real borders.

I intend to ask the Senate to make a clear statement on the mission of NATO, a mission that is a defense of territory, not just a defense of interests. I know that Senator ROBERTS of Kansas and Senator WARNER of Virginia have expressed their interest in this respect. We need to pass an amendment that will make sure that the Senate will not be endorsing what I call "treaty creep," where we just allow a creeping mission to get us to the place where we are no longer able to sustain those things which ought to be sustained.

It is with that in mind that I will be offering an amendment which would be added to the resolution of ratification. I hope that Members of the Senate will take into account the importance of understanding that we cannot dilute the capacity of the United States to defend its own freedom and to fulfill its collective defense commitment in NATO by making the breadth of this treaty so broad that it becomes a second United Nations, except this time with a standing army. NATO should not become an organization whose forces can be deployed and put at risk inappropriately and unduly in a wide variety of settings not defined by the territory of the members of the North Atlantic area.

It is with that in mind that I look forward to submitting the amendment and defending the opportunity to place in the resolution of ratification clear language which will define and reassert the only valid definition of NATO, its original purpose, which was the defense of territory, political independence, and security of member states in that particular organization.

I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the matter of NATO expansion is perhaps the single most important foreign policy or defense issue to come before Congress this year. Because of the complexity of the issues involved, the importance of this decision, and its implications for our relationship with Rus-

sia, I have not rushed to judgment on this subject. Today, however, I would like to explain why after careful consideration, I have decided to support NATO expansion.

The past half-century has shown the cardinal importance of American engagement in European affairs. Throughout the Cold War, our involvement in Europe, principally through NATO, helped provide a crucial framework of peace and stability in which the countries of Europe have been able to develop—giving them breathing room in which to leave behind wartime devastation and grow into prosperous trading partners and allies. Today, of course, the Cold War has ended. The importance of U.S. involvement in Europe, however, has not.

With the end of the continent's artificial division along the inter-German frontier into hostile ideological blocks, the meaning of "Europe" has changed and its role in the world has evolved. If they are to have relevance in this new post-Cold War era, institutions built around Europe's previous divisions must also evolve, or else face creeping irrelevance. NATO may not be important to the world in precisely the way it used to be—as a breakwater against Soviet expansionism—but the cooperative security arrangements it embodies remain vital to European stability and to world peace.

Mr. President, NATO stands without peer in modern times as an institution capable of effective, coordinated international action in times of crisis. More important still, however, is the Alliance's much more quiet, everyday role as the ultimate underwriter of European peace, providing a supportive framework within which allied democracies can successfully consolidate themselves after difficult periods of transition and become valuable friends and partners in the best sense of these words. NATO expansion to incorporate the newly-liberated countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will help ensure that the Alliance remains an important guarantor of continental peace and stability in the years to come—and that America continues to play an engaged and productive role in European security.

I do not mean to suggest that NATO expansion has no costs, or that I am entirely sanguine about its potential implications.

I have been extremely concerned both about the anticipated financial costs of NATO expansion and about its potential impact upon U.S.-Russian relations.

With regard to the costs of NATO to the American taxpayer, I have discussed my concerns with both Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In particular, I have been very concerned about the great variation in cost estimates given during the last year or so, estimates that have ranged from a total of \$35 billion, or even more, over the next 10 years to a total cost of a

relatively small \$1.5 billion, with the United States share of that \$1.5 billion being approximately \$400 million.

As both Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright have pointed out to me, the highest estimates anticipated expanding NATO to four countries, rather than three, and were not based on information now available about the condition of Eastern Europe's military infrastructure. I am thus greatly encouraged by NATO's most up-to-date financial estimates which were based upon an intensive country-by-country survey of the Polish, Czech and Hungarian defense establishments.

This latest study, the methodology of which has been endorsed by the General Accounting Office as well as by the Department of Defense, indicates that the likely costs of NATO expansion are much lower than had been previously estimated.

Mr. President, this study does not pull the wool over anyone's eyes. The shrinkage of the official cost estimates since early 1997, in fact, represents movement along a learning curve, and the pleasant surprise of discovering, after much analysis, that Eastern European militaries are in much better shape than previously thought is largely responsible for much of the change in the estimate.

There will certainly be costs to military modernization in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, but most of these expenses will be borne by the new member countries themselves. Of the remainder, we will share the burden with our present NATO allies through our proportional contributions to the NATO common fund. All told, these expenses will not be significant compared to the benefits we will all reap from ensuring NATO's continuing role in securing European peace and security and stability.

With respect to U.S.-Russian relations, I have also been encouraged by the progress of our extensive Partnership for Peace Program with Moscow and of our mutual efforts to ensure that Russia's decaying strategic nuclear infrastructure remains secure against terrorism, theft and accident. Today, Russian and NATO diplomats sit together to discuss mutual concerns on a permanent joint council convened for this purpose. U.S. nuclear experts work very closely with Russian authorities in protecting the security of Russia's nuclear establishment.

Significantly, these crucial cooperative efforts with Russia have continued and even accelerated as NATO expansion has become more imminent. Most recently, the Russian Government announced in mid-April that it will push very hard to persuade the Duma to ratify START II strategic arms reduction agreement with the United States. These are not the hallmarks of a government preparing for a "new cold war" if Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic join our alliance. To the contrary, U.S.-Russian relations have been growing warmer, even as NATO has been preparing to expand.

I look forward, in fact, to seeing Eastern Europe develop a whole new continuum of productive relationships with the United States and the West, links that range from formal NATO military ties to expanded Partnership for Peace relations, to ever more important economic and cultural ties.

The Europe of the 21st century will not be one of haves and have-nots when it comes to transnational ties. Rather, it will be a Europe bound together in a mutually reinforcing web of different but complementary relationships stretching across the entire spectrum of public affairs. This is a Europe to which we should look forward with eager anticipation, and it is one in the creation of which NATO expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic can play an important role.

It is for these reasons, Mr. President, that after careful consideration and much deliberation I shall cast my vote in favor of NATO expansion. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HAGEL). The Senator from New Mexico.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Bill Monahan, a fellow in my office, be allowed the privilege of the floor during the consideration of this NATO enlargement resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to express serious concerns about this proposal to enlarge NATO. The question of whether we admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO needs to be judged in the overall context of our security needs in this post-cold war period. Today's security environment is uncertain and vastly different from the climate of the cold war for which the NATO alliance was created. New threats dominate our national security agenda. The new threats are well known to all of us. They are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and regional instability created by rogue states in the Middle East or northeast Asia, the specter of accidental nuclear launch and other high priority military threats. Those are the immediate security concerns which we have.

Yet, when I look at the national security threats that we have, it does not strike me that enlarging NATO is likely to help us meet those threats. An important distinction was made by Dr. Kissinger, a former Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, between the role of a military alliance and a collective security system. Dr. Kissinger—who, by the way, is a supporter of NATO enlargement—stressed that NATO is a military alliance which is established for the purpose of defending a specified area. In contrast, a collective security system or agreement is formed in response to aggression on a case-by-case basis. It does not maintain forces of its own and it is not re-

stricted to defending a particular geographical area.

We need to ask ourselves which of these two types of organizations enhances our security more: Expanding a military alliance that was formed to defend the territory of its members against a Soviet threat that no longer exists—that is one option which is the one before us, unfortunately—or, on the contrary, pursuing collective security arrangements designed to meet today's threats.

I am concerned that this near-sighted emphasis on NATO enlargement may increase rather than decrease our threat to security interest in Europe. At best, NATO enlargement is a distraction in that it diverts our attention from other higher priority concerns and alternative solutions, and, at worst, it could undermine our ability to address these more immediate priority military threats and perhaps reduce the cohesiveness of the NATO alliance upon which we have depended.

Which one it results in will largely depend on how we address the long-term risks of NATO enlargement, how this open-ended process becomes limited, and what its impact is upon the cooperative efforts between the U.S. and Russia to enhance our security mutually, the security of the U.S. and of Russia, in the spirit of partnership.

If we proceed with NATO enlargement, we must ensure that we do not erode our ability to meet our highest priority security concerns or preclude alternative collective security arrangements that may more effectively address these concerns.

Mr. President, I am considering introducing several amendments to the Senate resolution on the protocols regarding the accession of Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic. These amendments are intended to safeguard against some of the potential long-term risks associated with NATO enlargement.

First, let me express support for Senator WARNER's amendment to establish a 3-year moratorium on further rounds of NATO enlargement. I am an original cosponsor of that amendment. NATO membership for Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic cannot be separated from the larger issue of the administration's seemingly open-door policy for enlarging NATO.

According to the administration, any state of Central or Eastern Europe that meets certain democratic criteria is a potential candidate for NATO membership. Altogether there are nearly a dozen countries that are or may be candidates for NATO membership in the coming years. Included in that group are the three Baltic States, Slovenia, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Macedonia.

I support the goal of integrating Central and Eastern Europe into a united and democratic Europe free of the divisive legacy of the cold war. But the question is, how do we achieve that goal? In this regard I have some serious

concerns about the administration's open-door policy on enlarging NATO.

There are some fundamental questions that remain unanswered. We do not know whether these three candidate countries, the three we are considering in this resolution, are militarily and economically prepared to contribute to NATO's common defense.

As several of the speakers this afternoon have mentioned, cost estimates for enlargement vary widely. The burdensharing arrangements within NATO are still unresolved. NATO itself is still revising its post-cold war strategic mission.

At a minimum, I believe we in the Senate, if we proceed with expanding the Atlantic alliance, it is in America's and NATO's interest to take the time to fully assess the effects, both the costs and the benefits, of this round of expansion. A 3-year pause, as suggested in Senator WARNER's amendment, would give alliance members a reasonable time to do this. If things go according to NATO's plan, then alliance members, both the new ones and the old ones, will have updated NATO's strategic military mission well within that time frame. A pause would allow cost-sharing arrangements to be reached and payments to be received.

Let me turn to a few other issues that I intend to deal with by proposed amendment, Mr. President.

Currently, the NATO resolution contains language intended to require the President to consult the Senate prior to consenting to invite any additional states to join NATO. I commend the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for including that provision. It ensures that the Senate will be a partner in any decision to invite a state to begin accession talks with NATO.

We should have had such a provision in place before we got to this situation with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. But I intend to introduce an amendment that I believe complements and strengthens the provision that is now coming to the Senate floor. This amendment would require the President to report to Congress on the qualifications of any country being considered for NATO membership prior to the United States consenting to invite that country to begin accession talks with NATO as was done with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in Madrid last year.

The amendment further specifies the kind of detailed information to be provided, including each potential candidate's military preparedness to join NATO, the costs and burdensharing arrangements for integrating each potential candidate into NATO, and the impact that admitting each potential candidate would have on NATO's cohesiveness and other priority U.S. security concerns.

The second issue that I believe needs to be addressed by amendment relates to the strategic mission of NATO. Right now we in the Senate are being called upon to sign up to a policy of enlarging the alliance without a clear,

coherent explanation of how expansion of NATO will serve NATO's strategic interests. I am concerned because NATO itself does not seem to have an agreed upon strategic military mission.

For several months now, NATO members have been engaged in updating the alliance strategic concept. The current concept, which was last revised in 1991, is outdated, and all agree on that. It fails to take account of such critical events as the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO'S peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, or more recently the special relationships that NATO has established with Russia and the Ukraine.

NATO is currently debating administration proposals to expand the alliance's military charter to include operations in the Middle East and North Africa, a subject of considerable controversy for existing and prospective members alike. The alliance will also be reviewing its critically important nuclear policies. The updated strategic concept will not be completed by the time the Senate is expected to vote on this round of enlargement.

My amendment would withhold inviting additional countries other than Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for NATO membership until after NATO has approved a revised strategic concept. This is simply a matter of setting our priorities. NATO members need to decide on the alliance's mission before any new candidates are asked to join. Future candidates need to know what obligations they would be undertaking in seeking NATO membership.

This should not cause a delay for anyone. The expectation is that this revised strategic concept will be completed this summer.

Once a revised Strategic Concept is agreed, existing and prospective NATO members will be able to judge for themselves whether further expansion will in the long-run strengthen—or undermine—NATO's effectiveness in fulfilling its mission.

The third issue that I believe needs to be addressed before we conclude action on this proposed ratification of this treaty relates to the critical question of NATO membership for the Baltic States. The administration has repeatedly welcomed the aspiration of the Baltic States—Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia—to join NATO, most recently in signing a charter of partnership with those states this past January.

At the same time the administration tells us that this charter is neither a precommitment by the United States to NATO membership for the Baltic States, nor is it a backdoor U.S. security commitment to those states. I believe it is critical that we be clear on the Senate's understanding of the Baltic Charter for the record. I am considering an amendment stating that the Baltic Charter neither precommits the United States to Baltic membership in NATO nor provides those states with U.S. security commitments.

In addition, the NATO resolution must also be clear that it is essential

for the administration to consult with the Senate well in advance of any vote in the North Atlantic Council to invite a Baltic state to begin accession talks with NATO.

Our military commitments must be tailored to our national security priorities. An open-door policy for enlarging NATO will mean further expanding U.S. security commitments. At the heart of NATO is the mutual commitment under article V of the North Atlantic Treaty to the common defense of all NATO members in the case of attack. Since the end of the cold war, even as our armed forces have been reduced by a third, our security commitments have extended to Bosnia and Iraq and Northeast Asia and other hot spots around the globe.

As we consider setting an open-ended course for expanding our military commitments, we must keep in mind that our defense resources are limited. I question whether we are prepared to allocate limited defense resources to ever-expanding NATO military commitments ahead of our other defense priorities, priorities such as force modernization, readiness, or investment in research and development needed to preserve our technological edge.

I am particularly concerned about U.S. and NATO preparedness to meet these article V commitments if the Baltic States are invited to join NATO.

If the United States and its allies are not prepared to meet our article V commitments to the common defense of all NATO members, then expansion could create alliance-threatening divisions within NATO.

Mr. President, I do not propose to preclude the possibility of Baltic membership in NATO sometime in the future. But any invitation to the Baltic States would be a serious step that should first be thoroughly considered with the Senate's participation. In any case, Senate consent to ratification of the current protocols for Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic should in no way be interpreted as a preapproval of the Baltic States candidacy for NATO membership.

One final issue I want to raise today concerns continued U.S. support for the enhancement of NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative. Some have argued that if the Senate does not go along with NATO enlargement, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will be abandoned in "strategic ambiguity," exiled to a no-man's-land between NATO and Russia. I do not accept this view. An alternative already exists in NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative. In this initiative, there are 28 partner countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, including Russia, associating themselves with NATO. This initiative is an essential element to current and future peace and security in Europe extending to central Asia.

Experts on both sides of this NATO enlargement issue agree on the need for a strong Partnership for Peace.

Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, an advocate of NATO enlargement, testified before the Armed Services Committee on this very need to ensure that the Partnership for Peace initiative is not undermined in the process of expanding the alliance. He stated, "The Partnership for Peace should receive attention comparable to that accorded to enlargement. The experience of PFP membership should closely resemble the experience of NATO partnership."

So the amendment that I intend to offer on this issue would be a declaration of support for the Partnership for Peace intended to place the NATO resolution in an important context; that is, the complementary effectiveness of the Partnership for Peace initiative.

This amendment would declare that PFP is both an essential and enduring complement to the NATO alliance in maintaining and enhancing regional security. It would also endorse NATO efforts to enhance PFP, to strengthen its political consultative mechanism through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, to expand the operational role of the PFP, and to provide for increased participation of Partner countries in decision-making and planning within PFP. Many of these objectives are the same ones voiced in favor of NATO enlargement.

I am concerned about contentions that the whole purpose of PFP is to prepare Partner countries for future NATO membership. For a significant number of PFP Partners, that simply isn't their primary purpose in participating. It is essential that PFP continue to be valued as an independent component of the European security system and not be reduced or constrained to being a prelude to NATO membership. Accordingly, my amendment would also clarify that PFP membership does not in any way prejudice a country's application or consideration for admission to the NATO alliance.

I would note that, in contrast to NATO enlargement, Russian reaction to PFP is increasingly positive. While it has been a PFP Partner since the initiative began in 1994, Russia is now completing its first-ever Individual Partnership Plan, detailing the specific activities in which it intends to participate over the next few years. These include eleven PFP exercises, including one on its own territory.

In conclusion, I urge my colleagues to consider carefully the long-term risks associated with NATO enlargement. The Senate must be an active partner in any future decision to invite further rounds of candidates for NATO membership.

In the meantime, we need to focus our efforts on meeting our top military security priorities. We must ensure that NATO enlargement does not undermine our ability to address our most pressing security concerns. But I believe we should reserve higher priority for our cooperative efforts with

Russia to eliminate strategic nuclear weapons under START I, to secure Duma ratification of START II, and to advance discussions on further reductions of nuclear weapons under a START III framework. The cooperation between the national laboratories in my state of New Mexico and their counterparts in Russia remains critically important to the pressing problem of nonproliferation. In addition, the United States needs to engage Russia in a dialogue on additional joint steps beyond START to reduce the nuclear threat.

In summary, our primary security goal must be to promote a safe and stable security environment for the United States, our NATO allies, and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, including Russia. No further enlargement of NATO should be considered unless and until it can be clearly demonstrated that such a step serves this goal. We need to proceed cautiously, with clear priorities and thorough consideration of all options—whether NATO, the Partnership for Peace, or other security arrangements—for promoting the security and safety of the North Atlantic area as a whole.

Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator take a brief question?

Mr. BINGAMAN. I am happy to respond.

Mr. WARNER. I wish to commend the distinguished Senator. He has worked from the beginning with Senator SMITH, myself, and others as we began to examine the very serious questions.

The Senator raised an issue that caused me great concern, and that is the nuclear aspect and how in his State so much valuable work is now being done and has always been done on this question.

My understanding, having met with a number of Members of the Russian Duma—and I believe the Senator was present at the time that Members of the Duma came informally before the Armed Services Committee—there is a considerable doubt as to whether or not they will ratify the current arms control arrangements because of the question of NATO enlargement.

Is that the Senator's understanding?

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me respond to my friend from Virginia by saying that is my understanding. I have yet to speak to any high official in the Russian Government who felt this would be helpful, that us going ahead with this resolution particularly at this time would be helpful in bringing Russia along to ratify START II or to take any other actions that would be helpful in reducing the nuclear threat.

Mr. WARNER. In response, I say to my good friend, I talked with a number of Members of the Duma. I accompanied the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cohen, to Russia in the January time-frame, where we sat down in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and listened to the

protests of about half a dozen Members of the Duma for the better part of 2 hours. There was absolutely no equivocation on their part that they felt that the future ratification by the Russian Duma of the current arms control arrangement now pending is in great doubt.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I thank my friend from Virginia for his leadership on this important issue. As I indicated earlier, I am proud to be a cosponsor of the amendment that he is offering and hope we can gain the support of colleagues on that as well.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Thank you, Mr. President.

I might add to the comments of the distinguished Senator from Virginia in the discussion of the distinguished Senator from New Mexico that we had had some testimony along the same lines in the strategic subcommittee. General Xavier indicated he felt, likewise, that the Duma would be less inclined to provide—they believe that if, in fact, NATO expansion were to continue, this could very well jeopardize the START II talks.

I think it is also important to note—and I know the distinguished Senator made many visits to Russia, as I have in the past few years—the worst part of this, I don't sense anger on the part of some of our Russian colleagues, but I do sense frustration, especially those who want to see Russia move to a democracy and stay there. Small "d" democrats in Russia really believe—and I think they are correct—that this is not going to help their cause.

President Yeltsin has been steadfast and brave and courageous as he has tried to move, despite great odds and a lot of problems, especially inflation, to try to move Russia to the West and to democracy and to a good free market.

I think this is going to hurt it, and I think hurt it needlessly, because there is absolutely, in this Senator's opinion, no urgency whatever to make this decision, which is the part I just cannot understand—why there is this sense of urgency.

Only 2 short years ago, reading a quote from the President of the United States—actually 4 years ago, in which he gave a compelling reason not to have NATO expansion, and yet now it has all changed, and it didn't change that quickly.

Mr. WARNER. If my colleague would allow me, first I wish to thank the Senator. He has been an absolute leader on this issue from the very beginning, and at the beginning there were fewer than there are now. We are fortunate there is a growing number beginning to look at it from the perspective that the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire and I have had for some period of time.

Just today, I was privileged to have lunch with the mayor of St. Petersburg, Russia. I was on his right, and to

my immediate right was the deputy chief of mission here of the Russian Embassy. Now, never should the United States allow Russia to veto any of our foreign policy. We always must do those things that are in our strategic interest.

But I join the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire in his view that there is no rush to do this. It is a window of opportunity that Russia has seized upon to try to solidify their movement toward a solid democracy, try to solidify their struggle in the free market system of the world, at the same time they are dealing with tremendous political instability at home both in elective office and indeed in law enforcement. Both of these persons told me, formally in the discussion over luncheon not over 2 hours ago, it is of grave concern to them individually, of the timing of this move.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank my colleague for those remarks.

I just say to Senator WARNER, on January 10, 1994, along the same vein, President Clinton himself made the following statement, only 4 years ago:

Why should we now draw a new line through Europe just a little further east? Why should we now do something which could foreclose the best possible future for Europe? The best possible future would be a democratic Russia committed to the security of all of its European neighbors. The best possible future would be a democratic Ukraine, a democratic government in every one of the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, all committed to market cooperation, to common security and to democratic ideals. We should not foreclose that possibility.

That was the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, on January 10, 1994. I simply say to my colleagues, what has changed? What has changed?

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN. What does that quote have to do with anything? What does it have to do with anything relating to whether or not we should expand NATO? How is it inconsistent with expansion of NATO?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I think it has a lot "to do with anything." The President made these statements at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, and his point is that drawing a new line through Europe a little further east might jeopardize the relationship between the Russians and the United States and bringing the Russians into the democracy, into the West as a democratic nation. The Senator doesn't believe that is relevant to this?

Mr. BIDEN. With all due respect, the President never spoke of that in the context of drawing any new lines; he spoke in the context of being democratic nations.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I'm reading the President's quote. "The

best possible future would be a democratic Russia committed to the security of all of its European neighbors. We should not foreclose it." That was the time he followed in President Bush's footsteps of supporting the Partnership for Peace, which I also support. Now something has intervened—perhaps the election of 1996—that caused him now to change his mind, and suddenly now there is this urgent need to have these three nations become part of NATO.

Mr. BIDEN. I don't want to take the Senator's time. He was kind enough to yield for a question. If he would like to, I could continue this. Otherwise, I will let him finish his statement and I will respond and point out why, in my view, there is not the least bit of inconsistency between wanting to see Russia as a democratic nation and expanding NATO.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Let me say, when I came into the room and prior to coming into the Chamber, I listened to some of the debate of my colleagues on the other side of this issue. Very interesting. I thought for a moment that I was in a time warp, that I was back in the 1950s and was somehow privy to the debate here. I heard terms like "cold war," I heard terms like "evil empire," "Iron Curtain," and Stalin was mentioned, as was Yalta and the Soviet Union.

Unless I am missing something—and I try to pay pretty close attention to current events—I don't see that same situation in the world today. I think Stalin is gone. It is my understanding that he is. The Iron Curtain is no longer there, which Churchill talked about. Yalta divided up Europe, unfortunately, and now we have these nations who have sought and got a well-deserved freedom. Now the Senate is considering whether to add these three nations—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. That is the issue before us. The question is whether that is necessary or not in considering the situation right now in the world.

I just say to my colleagues, what is the threat today to those three nations or any other nation that may be coming into NATO in the future? What is the specific threat? Is there still a cold war? Is there still an Iron Curtain? Is there a massive Soviet army poised at the ready on the borders of Poland or on the borders of Germany or on the borders of Hungary or Romania or the Czech Republic? I don't see any. Is Russia now an absolute to become a democratic nation, never to be a threat to the United States? No, absolutely not. That is the point of the discussion. What is the best way to try to bring that nation into the democratic fold, not to turn to the East, not to turn to Red China, not to turn to Iran and other nations that could very well be a serious threat to the United States before the end of the 21st century?

But a few weeks ago when this matter first came up, it seemed to be a

foregone conclusion that we were going to run this thing through with no debate, essentially. Everybody was feel-good, emotional. These nations had "earned it." They are free and now they have earned the right to fall under the umbrella of NATO—25 percent of which is funded by the United States, I might add—and earned the right to become members of NATO. Then, after several of us had written a letter to the leaders and requested some time—we had a little difficulty getting it, but we did get the time to have a good debate, and I appreciate the fact that both Senator DASCHLE and Senator LOTT responded to that request. However, unfortunately, there is still other information that is out there that we would like to have. For example, the NATO report, which is not due until perhaps late next month or early in June; it would be nice to have that. We don't have that. Again, we are now trapped in this urgency—this urgency. There is this huge threat looming out there to these three countries. Yet, I have not heard anybody tell me what that threat is. I would be happy to yield to anybody on the floor now or later who would be willing to stand up and tell me what the threat is to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Where is the threat that forces us to immediately, this week, vote on NATO expansion?

Frankly, a growing number of us have come to the realization that expanding NATO is unwise. At worst it is unwise and unnecessary at best. It is time for a little thought. Some tried to get this thing to go through without any thought. I think that was the goal initially, to run this thing through before we had much time to think about it, analyze the thoughts, and before we had time to realize that there wasn't any threat, that this was emotional, feel-good politics. That is what this is.

If NATO enlargement made sense, it would have gained strength as the debate began, not lost strength. It is losing strength. There are more Members now than there were several weeks ago who are opposed to NATO expansion. The more it was discussed, the more opposition there was. My suspicion has been that many of those clamoring for that speedy vote did so out of fear that the case for enlargement may not just bear the scrutiny that it deserves—and it does deserve a lot of scrutiny for a number of reasons, which we will be getting into, costs among others. But in discussions with constituents over the recess and colleagues over the past several weeks, my suspicion has been confirmed. When asked careful questions, the American people have serious reservations. I think initially—and I was one of them—when it first came up, the emotional response was, wow, they have gotten their freedom finally. We spent trillions to help them win it—trillions. We sacrificed American lives, millions of Americans in uniform, to help defeat the "evil empire" that Ronald Reagan spoke about. And it

worked. But the question really is whether or not the so-called NATO umbrella makes sense right now. Now what are the people saying?

Hot off the presses is a poll from Opinion Research of Princeton, a nationwide poll, just completed today. They ask the following question to people across the country: "Congress is currently debating expanding the NATO military alliance to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Estimates of the cost to U.S. taxpayers from the first phase of expansion range from \$400 million to \$19 billion. Do you oppose or favor expanding NATO? Answer: Favor, 32 percent; opposed, 56 percent."

By almost a 2-to-1 margin, when you indicate that we do not have a handle on the cost, people are opposed.

These are facts. This is information that deserves to be part of the debate. This decision should not be based on polls. I will be the first one to agree with that. We should not be making a decision as important as the expansion of NATO based on polls. But it shows that when the American people understand and get information, they react accordingly. I think many members had the feeling that the American people were overwhelming in their support of this because it is an emotional feel-good thing to do. These nations suffered immensely under communism for a long, long time. And they earned their freedom.

The question is: How do we preserve and continue to protect that freedom? The question is, Mr. President, do we look back at the last 50 years, or do we look ahead at the next 50 years in terms of protecting that freedom? Because that is the question we are talking about here today. We are not talking about Stalin and the evil empire and the cold war. We are talking about the next 50 years, and hopefully the next 150 or 250 years. That is what we are talking about.

The best way to preserve and protect and defend these nations and their way of life is to have a Western Russia, a Russia that has moved into the West, a democratic Russia, and we ought to be doing everything in our power to see to it that that happens, and anything we do in any way to hinder that is a serious mistake, a mistake that we are going to pay for dearly down the road. It is a very shortsighted, a very, very shortsighted decision.

With or without NATO, the United States can come to the defense of any European nation next week, tomorrow, next year, or 5 years from now. Should Europe ever be threatened by Russia, or by anybody else, we can expand NATO. We can do it quickly.

But there is a lot to lose and very little to gain by expanding NATO now. We basically say to Russia: Don't worry about it. Don't worry about NATO expansion. It is OK. It is a defensive alliance. But it does not matter what we say. It matters what the Russians think. They have stated clearly

and officially they oppose expansion. It has been said by others on the floor, and I agree that we should not set our foreign policy based on what the Russians say, I will be the first to admit that, but we ought to realize there is a lot going on inside Russia and there is no threat to these nations from Russia.

So why not leave the window open a little bit longer? What is the urgency? What is the threat? Let me keep asking that question. Somebody rise on the Senate floor sometime during this debate, if not now, and tell me what the threat is. Tell me what the urgency is. There is no urgency. There is no threat. It is an emotional feel-good thing to do. They earned it. They are free. Let us put them under the umbrella of NATO and protect them. From what? We are still going to go to their defense if anything threatens them. Every person in the Senate knows it. The most important requirement for the Poles, the Czechs, and the Hungarians as far as their security is concerned is that America and Russia remain friends. That is the protection these nations need—that Russia and America become friends and remain friends. That is the issue here.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator allow me to observe that the American taxpayers, since 1992, have contributed \$2.6 billion in the spirit of that friendship to help Russia dismantle its weapons systems. And here this comes along and takes a red-hot poker and jams it right in their ribs.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. It sure does. The Senator knows that. He knows the Senator has worked on this issue tirelessly in the Armed Forces Committee and has visited Russia to see this.

I don't think anybody could deny that in the very near future Russia is going to be one of the, if not the, strongest nations in that region of the world. The question is, Whose side is it going to be on? Is it going to be on the Iranians' side? Is it going to be an alliance with the Chinese Communists? Or is it going to be on our side? If it is on our side, why will the Poles care, or the Czechs, or the Hungarians, or anybody else? The point is they wouldn't.

What we ought to be doing again is keeping the window open, using the advantages that we have to draw that out, to draw them this way. Senator WARNER has mentioned how they have reached out to do that. We are taking down tremendous numbers of weapons that have been aimed at the United States for decades.

But extending an alliance, which during the cold war the Soviet Union considered hostile, the countries that she doesn't threaten is basically kicking this former giant, like the Senator from Virginia said, poking them in the ribs. That is exactly what we are doing. God knows. I have stood on this floor many times and in the House Chamber before that and extolled the virtues of the United States against the cold war Soviet Union and voted trillions to de-

feat it. But let's not walk away from the victory. Let's not walk away from the victory. History shows that it is unwise to treat nations like that, and it is highly dangerous for countries in the middle, because these are the countries that are going to suffer if there is a confrontation that takes place between the United States and Russia again. It is the nations in the middle in Eastern Europe that are going to get the squeeze. That is where it is going to be fought. Those are the people who are going to suffer.

We are talking about costs. The cost was in that poll question. I am not sure what we are paying for it. Maybe someone else does. You have estimates as high as \$125 billion, some \$250 billion. It is not the issue of cost per se. It is that nobody knows what the facts are. Nobody knows what we are dealing with. That is why there is this uncertainty.

What if there is a threat and these nations were actually threatened? The question of cost would be irrelevant—I think. I think we would go to the defense of France, a current NATO member, and I would assume if these nations become members we would go to their defense if there was a threat. It would be irrelevant now as it was in the cold war, because we made the commitment if one is attacked, we are all attacked and we are going to do our part. But unfortunately, our part becomes the dominant part in NATO, and as current members shrink back from responsibility, this will increase our responsibility or our burden. There is no foreseeable conventional threat to any country in Europe, and no credible analysis disputes this. I challenge anyone to give me an analysis that shows how any nation in Europe today has a conventional threat. Is there a Russian army, a strong Russian army that has threatened France, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or England, or anybody else? Where is it? If it isn't, then what is the urgency? What is the threat?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Certainly I will.

Mr. BIDEN. If there isn't a threat, what is the need for NATO?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. That is a good question.

Mr. BIDEN. I think what is really at the heart of this is what was said, if I am not mistaken, in a sort of dress rehearsal of this debate—the Senator from Virginia and I appeared before a group of Connecticut voters who were down here at the request of one of our colleagues, Senator DODD. He may remember my saying the real debate on the floor is going to be whether there should be NATO.

The only thing I would like to state now, before I make my opening statement—in the context of a question so the floor hasn't been yielded to me; ordinarily I would not put it in the context of a question—is that isn't the

real debate here, if there is no strategic rationale for expanding, if there is discussion questioning the strategic doctrine of NATO as it exists now, as Senator BINGAMAN said, and if there is no threat at all, as my friend from New Hampshire says, the real question is—this is a veiled way of us saying: Should we have NATO at all? If there is no threat to France, no threat to Germany, no threat to Poland, then obviously don't expand but also don't have NATO. If there is a threat at all to Germany or to France or the other 15 nations, or 13 nations, then there is clearly a threat to Poland or to the Czech Republic.

You cannot have both. This call of no threat either present or anticipated, indicating there is no need to expand, I think, leads one to the conclusion that if they take that view, there should not be NATO. So I don't know why you don't just stand up and say why don't we just eliminate NATO because there we are spending, for assets devoted to NATO, counting our national budget, over \$100 billion a year.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUTCHINSON). The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator from New Hampshire because this is the type of debate the Senate should participate in and it is a good one. I will respond directly. The United States of America had to rescue Europe in 1917 and 1918. How well I remember; my father served as a doctor in the front lines of those battles. The United States came to the rescue again in World War II, and that is clearly in the minds of all of us. We have not had to respond with significant force in these 50 years for the very purpose that NATO has served as a collective defense, and to deter—to discourage, to put it in a layman's term—an attack on any of its members.

Second, the United States is there because we need, as a nation, a presence in Europe, and that presence of leadership, both in a military form of NATO and an economic and every other way, gives us the justification for a strong voice of leadership in Europe—NATO. So it has served a purpose and will continue to serve a purpose if we do not dilute it, as the Senator from New Hampshire has ably said.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator allow me 2 minutes to respond to that?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Go ahead.

Mr. BIDEN. I think the Senator has just made an overwhelming case why the Poles think it is so important. The Senator just points out, World War I, World War II—by the way, for those wars to get to France they had to roll over Poland first on the way. Then the reason why there was no war, as the Senator points out, after World War II—a cold war, not a hot war—is we had NATO. And the nations that we extended the umbrella of NATO to were kept free from fear of attack. Guess

what. Poland was occupied during that whole period.

Now Poland is no longer occupied, and they are worried that the world may have the same kind of amnesia that it had in 1917, and 1916, and 1915—and 1938 and 1939 and 1940. They are kind of worried because they figured it out, if you are under this umbrella, it dissuades anyone from invading you.

So if it is a rationale to keep Germany in NATO, and NATO protects Germany because that gives it that added security, you can kind of understand why the Poles think it also makes sense for them, since they have been the doormat to Western Europe.

There is much more to say about this. I will not go on. But the point is that NATO membership significantly reduces the prospect that anyone now or in the future would conclude that you are a worthy target of their aggression. That is the point the Senator is making. And the clear notion is that if in fact Poland were part of this alliance, to take one country, they would not have to wonder any longer whether or not they would have to wait for the Brits to do something—as occurred in World War II. They would not have to wonder if Russia or anyone else understood that Poland was no longer the doormat of Europe.

If all goes well, as I anticipate, and I vote with my taxpayers' pocketbook to try to promote democracy in Russia—if all goes well, then in fact there is not any greater need in Russia for Poland to be a member of NATO than for Germany to be a member of NATO. There may be no need for NATO. Or it may be that Russia is part of NATO. But we are in a position, as the Washington Post says:

American interest in expansion lies in reducing unpredictability and instability in an arc that has generated the century's major wars.

One of the things, as the Post and many others have tried to point out, and as I have tried to point out on the floor before, part of Russia's necessary post-cold war evolution, mental evolution, if you will, is to understand and consider the novel notion that its neighbors have a right to whatever national orientation they want. Most other democracies in the world have figured that out. Most other nations have figured that out. And if you are not going to—the current likelihood that there is little danger that is posed for these three countries or any other part of Europe, it seems to me, again to paraphrase the Post, "makes it smart and a cheap buy for the extra security now, in case things don't go the right way."

But the bottom line is this: If, in fact, there is a rationale for us to continue to be a member of NATO, and I believe there is, and to continue to make commitments to the likes of Germany and other allies—if there is a rationale for expanding NATO on the Soviet Union's border bringing in Turkey not too many years ago, there is a ra-

tionale to bring Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary under that umbrella.

I will conclude—and I thank my colleague for allowing me to respond—but I conclude by suggesting to you that the way to the greatest certainty that Russia continues along its democratic trek and nonimperialistic instinct is to have these nations within NATO, forever removing the realistic possibility that they are part of the hegemony of the former Soviet Union or Russia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank my colleague for his comments. I in no way object or feel interrupted. I think this is a good way to debate the issue. It is much better than a series of monologues, I think, in regard to this issue.

I would just say to my colleague, though, I am trying to accomplish, I think, the same thing that he is, which is that Poland or any other country not be a doormat for anyone else ever again. I think that really goes to the heart of the debate here; what is the best way to accomplish that?

My point is—and I am a supporter of NATO, always was and still am—but I believe that what we have here is a window of opportunity that allows us to try to pull the Russians to us. If the Russians right now were threatening Poland, I would say it is urgent—or were even talking about threatening Poland—it is urgent to move forward on this. We would still go to their defense, in my opinion, anyway. But that is an academic argument.

Mr. BIDEN. But we never did. We never did. Twice before we didn't, not until after the fact, not until after they were no longer an independent nation. We never did.

I believe—I hope we would, too. But understand it from their perspective. We never did.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. It is still going to take a commitment, whether you are in NATO or not, it is still going to take a commitment to defend Poland, period. You have to have a will to do that, whether you are in NATO or not.

The point here is we have an opportunity, where the Russians have reached out to us ever so slightly, but as the Senator from Virginia has talked about in strategic weapons reduction, in trying to look at what Yeltsin has gone through, the market reforms—1000 percent inflation a few years ago down now to 8 percent. They have worked hard to try to make this thing work with a lot of strong leadership.

I don't think this is the way to encourage them to continue to do that. This Senator, I guess much like Nixon going to China, is hardly one who has been soft on the Russians or the Soviet Union over the past several years of my public life, and certainly I have been in as strong opposition to them as anyone else. But also a strategist has

to look at the real world, and I don't think we ought to be looking at just simple, cheap analogies here. We ought to be looking at the real world, and the real world is today, not what it was yesterday. Yesterday the real world was Stalin, was the cold war, was the "evil empire," was expansionist tendencies, and was the NATO which came forth to block all of that.

Today, we don't know what the future will bring; therefore, we do need NATO. But the question is, "Do we need NATO expansion?"; not, "Do we need NATO?" Those are two different issues. Do we need NATO? Yes. Do we need NATO expansion in order to make this transition? I don't believe that we do. I think that is really the crux of this issue. There is no urgency.

Again, what is the urgency? I say with the greatest respect to my colleague. What is the urgency? What now is the threat that is perceived, that you perceive to be, that makes this necessary to do today or tomorrow rather than to give the Russians some more time to make these reforms work, to perhaps get the START II agreement that the Senator from Virginia was talking about? What is the urgency? That is really the thrust of my involvement here.

I will be happy to yield for a comment.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I can make a historical observation. You raise the passions by saying we didn't come to the defense of Poland. It was September of 1939 when Hitler directed his forces across the border with an element of surprise with the panzer divisions and went against the Polish cavalry, in large measure, with lances. If you have never seen the footage of that battle, it is extraordinary.

Mr. BIDEN. I have.

Mr. WARNER. Subsequently, Stalin and Hitler partitioned and cruelly crucified the Polish people. But at that time, I say to my good friend from Delaware, the United States was holding its maneuvers with dump trucks acting as tanks and with wooden rifles or broomsticks. We were not the superpower, nor the military strength, as we are today.

I say to the Senator and my good friend, don't try to raise the passions that this country turned its back on Poland then and would now do so. The keyword that the Senator from New Hampshire used is "instability." And where is that instability? It is not in Poland, it is not in Hungary, it is not in the Czech Republic, but with the Russian nation struggling to work with democracy and an economic free-market system and the problems at home of the succession of Yeltsin. That is the instability. And, I might add, if we are going to use the military argument, the Red Army barely put down a minor revolution in Chechnya, which it had to fight for over a year, using every piece of modern equipment that they have, and barely did they subdue that small segment of the former Soviet Union.

Mr. BIDEN. Let me respond, if I may, to the question of urgency and the process to clarify the issue of going to Poland's defense.

My point about going to Poland's defense did not relate to whether Americans were courageous, were good, were bad, or kept or didn't keep a commitment. It was a statement of fact.

My friend talks about the real world. The real world, that was 1939. We got in the war on December 7, 1941. In the meantime, nothing happened. We were a major power. My colleague points out that we weren't militarily prepared. By our own choice, we weren't militarily prepared. But other nations that were allegedly militarily prepared were powers on the continent. They also did nothing, and they watched.

All I am pointing out to you is, from a Pole's standpoint, it is of little consequence to tell them, "Don't worry, if you're ever threatened, we'll be there, we'll be there." That would be like saying to most Poles, "The check's in the mail."

They look at history, like other nations have looked at history, and they know what has happened to them, and they know the powers who had power did not respond when power was available and they were in trouble. I think it is unrealistic to think that we should expect the Poles to assume that, especially with some of the comments made by my colleagues on the floor in this debate over the last couple weeks about whether or not it is in our vital interest that Poland be free. That question was raised on the floor, and it is raised constantly in the minds of those who deal with the issue of European security.

So, from the Polish standpoint, there is a clear, clear reason for them to know and understand that there is a big difference between being part of an alliance where the sacred word and trust of a nation is committed in advance and being left to the vagaries of rationalization on the part of a country after the fact to justify why they did or did not go to the aid of a country in question. It is a big difference. If it is not a big difference, then why do we have any treaties at all?

With regard to the real world—let's look at the real world. The real world is, as my friend from Virginia has pointed out, that we have committed over \$2 billion dealing with arms control agreements and providing American dollars to allow them to keep a commitment that they made with regard to arms control treaties.

All of the Western European nations, the United States included, have contributed over \$100 billion to Russia since the wall has come down and the empire has broken up. We, along with our other NATO allies, have taken the unprecedented step, accused by many on the right of having yielded our sovereignty to Russia by doing the NATO-Russian accords where they have full transparency within NATO.

We have and continue to seek ways in which to restore—"restore" is the

wrong word; there never was a democracy—seek to provide the circumstances where democracy can flourish in a market economy with American tax dollars and German tax dollars and French tax dollars. So there is no reason—no reason—whatsoever for the Russians—no real world reason for the Russians to conclude that they are viewed as the enemy, the enemy by us. Any indirect comparison to the Weimar Republic is bizarre. We were exacting reparations from them; we are sending dollars, we are sending deutsche marks, we are sending francs, we are sending pounds to Russia, maybe not as much as we should, in the minds of some of us, but we are.

With regard to the urgency, the worst time in the world to have to enlarge an alliance is at the moment of threat, because then it leads the other country in question to conclude that if they do not act out what we fear they will do before the alliance is reached, they will be in a weaker position.

I respectfully suggest that urgency isn't the question. The question relates to, Is this the time and the moment, 9 years after the wall has come down—almost 9 years now after the wall has come down—to end once and for all the artificial boundaries and the ability of any nation, including Russia, to suggest that individual nations within Central and Eastern Europe do not have the ability to choose their own natural and national alliances?

That is the urgency. The urgency is, the opportunity is here. It is the cheapest way to do it. It did not come as a consequence of any fad. It was debated and reflected among the NATO nations, not a decision made alone by the United States of America.

Fifteen other European nations thought it was in their interest and the interest of the West, did not feel that it would increase their jeopardy and offend the Russians to do this, and unanimously all voted to take in these three nations. The only debate related to whether we should take in three or five. That was the debate among our NATO allies.

So let me conclude—and I thank my colleague again for yielding this time—the urgency is that this is the most propitious time to end—to end—the artificial division of Europe and the implicit recognition that any country in Europe, including Russia, has the right to some buffer zone or has the right to impact upon the national decisions of a neighbor in that neighbor's determination to enter into a defensive alliance they view in their national interest—and I emphasize the word "defensive."

I yield the floor and thank my colleague.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Let me say to my colleague, I posed the question to you about urgency, and you answered it. And I commend you for that. I do not agree with your assessment of urgency.

I think that, to me, "urgency" would be a military urgency, a perceived

threat. It is not an urgent matter to make this decision today or tomorrow or within the next few months. It might be a matter that could, in your opinion, enhance the situation to prevent an emergency or an urgency, but I do not see it as that right now.

You mentioned—the Senator from—

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for one point?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN. I ask, would the Senator not acknowledge when we expanded to bring in Greece and Turkey, expanded to bring in Spain, there was also no emergency?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Correct.

Mr. BIDEN. No more urgent than now.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. There was a Soviet Union then.

Mr. BIDEN. A Soviet Union, but there was no specific threat that I am aware—specific change.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. The specific threat was the specific threat of the Soviet Union that was still there.

Mr. BIDEN. I see. I am trying to define—I mean, I am trying to get a clearer picture of what the Senator means by "urgent." He is not suggesting it requires there be a Russian division breathing down the throat, making threats to come across the line, merely that there was this power, this entity, that existed that, if it chose to exercise its military strength, was a real threat.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Clearly, yes. It clearly had the capability to send an army into Western Europe if it so chose, if we had not stood up to stop it.

I think the issue, though, of dividing lines—I believe the Senator used the term "dividing line" or "artificial lines" or "demarcations in Europe," saying, "See, I think it's the opposite." I think by doing this, we are creating artificial lines in Europe, and we are picking winners and losers. These three—why these three nations and not six, seven, eight others?

And I think we are going to have a permanent sense of disruptions, if you will, now in Europe over the next several years as this debate comes up over and over and over again as to who is next and who would be the next country to go in.

As far as going back to 1939 and what happened—we have 100,000 troops in Europe today. If we had 100,000 troops in 1939, Hitler may not have come into Poland with his panzer divisions. I think that is a very important point here. It is not that we are sitting there in a sterile vacuum in Europe with nothing there. We have NATO now. We have armed forces there. And, again, my objective here is to see to it that we create an environment that, hopefully, will see a peaceful relationship between the United States and Russia which will enhance the protection of these very nations that we talk about.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield on the point of 100,000 troops?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I think again we should focus on what my colleague from New Hampshire said about the real world. I think that is a legitimate point to make.

The real world several years ago was, we had 338,000 American troops in Europe. Today we have 100,000. That should make it awfully clear to Russia that ours is not an aggressive posture. The expansion of NATO is not for purposes of encircling and/or crushing Russia. The real world is, all indicia out there that are available for the Russians to look at—I understand the psychology, but the real world is, there is no threat, this is a defensive alliance.

With regard to drawing lines—I do not suggest in any way, in mentioning what I am about to say, that my friend from New Hampshire in any way wishes to ratify Yalta, but the practical fact of the matter is, Yalta was a deal made out of at the time, viewed by that President at the time, a necessary requirement to basically say, "Hey, look. Hey, look, you've got this sphere of influence. This is the line drawn in Europe." At the time, there was not this anticipation there was going to be this carnage that would result, there would be this overwhelming suppression that would result. "But here is the deal. Here is the line we are going to draw you. You have this buffer zone." That is what it was all about.

To say now that these nations cannot come in is to ratify in a different way but the same line. Why? "You can't come in because the successor to the Soviet Union—Russia—does not want you in." So when I say "redrawing the lines," I say, to say they cannot come in ratifies the old line drawn after World War II.

And when you erase that line, it is, in my view—and I respect the Senator from New Hampshire and all those who oppose expansion, but I argue it does not send a line closer to the Soviet Union for purposes of encircling; it says that there is no automatic line either of us, East or West—Russia—the United States, Russia-Germany, Russia-anyone else—is going to say, ipso facto, that no nation can make its own choice as to wherein they wish to have their alliance reside. That is what it says. That is what it says.

So, therefore, when I say "redrawing a line"—excuse me, "erasing a line," the line I am talking about erasing is Yalta. And separate and apart from the physical occupation of those countries, at its root it was an admission and an acknowledgment of a sphere of influence of one country over—over—the fate of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe on the grounds that to do otherwise would put them in jeopardy, they had a right to at least indirectly control the national decisions of those nations relative to where they viewed their security to lie, in what alliance, if any.

So to not extend, in fact, in my view, is a bold confirmation that that sphere of influence still remains. And that is a tragic historic mistake, in my view.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I really would take issue with the comparison between the situation today we are talking about with the expansion of NATO and Yalta. We had a ground war, a terrible war that impacted almost every nation in Europe, Western and Eastern, that was costly, and at the end of it, with two sides converging, the Americans and the Russians converging on Europe, basically, I believe in a horrible mistake—I think the Senator would probably agree—the politicians sat down and carved up Europe and therein caused the problem that we faced. And from that came NATO and the cold war and everything else.

This is not what we are talking about today. This is Russia today. This is a country that has had its ears pinned back pretty well as far as its conventional forces. It still has a ton of nuclear material and certainly nuclear weapons, tons of it, literally, that we are interested in working with them to get rid of.

But I do not know what message it sends, not only to the American taxpayers but also to the Russians themselves, to say, on one hand, as the Senator is saying, that we would provide moneys to this empire, former evil empire, to take down their strategic systems—and we are doing that with Nunn-Lugar and other funds—and, on the other hand, spend as much as \$250 billion to bring nations into an alliance to defend ourselves against that very same nation. Now, there is an inconsistency there somewhere, that sooner or later somebody will figure out that it doesn't make sense. I think we have to understand that.

I say to my colleague from Delaware, I am about to wrap up. I know the Senator has a statement. I have been on the floor quite some time and I will yield in a moment.

We are creating insiders and outsiders here. In my humble opinion, what we are going to do if we act on this this week is say to three nations, "You guys are winners; we are picking you." You talk about Yalta; if there is a comparison, that is it. They picked winners and losers at Yalta. We are picking winners and losers. You three nations, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, you are the good guys. You get the protection of NATO.

Tomorrow, next year, or 3 years from now, depending on how this is resolved on the expansion vote here, depending on what amendments may pass, we will see this revisited again with other countries—whether it be Romania or some other country down the line, Slovenia, and on and on, Latvian countries. We will see this come up again and again. The same issue is going to have to be argued again and again and the same hard feelings.

Again, going back to the position of the point of urgency, I just don't see

what the urgency is to do that and to continue that kind of dialog and that kind of agitation. Basically, it is a permanent agitation that will go on for years and years and years. If at any time the Russians, the nationalists in Russia, the Zhirinovskys of the world were to assume power or even to look like they were going to assume power, we do what we have to do.

Adding these three insiders creates more outsiders. That is the issue. This is a perpetual anguish that will be taken up year after year after year here on the Senate floor and will be debated nationally, and all the difficulties—and I think if the Senator would talk to some of the arms control people in the current administration, he might be surprised at some of the information they might give you on the QT as to how they feel about NATO expansion and what it might do to the strategic arms talks. I have talked to some of them, and it is interesting what they have to say. This will be disruptive for the alliance as a whole, and as member nations are encouraged or compelled to take sides, it will cause stress in the whole alliance.

The end of the cold war, NATO faces internal issues, serious ones about its means and its end, whether Bosnia-type missions are appropriate. Is a Bosnia mission appropriate for NATO? Do we know that? We couldn't find unity in the Persian Gulf war when we had the threat from Saddam Hussein. We could not get unity. We saw evidence in the Libyan situation where the French Government refused to allow our aircraft to fly over their country. We have not had a big, rosy picture of unity even among NATO nations at all times, although the alliance has worked well on the whole. There are a lot of issues that need to be desperately looked at regarding the current NATO before we start exacerbating the problem by adding new nations.

Enlargement, in my opinion, is a token, well intended, but a token and unimagined distraction from real problems. That is my concern. I get a little tired of the old cold-war dividing line reference and how we left the countries out in the cold and somehow we owe them.

A lot of Americans died, a lot of Americans put on uniforms, a lot of taxpayers ponied up to the tune of trillions and trillions of dollars to help them get that freedom. They earned it. I am glad they have it. Not letting them in NATO is not going to do one thing to harm it at all. It may enhance it. In fact, in my humble opinion it will enhance it because we will draw the Russians, I believe, out toward the West and not to the East, which I believe in the long run protects their freedoms.

In conclusion, this should not be a sentimental decision about our historic relationship with Europe. It ought to be a hard-nosed decision about extending a military guarantee to a precise piece of territory under current strategic circumstances.

I think, again, it is about the next 50 years, not the last 50.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Before the Senator leaves the floor, let me thank him again for allowing me to engage and be engaged while he spoke.

Before he leaves the floor, I indicated to Senator WARNER, and at least in an informal way I invite the Senator—it requires no invitation—I invite the Senator from New Hampshire, maybe we can work out a time tomorrow where those interested in the cost issue would be here to debate.

The cost of \$250 billion for expansion of NATO is bizarre, in my humble opinion. I will lay it out in detail why it is tomorrow. All of NATO combined, including our national budget now, doesn't cost but half that, less than half of that. How adding three nations would more than increase over 200 percent over the cost—I guess I assume the Senator is talking over a 10-year period—but essentially increase by 50 percent the costs of NATO is beyond me.

I think it may be orderly and useful to our colleagues and to the public if those of us who, as the Senator from New Hampshire does, have spent a lot of time researching the detail related to the cost in trying to decipher and explain the reasons for the inconsistent numbers. The inconsistent numbers relate to what we talk about as the unified budget, the national budget, and so on, what we allocate as part of our—for example, we spend a lot of money, \$300 billion a year, roughly, for defense. Is that all accountable to NATO? Do we say that the United States is spending \$300 billion a year on NATO? What portion of that is the consequence of us belonging to NATO? When we build a runway and so on, is it because of NATO?

The NATO budget and the cost relating to expansion I think are very, very important and warrant a very focused and coherent presentation by each of us.

I will be here tomorrow prepared to do my best to outline in detail why we are talking more on the order of \$40 million a year rather than \$200 billion, and I will lay out my reasons. Hopefully, Senator WARNER and Senator SMITH and others will come and lay out in detail why they believe rather than picking an estimate that has been set out by someone, explain how they arrive at those numbers.

I must say, if you tell my constituency to keep NATO—forget expanding, if you told them to keep NATO—it was going to cost them \$250 billion, I imagine the referendum in my State would go through like a hot knife through butter. They would say get out. Obviously, if you set a number where the costs could be from \$40 million to \$150 billion, as I think the Princeton Survey was, although I may have heard it incorrectly, that came hot off the

press, obviously a majority of the people would say, "I am not for that. You mean to tell me I'm signing on for 150 billion bucks?"

I will be here tomorrow, and it might be useful to pick a time when we can be here, all of us interested in the cost, to debate it in some detail.

In the meantime, I will take this opportunity to make a broader statement and I will respond to some of the things said today.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to yield.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Your colleague has said he would have a formal estimate of costs for Senator WARNER and that will arrive in a time we can do that kind of debate.

Mr. BIDEN. It will arrive in the form of the Senator from Delaware. We do have a formal estimate of the cost, and the chairman of the full committee was, I think, being his usual diplomatic self in saying that. Maybe it is best that we debate this in a coherent way and a very specific way. So that is why he asked the Senator to submit in writing, if I am not mistaken—Senator WARNER submit in writing; I was not here at the time—his questions and the basis of his analysis of the cost and he would come back with a formal response.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN. Maybe we could all try to work out a time through our offices if they are listening, although I'm not sure when I speak my office listens, but if they are listening, maybe the other offices might see if we can coordinate a time on the floor tomorrow where we could enlighten one another and enlighten the country about the cost of the matter.

Mr. President, as the Senate begins reconsideration of the resolution of ratification for enlargement—and I and others who are for or against expansion all agree on one thing: I strongly believe it was a mistake, for whatever scheduling reasons, to have brought this up, then delayed it, put other things before it, and then brought it back up. So my hope is—and those who support expansion and those who oppose it have all communicated to their respective leaders that we hope nothing will intervene during the consideration of this debate so that we can give it the time and attention and detail that the public is entitled to.

The truth of the matter is, all those folks sitting back behind the bar, back there on both sides, they, along with me and a number of others, have already devoted hundreds of hours to this. This is not a new deal. This is not something that all of a sudden we woke up one morning and said, you know, I feel like expansion today, let's expand, and here we go, let's go through it. This has been a long, serious debate, which has taken place within NATO among the military types and the political types. It has taken place within the national governments of each of

the other NATO nations. It has taken place within this country, within the administration.

There was a NATO observers group that, in my 25 years in the Senate, was granted unprecedented access to the decisionmaking process. There were 28 of us, the bulk of whom participated, while the decision to invite, if to invite, and who to invite, to join NATO was being made. We went to Europe on several occasions. I bet there were at least a half dozen trips of the NATO advisers to Europe to meet with the military in each of the existing NATO countries and all of the aspirant countries.

I myself spent time with my colleague, Dr. Haltzel, next to me here at the moment. We went to Russia, we went to Poland, we went to the Czech Republic, and to Hungary, and to Slovenia, and we met with all of the relevant parties—every leader of every major faction within the political spectrum in Russia today. We had long, private, and sometimes contentious, but always frank meetings. We met with military personnel. We met with the Polish Chief of Staff of the military. We met with the Defense Minister, the Prime Minister, and every major player. We did the same in each of the countries in question. We have hosted the NAC. I was at a meeting with Senator ROTH—I am the cochair and he is the chair of the NATO observer group—where there was so much brass in the room, I thought the floor was going to crack. If I am not mistaken—and I may be mistaken—I think the person comparable to our chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was present for every one of the nations in question, every one of them. I am serious. We debated and we argued and we discussed. It was open and frank. There is nothing new about this, and there is nothing quick about it.

The wall went down almost 9 years ago. The Soviet Union crumbled. It ended its existence. That was not yesterday, but a long while ago, in political terms. No one rushed out to judgment. The other thing I should point out is that we, under Secretary Perry, the predecessor to Senator Nunn, sent out a group of what he called the Perry principles, the requirements that each—I said Senator Nunn, who was our colleague who I wish was still here; he has a different view from me on this. Senator Cohen is the Secretary of Defense. I know it, Bill, if you are listening, I know it is Senator Cohen. But the truth of the matter is that Secretary Perry set out some criteria that were minimum requirements for any aspirant country to have to meet. By the way, just setting out criteria has fundamentally changed the dynamic and the picture in Central and Eastern Europe, without even joining NATO.

If I told my colleagues in 1992 that I believed by the year 1998 that we would have a circumstance where there was an accommodation to the Hungarian minority in Romania or that any border disputes or claims were settled by

Eastern European countries—and I could name them—and a whole range of other things, that there would be total civilian control of the military in Poland, et cetera, I think they would have thought that probably wasn't going to happen. But because we said to all nations who wish to be part of NATO, hey, look, there are certain basic drop-dead requirements to even be considered, democracies who lack imperial designs, abide by certain rules, and here are the minimum rules even to get in the game, and we laid them out—I might note, parenthetically, that I attended a conference with some leading Chinese Government folks—not dissidents—and we get the same kind of arguments with regard to China. If you want China to continue its market programs and market economies, you have to go easy on them. You have to back up and you have to slow up.

The question I raised there was, hey, wait a minute, if in fact you want to be part of the civilized world and seek civilized behavior and civilized treatment, when you sign an agreement and make a deal, should we not hold you to that deal? There are certain minimum requirements to be able to establish your bona fides as even an aspirant democracy or a market economy.

In the case of Russia, can anybody in Russia say now, next year, or could they say yesterday that the minimum requirement for a peaceful democracy is, by the way, my neighbor has a right to choose, assuming it is nonthreatening to me, whatever alliance they wish. It is called their national sovereignty. We relinquish any claim to hegemony. It seems to me to be a minimum nonstarter if you fail to do that, a minimum requirement, a nonstarter, if you fail to do that. How have we threatened Russia? I am the author of the act that became the Freedom Support Act under President Bush. What have we done to threaten Russia? The irony is how the tables are turned here.

In the early 1970's, some of my conservative colleagues would look at me as if I were an apologist for the Soviet Union. And here I am now saying expand NATO to include these three nations, assuming they meet the criteria, and extend beyond what we already have, a hand of friendship and help to Russia. They are not inconsistent. As a matter of fact, in my humble opinion, if you would like to diminish the drive toward democratization in Russia, if you would like to diminish the prospects of an emerging market economy in Russia, let the browns and the reds, let the nationalists within Russia crow about how their unsatisfactory response to expansion in NATO was the reason why the United States did not go along and vote to expand NATO. If you want to give antidemocratic forces in Russia a boost, that is a good one. That is the one to do.

That is not the intention of any of my colleagues. This is a legitimate, honest, and open debate. I am not ques-

tioning the motives of any man or woman in this body. Not a one of us desire anything other than security in Europe and a democratic Russia. That is a universe that all of us can agree on in this body.

I think we kind of have it backwards, because, as I said earlier, I think what is strung throughout this, as Senator WARNER and Senator SMITH of New Hampshire—I do not want to put words in their mouths. So I will say they did not take strong exception to my saying what this is really about is whether or not there should be a NATO; not whether or not to expand NATO but whether or not there should be a NATO. That is a legitimate debate. We have not addressed that in 50 years. For 50 years, we have said this is a good thing. The world has changed, as they point out. It is legitimate to debate whether or not we should even have NATO. But let's not confuse expanding to include these three countries with whether or not there should even be a NATO. If it is about NATO and its existence, let's debate it. Because, as I said, I constantly hear, What is the threat? My response is, If you don't think there is any threat now or in the future, why NATO? Why not save a lot more money? Why not bring all 100,000 folks home? Let's do that. Some would say, yes, let's do that. But I think it is real important we get our facts straight. After a tremendous amount of study and discussion by more than 70 Senators and 4 different committees, and the Senate NATO observer group, before we began the debate, we began on the floor last month to focus attention on whether we were going to vote up or down for or against expansion.

So I welcome this climactic debate. As with many momentous decisions, there are legitimate questions to be asked, and it is always easier to criticize than create. But, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues not to fall into the trap of failing to see the forest for the trees. Let's step back a little bit and take a look at the big picture.

By enlarging NATO membership to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, we will merely be catching up with reality. For centuries, these three countries have been part of the West. Four decades of Communist oppression and isolation was the historical aberration that has been all but corrected culturally and economically. Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw are now every bit as European as Madrid, Paris, and Berlin. It would be, in my view, indeed, perverse to recreate Stalin's immoral and artificial dividing line through the heart of Europe. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic belong in NATO, and in the European Union. They will soon join these organizations.

I would parenthetically note, if you were a Russian and you had the choice of having other European nations near you join NATO, or join the EU, I suspect they would view their economic

interests as the most negatively impacted upon by the EU being enlarged and them not being a part of it.

What are we talking about? We talk about how we are offending the Europeans or expanding the EU. We are offending Russia to expand the European Union. Great. Great. You are sitting in Russia. Hey, good idea. I now have bilateral relationships that work pretty well with Poland and with Hungary and with these other countries. But I will tell you, they are now going to join the EU, and we don't get a piece of the action.

Look, you cannot have it both ways. If this is about Russian pride, Russians feeling they are not part of the West, Russians not being involved in a way that they see their future in the West, then how does isolating them economically in the same way it is isolating them militarily, how does that convince any Russian leader? "They won't let me sell my widgets in Paris. But they say I am part of the West. They are welcoming me. I need to sell my widgets so I can employ my people."

The same polls we hear bandied about—the last poll I recall being conducted in Russia, the Russian people didn't even raise NATO on the scale of concern. Zero. Literally zero, of little or no concern to them.

So it would be perverse if we were to say that, "Hey, by the way, you can't join NATO until you are part of the EU." As if Russian is going to say, "Oh, that's a good idea. I really want Poland in the EU and a member of NATO. That will make me feel a lot better."

It is kind of hard to get a handle on this. But let me just read this poll: 53 percent say Poland—this is in Russia, a Gallup poll, March 14 of this year—53 percent say Poland should be allowed to join NATO.

Did you hear what I just said? Fifty-three percent say Poland should be allowed to join NATO; 57 percent say the Czech Republic should be allowed to join NATO; 54 percent say Hungary should be allowed to join NATO, and 25 percent had no view on the matter. Threat? That is one of the reasons I think, by the way, that the Russian people think that, No. 1. This is conjecture on my part; no poll says this. I cannot cite any evidence of this. But I think they are like the American people. They are pretty smart, intuitively pretty smart. They know if Poland is part of NATO that any of the hare-brained schemes any of their leaders may have in the future about sending their boys to Poland will be eliminated. I think they are pretty smart. They kind of have us figured out.

If, in fact, national Poland is a part of NATO, they realize their political leadership in the future, as well as what is already done now, will have to finally shed 500 years, from czar through commissar, of a notion that somehow in American terms there is a manifest destiny for Russia to control Poland or any other place west of their boundaries.

Don't you kind of find it fascinating that a majority of the Russian people say these countries should be able to join? We talk about this like it is a vacuum, where we are operating in a vacuum. How about all those European countries, our allies? I am not suggesting we should take a different kind of poll; that is, the more nations that agree, the better it is. But in counter to the argument that you know the best way to bring Russia around permanently is not to have NATO expanded. But the countries who are most threatened by Russia over the years, don't you kind of find it fascinating they think expansion is a good idea? We hardly agree with the French on anything. We can't even agree with them on Coca-Cola. We hardly have similar values. We hardly agree on any foreign policy national matter, except NATO. They think it is a good idea. The Brits think it is a good idea. The Danes and Spaniards think it is a good idea. The Italians and Greeks think it is a good idea. It is the only thing the Greeks and Turks agree on.

Those who argue for expansion sometimes exaggerate the benefits that flow from this picture. I assure you that those who argue against expansion vastly exaggerate it and the potential damage that can be done to the emergence of a democracy in Russia.

I ask my colleagues: What are we worried about? Are we worried about Russia? Of course, in public most Russian politicians will grouse about NATO enlargement. Public pronouncements cost them nothing. But from my many conversations with Russian politicians, both here and in Moscow, I can tell you that not one—not one, I repeat, not one—think that the entry of Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO will constitute a military threat to Russia, including a long private luncheon with Chernomyrdin not too long ago—2 weeks, 3 weeks ago, whenever he was here last.

Now, it would be my opponents, the opponents of enlargement in this country, who will cite a range of issues on which Russia and the United States have different policies and then point the wagging finger at NATO enlargement as the universal culprit. One size fits all. Secretary Albright used an apt metaphor when she labeled NATO enlargement as the opponents' "El Nino." They blame it for everything wrong in the United States-Russian relationship.

But even a superficial familiarity with the recent history of our relationship gives the lie to such illogic. Russian Communists and ultranationalists were against ratifying START II before NATO enlargement was even a gleam in the eyes of Lech Walesa and Havel, let alone U.S. policy. Why were Russian Communists and ultranationalists against it? I'll tell you why. Because American arms control negotiators did a heck of a job, and Russia knew it.

That does not mean that ratifying START II isn't in Russia's self-inter-

est. It is. But it will take some hard swallowing for them to take that step. It's all part of Russia coming to terms with the end of an empire. And this difficult psychological adjustment lies at the root of the Russian rhetoric against NATO enlargement. But I repeat, when you get down to brass tacks in discussions with Russian leaders, absolutely none of them think that their country's security will be threatened by Polish, Czech, or Hungarian troops being part of NATO—none.

Why should they worry? Do my colleagues really believe NATO is anything but a defensive alliance? Surely they don't want to validate crude Russian cold war stereotypes of NATO as a rapacious aggressor just waiting to invade Mother Russia. We all know that NATO never had a plan to invade Russia. Do you know what? The Russians know it, too. How do I know that? They know it because thanks to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which was signed in Paris last May, Russians have a permanent physical presence at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at SHAPE headquarters in Mons, Belgium. They take part in all discussions with NATO members, and they see for themselves that NATO has no hostile intentions.

If they don't believe my analysis, let me quote from an article by the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation in the spring of 1999 edition of the NATO Review. The very fact that the Russian Defense Minister is now contributing, I might add, to the NATO Review, I believe says something in itself, as does the title of his article: "We Are Not Adversaries, We Are Partners."

Although the Russian Defense Minister repeats the obligatory negative attitude toward NATO expansion, the vast majority of his article stresses the positive. In particular, he declares:

Today it is an established fact that Russia and NATO no longer regard each other as adversaries. * * * Moreover, a partnership in maintaining peace and security on the continent has begun to take shape in our relations. The NATO-Russia Founding Act is an example of this.

It doesn't sound to me like a guy who thinks that expansion jeopardizes the security interest of his country. So let's give the Russians a little credit for being intelligent, thinking people who are not captives of outdated, ideological propaganda. From the Gallup Poll I read you, clearly the Russian people are not. And, obviously, the Russian military is not either.

If some of my colleagues still don't believe me, I direct their attention to the balance sheet of recent Russian international behavior. On the negative side, from America's point of view, is their unwillingness to follow our lead on inspections of suspected Iraqi military sites, weapons sites.

Does anyone really think this had anything whatsoever to do with NATO enlargement? Russia has two centuries worth of involvement in the Middle

East, has had Iraq as a major client for decades, has a foreign minister who specializes in that area and has had a lengthy personal friendship with Saddam Hussein. It is nothing to do with NATO.

I may be wrong, but I doubt that when Mr. Primakov and Saddam Hussein get together, they talk about the evils of the enlargement of NATO.

And, I might add parenthetically, if the reason why the Russians didn't go along with our plan—someone explain to me, my ancestors, the French, how did they arrive at that? Was their decision to side with Russia relative to inspectors because of NATO enlargement? I think it was. I think it was. It is bizarre—I am only joking. I don't think it was.

So, you can't have it both ways. It is often cited: You know, they were with us in the gulf war. France was with us in the gulf war. It was a different circumstance. A country had been invaded. They are not with us now, nor is France with us this time.

How about Iran, another irritant in our relationship with Russia? Russia's involvement with Persia is even older than that with the Arab world. We certainly must and do oppose Russian investment in Iran and arms shipments and technology transfers to that country. But, again, their policies are grounded on historic geopolitics on their southern flank, economic distress, and lax controls—not on NATO expansion.

Or let me frame the issue another way. I ask the critics of NATO enlargement, if NATO rejects enlargement, rebuffs Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, who have met NATO's rigid membership qualifications, is anyone going to be prepared to come to the floor here—the staffs of the opponents are listening here—is anyone going to come to the floor and say, if we reject NATO expansion, and we do it on the floor in the next week or so, that out of heartfelt gratitude you are going to see Russia break off relations with Iran, break off relations with Iraq—which is what we wish them to do—and immediately ratify the START agreement? What do you think?

If Senator ROTH and I lose on this one, I'm willing to bet you a year's salary, and that is all I have is my salary. It's plenty, but that's all I have. I am willing to bet you a year's salary—that's a joke. I'm not allowed to bet on the floor. I don't really mean it. I'll get letters saying BIDEN is gambling with his salary. But I will bet you anything that I'm allowed to bet that circumstances, in terms of the ties with Iran and Iraq, will increase, not diminish; that there will be less prospect for future arms control because the nationalists will have prevailed and they will triumph, and they will trumpet their triumph. So, look, if NATO expansion is the reason these bad things are happening to the extent they are happening, then obviously, if it's defeated, a lot of good things are going to happen. Don't hold your breath.

Let's turn to the other side of the ledger and go back for a minute to arms control. What is Russia's recent record? I keep hearing from my friend from Virginia: You know it's going to be the end of arms control. Everything is going to come to a screeching halt because this occurred, because we voted to expand—so on and so forth. Let's look at the record. Much as opponents of NATO enlargement would like to forget, the facts are that within the past year the state Duma and Federation Council have ratified two critically important international treaties. One is the Flank Document to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. As the Presiding Officer and all my colleagues know, that is the treaty that talks about how much materiel, armored personnel carriers, et cetera, weapons, heavy weapons that each side could have and where they could have them.

We just modified that agreement. They ratified it—an arms control agreement.

With regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention, I was told once we passed it here, that would be the end of it in the Duma. If I am not mistaken, it was almost the very day we were in either Paris or Spain where the President and the 15 other NATO heads of state were inviting—inviting—these three additional countries to join that by an overwhelming vote, their version of our Senate and House, the Duma, went ahead and overwhelmingly ratified a very controversial arms control agreement requiring them to destroy thousands of tons of chemical weapons.

Even now, the Yeltsin government has pledged to push for ratification of START II. Russia is well ahead of schedule in its destruction obligations under START I, and the Russians continue to work with us in implementing the vitally important Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. That doesn't sound like a country that is so blinded by hatred for NATO enlargement that it is opting out of international arms control agreements.

How about cooperation in conventional weapons? I might add, Chernomyrdin, when he met with us here, predicted by the end of summer, he was confident that they would ratify the START II treaty. But how about conventional weapons? Russia and the United States and 28 other countries signed the CFE Treaty and, as a consequence, destroyed more than 53,000 pieces of heavy equipment in this decade. And the process continues.

Does that sound like a country that is opting out, figuring there is a threat and they are going to stop and start to rebuild? Not only not rebuild it, they are continuing to meet their obligations under the CFE Treaty and destroying military equipment.

Let me say that again. More than 53,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces and helicopters, and guess what, NATO enlargement hasn't stopped this remarkable process

on multilateral disarmament, and it won't stop it after Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic finally join the alliance.

Finally, NATO enlargement has not prevented Russian forces from serving side by side with U.S. forces under NATO command in Bosnia. In my last of several trips to Bosnia, I was standing at what we call Camp McGovern. I was standing out in the field talking to an American one-star general. A Russian colonel who looked every bit like the guy who fought Sylvester Stallone in Rocky IV, whatever that was, ramrod straight, 6 foot 3, wearing a Russian uniform, comes up, seeks to interrupt, salutes the American general and asks what his orders are.

I don't know. For all this lack of cooperation we are talking about, how much the Russians hate expansion, how much they view it as a threat, how it is going to bring to a crashing end any cooperation on military matters, on arms control, conventional and strategic, I don't see it. I see no evidence to suggest that.

For someone like me of the cold war generation, this was mind-boggling to watch this Russian colonel salute an American general. In spite of the policy differences between Moscow and Washington with regard to Bosnian Serbs, cooperation on the ground is exemplary. I heard the same thing from the Russian Ambassador who is deputy to the American civilian administrator in Brcko when I was in Bosnia. I scarcely need to say that neither the Russian colonel nor the Russian Ambassador had even one word to say about NATO enlargement. It was a nonissue to them. In fairness, there was no way I brought it up. It wasn't like they raised it and I responded. Nobody said anything to me.

The salient point which the naysayers would like to obscure is that NATO enlargement is simply a matter of catching up with reality. It would be nothing less than grotesque, in my view, for the U.S. Senate, out of a totally misplaced fear of offending Russian sensibilities, to consign the thoroughly Western Poles, Czechs and Hungarians either to Moscow's sphere of influence or to a "gray zone" in Central Europe.

Imposed spheres of influence have no place in Europe in the 21st century. Every country must have the right to choose its own political system, its own economic system, its own cultural direction and its own security arrangements, including whether or not to join the alliance. If we would reject the Poles, the Czechs and Hungarians for fear of antagonizing the Russians, the only people we would be helping would be the Russian ultranationalists and Communists by validating their outdated, vicious portrait of the United States, a view not shared by the democrats.

The worst you hear, by the way, in Russia from Russian democrats, the worst you hear is not that "we think

expansion is a threat, we think expansion will be a problem to us." We know it is not. The worst you hear is "this expansion will or might give fodder to the ultranationalists and the Communists in our battle to establish democracy." That is the worst you hear—the worst you hear.

The only people, in my view, we would be helping if we rejected expansion would be the ultranationalists and Communists by, again, validating their outdated and vicious portrait of the West and their outdated and dangerous notion of what they are entitled to do in terms of influencing their neighbors.

That rather obvious conclusion brings up a more basic point, which is regularly glossed over by the opponents of NATO enlargement. The choice is not between enlarging or maintaining the status quo; the harsh reality is that the status quo is not an option.

It is myopic, in my view, to believe that three booming, vigorous Central European countries, all of whom have bitter historical memories of Russian domination, if rebuffed by NATO would sit idly by and trust good fortune to protect them.

It should be obvious that they will not. They didn't do it in the interwar period earlier in this century, and they wouldn't do it now. The renationalization of security policy would take place, undoing all the stability that has been painstakingly created since the fall of communism. It would allow the poisonous forces of ethnic and religious hatred and international crime to regain a foothold in that volatile region.

Nearly 60 million highly educated, talented Central Europeans are ready and willing to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. All three candidate countries have carried out rigorous reforms to conform to NATO's political and military standards. All three have already contributed to NATO-led missions in the gulf war and in Bosnia. They will be an invaluable asset in controlling the forces of chaos and destruction that are now the real threats in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, this is the basic rationale for NATO enlargement—to extend the zone of peace and stability in Europe. It is a zone within which democracies do not fight with each other and which other countries, Russia included, need not fear.

Obviously, there are certain risks associated with NATO enlargement, as there are with any policy initiative. But the risk of not enlarging NATO, of not catching up with history, in my view, are far greater.

One other word about history. In the frantic flurry of last-minute attempts to derail ratification of NATO enlargement, I have even heard the accusation that we would be undermining the young Russian democracy, of helping to create a so-called "Weimar Russia." Well, that charge wins the prize for historic illiteracy.

After World War I, the victorious allies imposed punitive reparations upon Weimar Germany and kept it out of the League of Nations until 1926.

After the cold war, on the contrary, the victorious West has done exactly the opposite with Russia. The United States and Western Europe have pumped more than \$100 billion in aid and investment into Russia and have brought Russia into the international bodies where it was formerly not represented. They have even brought Russia into a working relationship with the inner councils of NATO itself.

So please, in this round of Senate debate, let us spare ourselves hearing about "Weimar Russias" and "Iron Rings" and other ridiculous historic constructions. We are building a partnership with Russia which can continue to grow. Later in this session, Senators will have the opportunity to strengthen this process by voting resoundingly for the administration's enhanced funding request for assistance to Russia and the Nunn-Lugar program. I want to see all those who are opposed to expansion of NATO on the grounds of, it is going to offend Russia, to step up to the ball and do what they say they really are concerned about. Let us see them vote for enhanced funding for assistance to Russia and the Nunn-Lugar program.

Another canard of the opponents of enlargement is that we will saddle the American taxpayer with mountainous new costs. Although I would invite my colleagues who wish to debate this to set a time tomorrow to do that, and do it in a coherent way, let me very briefly speak to that.

Fortunately, we now have indisputable facts to refute this element of the basic scare tactic which is being engaged in: Is it going to cost \$250 billion? \$125 billion? and so on. NATO officials estimate that the total common cost of enlargement is \$1.5 billion over 10 years. Of this, the share of the United States will be approximately \$400 million, or an average of about \$40 million per year over 10 years. And that is based upon our accepting the same proportion of responsibility for enlargement as we have for NATO thus far—burdensharing as we have been engaged in it for the past 20 years.

As I said, later in the floor debate I hope to have an opportunity to explain this official cost estimate in some vivid detail. For now, however, I refer the doubters to the analysis of two U.S. Government agencies, the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office.

The GAO concluded last month that NATO's approach to determining the \$1.5 billion estimate over 10 years is reasonable. The CBO, which traditionally uses worst-case analysis as a hedge against any surprises in the future, set the common cost at \$2.5 billion over the next 10 years.

The worst estimate is one-tenth of what the worst estimate suggested by our colleagues is. Even the CBO figure,

however, would yield an annual American contribution that amounts to only .15 percent of our total defense budget—.15 percent—almost only one-tenth of 1 percent.

One final word is in order. No resolution, or even final legislation, is perfect. And there may be a few areas in the resolution of ratification that could be improved upon. Senator HELMS and I plan to offer an en bloc managers' amendment that includes several of the amendments proposed to date.

I anticipate that in these coming days several other amendments to the resolution of ratification will be offered and we will have ample time to discuss them. So I will not go into detail now. But, Mr. President, I see my senior colleague from Delaware is on the floor, so let me wrap up what I am about to say and what I have been saying in order to give him a chance to speak.

Mr. President, it is important to note that the resolution of ratification is thoroughly a bipartisan product, as you will soon hear from my colleague from Delaware, a product in the committee crafted by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator HELMS and myself, with significant input from other members of the committee and our respective staffs. It was voted out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 16-2 after hundreds and hundreds of pages of recorded testimony for and against expansion.

I urge my colleagues to reread the resolution before offering amendments, for upon careful scrutiny, some of them prove to be superfluous, others harmful, and some both.

An example of this is the amendment introduced by my friend and distinguished senior Senator from Virginia which would mandate a 3-year pause for additional countries before they could be invited to join the alliance, if they were to be invited. This would tie our hands diplomatically, Mr. President, if, for example, a clearly qualified country like Austria should apply for membership, and will put an arbitrary hold on Slovenia's case for membership which I believe is already convincing.

Other amendments offered by my friend, the distinguished senior Senator from New York, for whom I have no higher regard, would require new NATO members to first join the European Union. This, in my view, equates apples and oranges, forgetting that the criteria to qualify for those two organizations are dramatically different.

Moreover, his amendment would turn the institutional history of the last 50 years on its head. Traditionally, NATO membership has preceded EU membership. And I would further add that he chooses, as we are trying to come up with a new architect for the security of Europe, a requirement to go forward first by a group of which we are not a member and in which we have no say.

We are not a member of the EU. To suggest that, before we could consider

membership in NATO, it has to be decided by the EU whether or not they can join essentially takes us out of the game. And every time we have been taken out of the game in Europe—I might note parenthetically, this is not a direct analogy—but every time we have been taken out of the game or taken ourselves out, there has been real trouble in Europe. We are still a European power. We must remain a European power. We must continue to have a major say in the structures of Europe, because we have found, when we do not, nothing good usually happens.

Still other amendments proposed by the junior Senator from Texas and the junior Senator from Missouri would use the enlargement ratification process as a vehicle to alter the very fundamentals of the NATO treaty that exists today, either by changing the rules of the North Atlantic Council or by putting severe restrictions on non-article V missions—an issue that is being debated right now within NATO.

I want to put my colleagues on notice that I will oppose any amendments that will undermine the most successful military alliance in history.

Mr. President, nearly 50 years ago, NATO was founded to counter a Soviet threat in Western Europe and to establish stability in the rest of Europe. Today, the new threat is instability itself arising out of ethnic and religious conflicts. And this is, at a minimum, a hedge against any future wrongheaded decisions by Russia. Enlarging NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is a unique opportunity to expand the zone of stability in the continent. It serves America's interest, Europe's interest, and the world's interest. I am absolutely confident, if we do this, history will record, as well, it serves Russian interests.

I thank the Chair, and I now am happy to yield the floor to my colleague from Delaware, Senator ROTH.

Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. COATS). The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. ROTH. First, let me express my gratitude and thanks to my colleague, the junior Senator from Delaware, for his effective leadership in this most important foreign affairs matter. He, of course, speaks as an expert, as one who is the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee and, of course, coauthors with me the Senate observer group. I just want to publicly acknowledge the strong leadership role he is playing in what I consider the most important foreign policy matter that will come before this Congress.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent David Stephens of Senator KYL's staff be permitted on the floor for the duration of the debate on NATO enlargement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, as the Senate resumes consideration of the resolution of ratification for NATO enlargement, I would like to commend my colleagues for the debate that has occurred thus far.

In the few days that the Senate has already dedicated to this important issue, and I speak before the debate today, some 21 Members of this Chamber have expressed their views. I have listened intently to their arguments and I have been impressed by the substantive dialog. This vote on NATO and its future is perhaps the most important foreign policy decision we will make since the end of the cold war. I appreciate the efforts my colleagues have dedicated to this matter.

I have long felt that NATO enlargement is a policy whose time is past due. The case for NATO enlargement is indisputable. The accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the only three countries that are the focus of the resolution before us, will, without a doubt, strengthen the alliance. It will eliminate the stabilizing and immoral dividing lines imposed upon Europe by dictators of the past. It will consolidate peace and stability on that continent. A stable and peaceful Europe will benefit the entire transatlantic community, as well as Russia.

I could elaborate on these points and other important benefits of NATO enlargement, but I have done that on many occasions in the past. Today, instead, I wish to address a number of arguments that I have heard made directly against this important policy. For example, in the course of our debate it has been incorrectly asserted that the Senate is rushing this important debate and that it remains inadequately prepared to address this issue.

This is wrong. Few issues of national security have been as extensively examined by the Congress as well as the public. NATO enlargement has been the topic of countless editorials and opinion pieces in national and local papers. By one estimate, over 1,000 scholarly article opinion pieces and editorials on NATO enlargement have been published in leading journals since 1994. A quick count of editorials and opinion pieces in the New York Times found that it has run some 72 such articles over the past 3 years. A quick survey of the Washington Post found another 90 over the same period of time. In other words, these two nationally syndicated papers have published articles on NATO enlargement at a rate exceeding one every 10 days. This does not take into account the other important national, local journals.

I might suggest that those who believe this issue has not been well vetted may not be reading the right papers. Either that or they have not been interested enough in the issue to be aware that a debate concerning this policy has been waged for 3 years. Over the last 2 years, some 15 States—including my first State, Delaware—have

passed resolutions endorsing nuclear enlargement. Moreover, this policy has been endorsed by countless civic public policy, political, business, and veteran organizations.

I point to a chart beside me, the number of organizations that have supported NATO enlargement. All of our outstanding veteran organizations, the AMVETS, the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars—just to mention a few—have all endorsed NATO enlargement. We could point to the many other organizations that have done exactly the same.

Congress itself has been deeply engaged in NATO enlargement from the very beginning of this policy initiative. In fact, Congress has not only done its homework on this matter, Congress Has led the charge for NATO enlargement. I think that is particularly important to understand, that Congress has been in the lead on NATO enlargement.

Its committees have examined in detail the military, intelligence, foreign policy and budgetary implications of this long overdue initiative.

Since last July alone, thirteen hearings have been conducted on NATO enlargement by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations, and Budget.

The Senate NATO Observer Group, which I chair with Senator JOE BIDEN, has convened seventeen times with, among others, the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, NATO's Secretary General, and the leaders of the three invitee countries.

In support of these Congressional initiatives, the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office have produced some 30 objective, non-partisan reports and countless memos on the subject of NATO enlargement.

As I said when we began this debate, it is no surprise—indeed, for me, it is a matter of pride—that Congress has legislatively promoted NATO enlargement every year since 1994. Perhaps a good question is how can we ensure that all dimensions of U.S. national security policy benefit from this much public attention and endorsement.

The second argument that one often hears falsely asserts that the extension of NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will dilute the Alliance because their military capabilities do not match those of Allied nations.

It is true that the militaries of these three countries must be modernized. They do not deny that. That is why these three countries have embarked on military modernization programs that involve regular increases in their defense budgets. And, these programs have been endorsed by NATO's political and military authorities.

Earlier this year, I and a few members of the NATO Observer Group met with General Klaus Naumann, a highly respected German military officer who is Chairman of NATO's military com-

mittee. He stated that because Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are so committed to modernizing their militaries they may sooner rather than later find themselves better equipped and more technologically advanced than some of the current Allies.

To see the level of contribution that these countries will make to the Alliance, we need only look at what they have done and are doing today. Already, they are enhancing the Alliance's military capabilities. They contributed forces to Operation Desert Storm. They have forces serving by the side of U.S. Forces as part of S-FOR in Bosnia. They were among the first to commit forces to stand by the United States in the recent stand-off against Saddam Hussein.

NATO commanders, including those from the United States, have stated clearly that the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will increase the capabilities of the Alliance. And this view is shared by some sixty retired four-star admirals and generals, including former Chiefs of the Joint Staff, former Supreme Allied Commanders of Europe, and numerous former Service Chiefs.

Mr. President, the facts before us today, and the endorsements of these military leaders, can only leave one fully confident that the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO will leave the Alliance stronger. We can be confident that these three democracies will not only be model members of the alliance but also pro-American Allies.

A third argument that has been voiced by some of my colleagues falsely asserts that NATO enlargement threatens Russia, or that we should abandon this policy because Russia perceives it as threatening.

The reality is that NATO is a defensive Alliance of democracies. Its decision-making process is consensual, and I find it hard to believe that any one of its members—all democracies—would ever advocate aggression.

The fact is that NATO poses no immediate military threat to Russia. U.S. force deployments in Europe, arguably the Alliance's most mobile component, has been reduced by two-thirds since the Cold War. Allied force structures and defense budgets have declined steadily over the last decade. The Alliance has stated that it has no intention to permanently station foreign forces or deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of new member states. Where is the threat to Russia?

Those who argue that NATO enlargement threatens Russia have also asserted that this policy directly contradicts efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation with Russia and to ensure that Russia's nuclear arsenal does not leak out to rogue states.

The evidence however shows that this assertion is false. Since 1994, when NATO first announced its intentions to open its membership to the democracies of Central Europe, the risks of

nuclear war have not increased, but been reduced. There is no evidence that NATO enlargement has hurt cooperation with Russia on nuclear matters.

First, the actual number of Russian and American operational strategic nuclear weapons have continued to decline. In 1990, that number was about 24,000 warheads. Today, that number is in the vicinity of 14,000 warheads, and Moscow is dismantling its strategic nuclear forces at a rate faster than that required by the START I treaty.

Second, the Russian government has again reiterated its commitment to ratify the START II treaty, which will further reduce these two strategic nuclear arsenals. Those who note that the Russian parliament, which has voiced its opposition to NATO enlargement and continues to block the ratification of START II, should recognize that the same Duma has blocked START II long before NATO enlargement was formally endorsed by the NAC.

And, let me add that the Russian government has agreed to pursue a START III accord once START II enters force.

Third, the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Program continues to improve the Russian's control and security of their nuclear arsenal. Indeed, this program has been enthusiastically received by Russia. It stands out as one of the true success stories of Russian-American partnership in the post-cold-war era.

Our policies toward Europe must focus on these objective strategic realities and must be structured to enhance economic, political, and military stability in all parts of Europe. That is exactly what NATO enlargement does. That is in our national interest and in Russia's national interest.

For those who are still concerned about Russia's fear of NATO enlargement, let me share with you a recent poll conducted in Moscow.

Earlier this year, a branch of the Gallup Organization, found that among respondents in Moscow: 53 percent said that Poland should be allowed to join NATO; 57 percent said that the Czech Republic should be allowed to join NATO; and 54 percent said that Hungary should be allowed to join NATO.

These polling results are not surprising if one takes into account the fact that NATO enlargement is facilitating unprecedented reconciliation between Russia and its neighbors. The reconciliation now occurring between Warsaw and Moscow and Moscow and Kyev are positive developments for Russian citizens, and they understand this. They also understand that such developments would not be occurring with NATO enlargement.

And, let us not forget the open and inclusive manner in which Nato and the West has approached Russia. The Alliance has extended the hand of partnership through the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and today Russian troops serve with NATO forces in Bosnia. The West has extended some \$100

billion in assistance since 1991, to help Russia's democratic and economic reforms, and over \$2 billion in weapon dismantlement and security assistance. On top of that, Russia has regularly been invited to participate in the G-7 or G-8 meetings. This is hardly—as some detractors might try to persuade—a policy of punishment and isolation.

It is false and even misleading to assert that Russia is being surrounded by a ring of isolation. Rather, NATO's policies have been more like a strong magnet drawing Russia out of its historically self-imposed isolation into a growing web of political and military cooperation. Such cooperation holds out the prospect of an entirely new and constructive relationship with a reforming and democratic Russia.

Mr. President, I hope that these three points have added clarity to the Senate's consideration of NATO membership. There are few policy initiatives as important as this one. There are few that stand to offer peace-loving people throughout the transatlantic community and in Central and Eastern Europe so much hope—hope for greater stability, increased security, enhanced cooperation, and even a collective vision for the future. I encourage my colleagues to support NATO enlargement. History is being made, and for the sake of those who have long-awaited this moment, we must not keep it waiting.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the NATO issue. I understand that we have 10 minutes before a vote. Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I would like to address the legislation before the Senate, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as members of the NATO alliance.

Mr. President, let me begin by sharing a statement made to me last fall by Hungarian Ambassador Banlaki during his visit to my office. He said, "The people of my country would like to be able to choose our own allies. We would like to enjoy all those things that history has denied us."

Mr. President, I am here today to say, this is the U.S. Senate's chance to make Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic's hopes come true—let them choose their own allies for they are choosing to join NATO where they have been denied in the past the right to choose their own allies. We all know that. We all understand that.

Let me be clear—I am fully supportive of this treaty before the Senate allowing these three countries membership into NATO. NATO is an alliance that has been a success beyond anyone's expectations—it has never been permeated—and since its inception, no great wars have been fought within its borders.

NATO embodies our continued commitment to Europe. Its existence ties U.S. security to peaceful relations among our European allies. The historic, political and cultural connection between the U.S. and Europe provide the foundation for this transatlantic alliance.

The objective of the myriad institutions and organizations created in the aftermath of World War II were a reaction to the carnage of two great wars in the first half of this century. The NATO alliance, the Organization for Cooperation and Development, and the European Union were all created with one purpose in mind—preventing further conflict between the states of Europe. This goal of peace was achieved. The only tragic failure in the history of these alliances was their inability to encompass nations beyond the Iron Curtain.

Today we have the opportunity to realize what was impossible only a few years ago—expanding a cooperative alliance to the nations previously locked in a coercive pact.

I have listened to many of the arguments for amending this treaty and for delaying this treaty. I have also heard the criticism aimed at the U.S. Senate for not debating it further.

So let me make this point—NATO was a defensive alliance. But it was never an exclusive alliance. We in the free world waited for the day when the rest of Europe would be free—free from tyranny, free from communism, and free from the everyday controls placed on the people of Eastern and Central Europe.

Mr. President, that day is here. These countries are free. They have been free for 7 years. They have struggled to establish democratic, free market societies. To a greater or lesser degree, all three of them are being successful. They desire a place at the table among the democratic, free states of the West. And in my opinion, we should have allowed them to join NATO sooner than 1999, as this treaty before us states.

This Senate would be foolhardy to turn its back now on these countries or even to continue to delay the treaty's implementation.

In January, I visited the NATO headquarters in Brussels and met with NATO officials as well as the ambassadors from the new member countries. I was impressed by their perspective that this was not NATO expanding out to engulf these countries, but rather this was Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic asking to come into NATO.

It is crucial to remember that NATO is not expanding against any sovereign

will, but exactly the opposite. This treaty allows the West to let these countries fulfill their destinies—and if this Senate does not allow the treaty to pass and pass quickly—we are denying them the ultimate freedom—as the Hungarian Ambassador said—to choose their own allies.

I do not believe that Russia should fear the free association of allies, even those that might have been former enemies. There is nothing for Russia to fear. They should be reassured that the borders of Russia are peaceful today, that there is a united and growing Europe. They should be welcoming of NATO's ability to maintain peace and harmony among its members.

I would like to address those Senators who have expressed the need to link European Union membership with NATO membership. We must recognize that NATO enlargement, European Union expansion and monetary union are inextricably linked.

Last fall, I began considering the different arguments for and against this treaty. The Committee which I chair, the Senate Budget Committee, held a series of hearings on U.S.—European issues which gave me a different perspective to the many questions about the U.S. and Western European roles in Eastern Europe.

We cannot ignore that it was the presence of a U.S.-led NATO that provided the security for European Union that has facilitated its economic development. Without sovereign security, economic security cannot happen. These are exciting, new times in Europe. We have Europe in the next months uniting beyond its original common market alliances to become a monetary union.

While I know European Union membership is desired by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, EU membership is very different from NATO membership. And Monetary Union cannot even be considered until membership to the EU has been granted. Someday, I am convinced, they will become members of the European Union.

Some day, when they have developed their free markets which are emerging and their emerging new democracies, they will also be part of the new monetary union, the new single currency that many European countries will have in the not too distant future. They need the security and the structures of democracy to make capitalism work. To tie NATO membership with European Union membership at this time would not be wise. Defense security first will then lead to economic security.

On costs, over the last few months, I have had CBO, GAO and the administration explain their estimates of the costs of NATO expansion. CBO estimates that the costs to the U.S. will approximate \$100 million per year for the next four or five years.

From the perspective of the Budget Committee, this cost is very affordable when compared to the overall levels of

defense spending this year of \$272 billion that we approved for the 1999 budget resolution.

Let me conclude Mr. President, that while the debate on NATO has raised several issues, one issue keeps dominating my thoughts. Here is an alliance, that once was designed to respond to the threats of the Cold War. Those threats included the armies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Now this same alliance is being asked by those same three countries to be allowed to join today. How can we possibly say no?

I have no doubt that we are witnessing a major event in the histories of these former Warsaw Pact countries as well as the Free World.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article "For Expansion: The Case Clinton Isn't Making" from *The Wall Street Journal*, April 21, 1998, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FOR EXPANSION: THE CASE CLINTON ISN'T MAKING

(By Zalmay Khalilzad)

This week the Senate will start debating the question of whether to allow the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A vote on the issue is likely next week. Although the Clinton administration supports NATO expansion, it has not made its case forcefully enough. In its public defense of NATO expansion, the administration has emphasized bringing the three Central European states into the zone of democracy, peace and prosperity. This argument is a good start, but a much stronger case can be made. NATO expansion is vital not only for the well-being of these potential new members, but also for the security of the U.S. and its Western allies.

The first strategic argument for an expanded NATO is to hedge against uncertainties in Russia. The administration argues that NATO expansion is not directed against Russia. This is true, to a point. As long as Russia is not expansionist, it will have nothing to fear from an enlarged NATO. In fact, a democratic and nonimperial Russia should be NATO's partner. But Russia's future is not certain. Many in the Russian elite are unhappy with the current international system and the U.S.'s preeminence in it. They are nostalgic for their lost empire and would like to reimpose hegemony over the former Soviet territories and Eastern Europe.

Russia is too weak to dominate its former empire today. However, even with its current difficulties, Moscow is developing two new long-range nuclear missiles, is reluctant to ratify the Start II treaty, and insists on interpreting the Antiballistic Missile treaty in ways that put severe limits on effective defense against ballistic missiles to which both the U.S. and Russia are increasingly vulnerable. Moscow's statements and behavior towards the Baltic states, Ukraine, the Caspian Basin and Central Asia at times have neoimperial overtones.

Russian weakness, however, will not last forever. Rich in natural and human resources, it will eventually reemerge as a great power. A revitalized and democratic Russia would most likely seek greatness through economic prosperity and political stability. However, should a revitalized Russia prove hostile and expansionist, NATO membership for Eastern European states will

act as a powerful deterrent against future Russian aggression in this region. Unfortunately, Russia can go either way—and which way it goes will not be affected by NATO expansion.

Second, an expanded NATO keeps Germany as part of an American-led international system. Eastern Europe is Germany's backyard, and the European Union is unable to look after the security of Western Europe by itself, let alone protect Eastern Europe. Therefore, if NATO does not stabilize Germany's frontiers, Germany might do so alone. Germany is a key democratic ally of the U.S. and prefers to cooperate within NATO to stabilize Eastern and Central Europe. A renationalization of German security policy will end NATO as we know it and could lead to a less stable, less unified Europe. This would create an enormous problem for U.S. security interests, not only in Europe—both East and West—but around the world.

Third, an expanded NATO strengthens the U.S. position in Western Europe. The Eastern Europeans are more pro-American than most of our current allies. They attribute their freedom to the American-led containment of the Soviet Union, and they know that the U.S. led the alliance to expand NATO eastward. Within the alliance, they are likely to be strongly supportive of the dominant U.S. role. And should they also join the EU—as they are likely to—they will be a strong force for a continued U.S.-European alliance.

Fourth, an expanded NATO ties Europe and the U.S. closer together and opens the door for greater cooperation in other parts of the world, especially the Middle East, a region vital to both sides of the Atlantic.

NATO expansion eastward should be accompanied by an effort to develop a common U.S.-European strategy for ensuring energy security and for countering the spreading of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. And we need to consider steps to increase military cooperation between the U.S. and European nations for the longer term and agree to financial formulas for sharing the burden of Persian Gulf security as the Europeans develop their military capabilities. The Europeans have been freeloading at U.S. expense. Thousands of the U.S. troops protect the gulf from Iran and Iraq. Europe contributes little, though it is more dependent on the region's oil and more vulnerable to its missiles. In exchange, the U.S. should be willing to give Europeans a greater say in decisions about the Middle East, including policies towards Iran. As with NATO expansion such steps are unlikely to be taken without U.S. leadership.

Although the administration may want to avoid publicly voicing these strategic reasons for NATO expansion in order to avoid offending Russia and some of our European allies, it is important that we recognize that NATO expansion is necessary to protect vital U.S. interests, increase cooperation among European and North American democracies and sustain America's global leadership. Given the stakes involved, congressional support should be overwhelming.

Mr. DOMENICI. I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.